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ABSTRACT 
United States Army and Marine Corps ground tactical warfighters find themselves 
conducting operations across greater distances and with more autonomy from their higher 
commands than ever before.  As their areas of operations become larger in modern 
conflicts, and distributed operations become more the norm, deficits in the tactical 
warfighter’s ability to conduct beyond line of sight (BLOS) communications, 
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), blue force tracking and situational 
awareness (BFT/SA), and position, navigation, and timing (PNT) become more 
noticeable, vulnerable and dangerous.  The capabilities existing in the tactical space this 
warfighter operates within and from where he is supported cannot meet his needs now, 
nor will they likely meet his needs in the future. 
While upgrades and expansion of current satellite and unmanned aerial system 
(UAS) architectures will expand these BLOS capabilities, it is not likely they will 
increase sufficiently to reduce the deficit in support.  A new regime, the High Altitude 
Area of Interest (HAAI) also known as near space, provides potential capabilities 
specifically tailored to the tactical warfighter.   
This thesis reviews the BLOS requirements of the tactical warfighter, identifies 
the current and future deficits in each area, and identifies emerging areas of support.  It 
then provides recommendations on further development of integrated architectures 
spanning multiple regions, to provide efficient, persistent, and sufficient BLOS 
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You can fly over a land forever; you may bomb it, atomize it, 
pulverize it and wipe it clean of life but if you desire to defend it, 
protect it, and keep it for civilization you must do this on the ground, 
the way the Roman Legions did, by putting your young men into the 
mud.1 
That quote from Fehrenbach captures the purpose of the Army and Marine Corps 
ground tactical warfighter.  These men and women often conduct their operations in 
austere environments with support from systems that consider them “disadvantaged 
users.”  They are warfighters by the fact that they are actively prosecuting warfare for 
their country, in the region known as the close fight.  They are a tool of the government, 
an attempt to make change when political, economical, and diplomatic attempts have 
failed.   
The purpose of this thesis is to explore beyond line of sight (BLOS) alternatives 
to support these ground tactical warfighters.  The terrain that they operate within is 
complex and rugged.  The infrastructure to support them is sparse and immature.  The 
enemy they face is intelligent, quick, knowledgeable of the terrain and people, and often 
hidden among civilians.  To prosecute the fight he is in effectively, this tactical 
warfighter needs the ability to leverage technologies and systems that grant him an 
advantage in seeing and knowing the enemy first, so he can strike the enemy first.   
The basic tools of these warfighters have not changed tremendously in the last six 
decades.  Surely, they have all improved in technology, but the equipment of the modern 
ground tactical warfighter is essentially the same as that of his grandfather.  Especially in 
many of today’s conflicts, where the nature of the conflict mitigates the use of many of 
our more lethal systems such as artillery and air support, the tactical warfighter’s 
equipment is quite similar to that of his grandfather’s.    
While better weapons, armor, and similar equipment enhances the tactical 
warfighter’s ability to fight his enemies, the tools that will make him successful are 
perhaps those that allow him to offset his adversary’s advantages within the indigenous 
                                                 
1 T.R. Fehrenbach, This Kind of War: A study in Unpreparedness (New York: Macmillan, 1963).   
2 
population.  Enhanced technological effects, delivered seamlessly to the appropriate level 
of unit commander, can make the tactical warfighter far more effective than he is now.  
Specifically, the tactical warfighter requires enhanced capabilities in BLOS 
communications, tactically responsive intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance 
(ISR), blue force tracking and situational awareness (BFT/SA), and position, navigation 
and timing (PNT).  Improvement in these four areas provides tremendous advantages to 
the ground tactical warfighter, allowing him to operate more effectively while distributed 
over greater distances. 
The figure below shows an overview of the trade space that can provide this 
support to the tactical warfighter.  Space, the High Altitude Area of Interest (formerly 
near space), and the aerial (terrestrial) regions each provide specific advantages and 
disadvantages in each functional capability.  This thesis seeks to identify these strengths 
and weaknesses, show gaps in the tactical warfighter’s support, and then provide 
recommended architecture solutions.   
 
Figure 1.   Graphical Depiction of the Gaps Filled by Near-Space.2  
                                                 
2  Edward B. Tomme and Sigfred Dahl, “Balloons in Today’s Military – An Introduction to the Near-
Space Concept,” Air and Space Power Journal 19 (December 2005), 5. 
3 
A. TACTICAL TROOP NEEDS 
Currently, many of the BLOS capabilities provided to the tactical warfighter were 
afterthoughts.  Often, they were the result of capabilities provided by strategic systems 
that were discovered could provide some tactical capability.  Few of these existing 
systems were designed specifically to support the often-unique needs of the tactical 
warfighter.  While the tactical warfighter will not likely complain when given an 
enhanced capability, he often must make do with what he is given.  To stay ahead of his 
modern and future adversaries, the tactical warfighter needs systems designed for and 
dedicated to his unique fight.  The tactical warfighter needs to understand what he needs, 
understand how to transfer those needs into requirements, and then supervise the 
development of systems that will fill those requirements.   
Making an existing system better is not always the best way of meeting increasing 
requirements.  Sometimes a system has specific limitations that are inherent due to 
physical or operational reasons.  Trying to force a system to do something it is not suited 
for provides some capability but rarely in an efficient or cost-effective manner.  
Exploring new regions or technologies assumes some risk, yet the potential outcome is 
quite often worth that risk.  The United States has a long tradition of finding innovative 
solutions to problems that have allowed the fielding of incredibly complex and capable 
systems.  It is time that this innovation and development supports the “disadvantaged 
user” with BLOS capabilities, allowing that term to be placed into historical record.   
B. SPACE: THE FINAL FRONTIER? 
Space was the ultimate achievement; to leave the constraints of earth’s gravity 
and atmospheric effects behind was empowering.  After many decades of space 
exploration, operations, and experience, we find that the ultimate high ground has some 
very real constraints and limitations.   
Space can perhaps meet all the BLOS requirements for the tactical warfighter, but 
to do such would be cost prohibitive and extremely inefficient.  Space effects are critical  
4 
to our nation, in both military and civil sectors.  Our military would be unable to execute 
large numbers of essential missions without the effects provided by space, specifically at 
the strategic and operational level.   
In most cases, space is perhaps not well suited for the unique situation of the 
tactical warfighter.  The tactical warfighter operates on a different scale, his timeline is 
smaller, his distances are smaller, his unit size and capabilities are smaller, his support 
staff is smaller, his budget is smaller, and his decision cycle must be smaller.  Smaller 
does not make things easier, however, especially when it comes to making tactical 
decisions with lives at stake.  Due to availability, priority, and responsiveness, space is 
usually not the perfect match to tactical requirements.   
C. TACTICAL SPACE AND HAAI SYSTEMS 
What if we create a near space, what if we gave it to the space guys?  So 
that space guys were forced to be less platform centric and more results 
oriented.  We tell them to solve the problem of persistency.  What if we 
did that?  I bet it would work.3 
General Jumper’s key point here is that the tactical warfighter does not care where 
his support comes from.  The tactical warfighter cares that he has that support when he 
needs it.  High altitude systems promise to be uniquely suited to meet the needs of the 
tactical commander in a regional area.  At the tactical level, it is not often necessary to 
communicate with the other side of the world, but rather, over the next two ridgelines.  
As such, a regional capability may be better suited to tactical needs.  High altitude 
systems, as part of an overall architecture, may be the proper answer for meeting the 
needs of the tactical warfighter, and not a competing asset with space or other systems.   
                                                 
3 General John P. Jumper, USAF (2004, October 27), Speech given at the C4ISR Summit, Danbury, 
MA, 27 Oct 2004.  
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II. DEFINING TACTICAL SPACE 
A. REFINING THE CONCEPT OF “TACTICAL SPACE” 
There are many publications, both published and available on the Internet, which 
discuss the concepts of “Tactical Space.”  Many of these documents use vague terms or 
common rhetoric to support a specific point, or to appeal to a target audience, without 
clearly defining the terms or their meanings.  Initially, we will define many of these 
often-misused terms to establish a standard baseline for discussion.  We have chosen to 
divide “Tactical Space” into four communities of information:  Military, Military in Civil 
Publications, Government, and Civil.  As the focus of our thesis involves support to the 
“Tactical Warfighter,” our definitions will center on this group of warfighters.   
We will first establish what encompasses each of our four communities of 
information and then, in each community, provide applicable definitions (where 
available) to each term, we define.  While there are other sources for definitions, we have 
chosen these four communities and the associated definitions based on current work in 
the area of “Tactical Space.”  In many cases, there are competing definitions and we will 
compare those to define the term for this thesis.  
In the end, we will provide a common definition for the terms “Space,” “Near-
Space / High Altitude,” “Tactical,” “Tactical Warfighter,” and “Tactical Space” as they 
apply to the support of Army and Marine Corps forces operating at the tactical level of 
war. 
1. Military 
Inside the Department of Defense (DoD), there are doctrinal publications at both 
the individual service and joint levels.  We will extract from the most commonly 
accepted, the definitions and requirements to define these terms as a basis of discussion.  
We understand that there are cultural differences between the services and we hope to 
capture a common, understandable definition that transcends these differences.  All of 
these definitions are published or accepted definitions, used to demonstrate to the reader 
the common ground, as well as the differences among various segments of the DoD.  Our 
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focus, again, is on the Brigade (USA) / Regiment (USMC) and below units operating at 
the tactical level.  The sources used include various published joint and service doctrinal 
publications and manuals, joint memorandums, and initial capability documents (ICD).   
2. Military in Civil Publications 
These publications will cover articles produced or written by members of the 
United States military for presentation in civilian publications.  Also included will be any 
presentations given during non-military or non-governmental conferences.  While these 
definitions do not constitute policy or doctrine, they represent individual thought by those 
who are closer to the problem or have a genuine interest in the topic presented. 
3. Government 
Government documents referenced will encompass any publication contracted by 
the government (military/government, i.e. DARPA) to evaluate a need or capability.  
These will include reports from organizations such as the Rand Corporation and National 
Defense Industrial Association and Universities, as well as NASA and other government 
(non-DoD) agencies with interests in this area. 
4. Civil 
Civil documentation will be from any unsubsidized and/or independent entity that 
conducted its own research in support of a need or capability.  These will include any 
corporation, private company, and personal entities that may have conducted some need 
or capability research independently. 
B. DEFINITIONS 
As discussed earlier, we will now highlight the most accepted or used definitions 
as presented by the popular players in military space.  Although your perspective on the 
battlefield will affect your definition and its application to you, we will attempt to take 
the intent of all these perspectives and definitions and form a definition favorable to the 
discussion of the application of effects provided to the ground tactical user.  This will 
provide a common language and foundation to frame discussion.  Nowhere in our 
research have we come across much of an attempt to establish definitions for these often 
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haphazardly used terms.  Most writers assume that the readers accept and/or understand 
their point of view or definition, even if exhaustive searches for an actual definition prove 
futile.  Whether intentional or not, this lack of definition creates confusion and misleads 
the readers as to the capabilities or intended use of a system.  We hope to avoid any 
confusion and make our claims by replacing the use of often clichéd words with 
specifically defined terms.  The most ambiguous terms we will cover are, “Tactical 
Warfighter,” “Tactical Space” and “Near Space / High Altitude.”  For completeness, we 
include and start with the terms “Space” and “Tactical,” as they are slightly better 
understood and are required in developing any definitions derived from them. 
1. Space 
a. Military  
The joint definition of space, according to Joint Pub 3-14, “Joint Doctrine 
for Space Operations, is, “A medium like the land, sea, and air within which military 
activities shall be conducted to achieve US national security.”4  This definition, while 
useful perhaps at the joint level in showing that space is like as any other medium, does 
not help much in our discussion.  Fortunately, most individual services share a common 
understanding of its definition.  A representative and concise definition, as used by the 
US Army is: 
The part of the universe that extends from the upper limits of the earth's 
atmosphere outward.  While a precise limit cannot be ascertained, in 
general it begins at about the altitude above the earth that corresponds to 
the lowest stable satellite orbits and above which aerodynamic forces can 
no longer support the control of conventional aircraft.  This is usually an 
altitude in excess of 100 kilometers.5  
As part of the DoD, military personnel avoid setting hard altitude limits on 
the lower limits of space.  While the US Government maintains a desire to keep the 
boundary of space a loosely defined region, the military will follow suit.  It is hard to 
predict today, what orbital capabilities will exist in the future.  Setting arbitrary numbers 
                                                 
4 U.S. Department of Defense, Joint Publication 3-14: Joint Doctrine for Space Operations, 
(Washington: Government Printing Office, 2002), GL5. 
5 U.S. Department of Defense, Department of the Army, Training and Doctrine Command Pamphlet 
525-3-14:  The United States Army Concept for Space Operations in Support of the Objective Force, 
(Washington: Government Printing Office, 2003), 38. 
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based on current technology and capabilities would surely pose complications in the 
future where orbits might be maintainable at lower altitudes than currently envisioned. 
b.  Military in Civil Publications 
Military personnel writing in civil publications follow either the military 
or government definition of space, with few drastic differences.  Those differences were 
not sufficient to warrant any influence on our process. 
c. Government 
There are no specific definitions or limits accepted by the United States 
Government on the term “space.”  Government definitions often define “space” based on 
the capabilities or characteristics of an object rather than where it operates.  This absence 
of limits does not restrict our operations in support of the U. S. National Space Policy.  
The United States rejects any claims to sovereignty by any nation over 
outer space or celestial bodies, or any portion thereof, and rejects any 
limitations on the fundamental right of the United States to operate in and 
acquire data from space.…The United States considers space systems to 
have the rights of passage through and operations in space without 
interference.6 
d. Civil  
The debate as to where and how to define space and its demarcation with 
our own protected airspace continues, much like the following quote expresses:   
There are major differences in the legal realms of outer space and air 
space and yet no agreed and defined legal boundary exists between the 
two.  States are affected by the different legal regimes of air and space law 
in many ways, most especially in relation to state sovereignty and national 
jurisdiction7 
Most other articles fall on one side or the other of this stance.  Nations and 
entities seem to either oppose or support clearly defining space.  There appears to be little 
middle  
                                                 
6 U. S. Office of Science and Technology Policy, Executive Office of the President, U.S National 
Space Policy, (Washington: Government Printing Office, 2006), 1. 
7 Alexandra Harris and Ray Harris, “The Need for Air Space and Outer Space Demarcation” (London: 
University College, 2006), Available from http://www.sciencedirect.com/science; Internet; accessed 18 
January 2006. 
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ground or compromise on the subject.  As of now there is no accepted definition in the 
civil community for space except as defined by the characteristics of the object operating 
in either airspace or outer space. 
e. Space Defined 
For the purpose of our topic, support to tactical operations, and to focus on 
the real intent at hand, we will define space as the altitude of perigee or orbit in which a 
spacecraft (designed for operations in that environment), can maintain an orbit for an 
extended duration (months for comparative analysis to tactical operations). 
2. Near Space / High Altitude 
a. Military 
Though there are many definitions of “Near Space” in military 
documentation, there is a consensus that it occupies a general area of the atmosphere.  
The Navy and Air Force define “Near Space” as between 65,000 and 325,000 feet.  
Operational characteristics of current aircraft systems define the lower boundary of this 
region.  Two such definitions are, “Near Space systems will operate in the harsh natural 
environment between 65,000 and 325,000 ft.”8, and “The domain above typical aircraft 
operational altitude and below the orbital realm (65,000 and 325,000 ft domain) provides 
the advantages of wide area and persistent sensor coverage to bridge the gap between 
UAVs and satellites.” 9   
The Army position is that “the high altitude region of the stratosphere and 
mesosphere is defined as that region between the tropopause and the region of orbital 
space, 18 to 100km above MSL.”10  Converted to common measurements, that is around 
59,000 feet to 328,000 feet.  This difference is not significant considering the scope of the 
difference, and generally shows the different perspectives between the Air Force and 
                                                 
8 U.S. Department of the Air Force, HQ Air Force Space Command, “Initial Capabilities Document 
For Operationally Responsive Space - Near Space Draft v. 7,” (March 2006), 13. 
9  Ibid., 5. 
10  U.S. Department of the Army, Training and Doctrine Command, TRADOC Pamphlet 525-7-4 
Concept Capability Plan for Space Operations 2015-2024, (Washington: Government Printing Office, 
2006), 12. 
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Navy, who look at air distances in altitude by thousands of feet, and the Army who 
measures distances primarily on land, with measurements rounded to nearest kilometers. 
 
Figure 2.   Regions of the Earth’s Atmosphere and Orbital Space (not to scale).11 
 
At the onset of a military discussion, concerning the utility of this region 
for military use, it seemed necessary to define the space.  By doing so, it would allow a 
service to claim the region as part of their area of responsibility.  Due to legal 
ramifications and service conflicts, it has been necessary to eliminate the label and focus 
on the effects and platforms to operate in this area.   
While it is currently popular to use the term “Near Space” in scientific, 
academic, and industry circles, the Department of Defense is officially moving away 
from the term, as is clearly outlined by the Chief of Staff of the Air Force:   
There are only two categories of space: air space and outer space.  The 
term "near space" has no meaning in domestic and international law, and 
any activities conducted at near space altitudes must be analyzed using the  
                                                 
11  U.S. Department of the Army, Training and Doctrine Command, TRADOC Pamphlet 525-7-4 
Concept Capability Plan for Space Operations 2015-2024, (Washington: Government Printing Office, 
2006), 11. 
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applicable legal regime for air space or outer space.  The United States 
does not recognize a specific altitude at which air space ends and outer 
space begins…12   
As stated in a memorandum policy letter from the Director of the Joint 
Staff, the term “near space” is no longer to be used by the DoD, in joint usage, and 
should be discouraged at all levels.  13 
b. Military in Civil Publications 
The Air Force stays well grounded with the definition in an article by Lt 
Col Ed “Mel” Tomme, USAF and Col Sigfred “Ziggy” Dahl, USAF,  
Near-space is well below orbital altitudes.  Being roughly defined as the 
region between about 65,000 and 325,000 feet, it is too low for sustained 
orbital flight and above the region where air-breathing engines and wings 
work very well.14  
This definition builds on an earlier article concerning Air Force Space 
Command:   
As Air Force Space Command (AFSPC) furthers its utilization of the high 
frontier, it’s looking for persistence that doesn’t have to reside quite so far 
out of this world.  The command is focusing on developing programs that 
will operate in the near-space region, which is located between 65,000 feet 
and 325,000 feet.15   
At the UCCS Near Space Symposium for 2006 and 2007, the term “Near 
Space” appeared frequently in use, though there was no formal definition outlined except 
by individual members. 
                                                 
12  Mary Walker, “Memorandum for the Secretary and The Chief of Staff of The Air Force, Subject:  
Legal Regime Applicable to ‘Near Space’,” 27 September 2004. 
13 Ryan Henry, “Memorandum for Director, Joint Staff, Subject:  Use of the Term ‘Near-Space’,” 29 
January 2007.  
14 Tomme, “Balloons in Today’s Military,” 5. 
15 Jennifer Thibault, “Developing the Near Frontier, Military Aerospace Technology.  Online Edition 
6:1, Available from http://www.military-aerospace-technology.com/article.cfm?DocID=1210; Internet; 
accessed 12 September 2007. 
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Army Space and Missile Defense Command (SMDC) stated in 2006, that 
“Near Space” was the region between 60,000 feet and 100,000 feet.16  In 2007, a similar 
briefing used the term “High Altitude” as being located between 20km (65,000 feet) and 
100 km.17   
c. Government 
Much like the United States government’s desire not to numerically define 
space, the government also has no numeric or scientific definition of “Near Space.”  To 
define “Near Space” would force its upper boundary to be the lower boundary of space, 
which would violate United States National Space Policy.  This hard altitude limit has 
serious legal ramifications and as such would likely be opposed for the same reasons as 
the formal definition of space altitudes.   
d. Civil 
There is considerable difference among civil definitions of what “Near 
Space” actually is.  One definition is that near space assets are “High Altitude Platforms 
(HAPs) or Stratospheric Platforms (SPFs), and located 17–22 km above the Earth’s 
surface.”18 The International Telecommunications Union (ITU) defines the term High 
Altitude Platform Station (HAPS) to describe a “station located on an object at an altitude 
of 20 to 50 km and at a specified, nominal, fixed point relative to the Earth.”19  
In the 2006 Near Space Symposium, the Space Data Corporation stated its 
understanding of this region to be between 65,000 and 100,000 feet.20  During the 2007 
Near Space Symposium, the Near Space Corporation identified anything greater than 
                                                 
16 Jeff Faunce and Stew Stout, “Army Activities in Near  Space” Briefing to the Near Space 
Symposium, Colorado Springs, CO, 2 February 2006, Jeff Faunce and Stew Stout, United States Army 
Space and Missile Defense Command, slide 4. 
17 Jeff Faunce, “Army Activities in High Altitude” Briefing to the Near Space and High Altitude 
Operations Symposium, Colorado Springs, CO, 22 February 2006, slide 7. 
18 Stylianos Karapantazis and Fotini-Niovi Pavlidou, “Broadband Communications Via High-Altitude 
Platforms: A Survey,” IEEE Communications Surveys, 7, (First Quarter 2005): 1.  
19 Ibid.  
20 Phil De Carlo and Shawn Bratton, “Deployment of a Military Near Space Communications 
System” Briefing to the Near Space Symposium, Colorado Springs, CO, 3 February 2006. 
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65,000 feet up to, but not including 100,000 feet as near space.21  QinetiQ’s Zephyr Hale 
UAS defined mission altitude for near space as anything greater than 30km (60,000 
feet).22  University of Colorado at Colorado Spring’s (UCCS) SANSRG (Space and 
Near-Space Research Group), who sponsored the 2006 and 2007 Near Space 
Conferences, uses the region 12-62 miles (~63,000-~327,000 feet/100km), in an article.23 
e. Near Space / High Altitude Defined 
For our discussion, we will attempt to limit ourselves to the label of “High 
Altitude Area of Interest” (HAAI) throughout this thesis.  This thesis defines HAAI as, 
airspace above 65,000 feet, up to but not including the orbital regime.  Loosely, this 
range excludes all but very specialized air-breathing manned aircraft as well as current 
and projected orbital systems.  Our objective is not to recommend what service or agency 
should have operational control of this area, but rather to highlight how the region can 
support the “Tactical Warfighter.”  
3. Tactical  
a. Military 
Without surprise, we find that traditional military publications provide 
well-developed and established definitions of the term tactical.  Both joint and service 
publications had no shortage of complementary definitions for the terms tactics and 
tactical, as well as providing context and framework for both terms. 
JP 3-0 Joint Operations defines the tactical level, from a Joint Perspective, 
as:  
The tactical level focuses on planning and executing battles, engagements, 
and activities to achieve military objectives assigned to tactical units or 
task forces (TFs).  An engagement normally is a short-duration action 
between opposing forces.  Engagements include a wide variety of actions 
between opposing forces.  A battle consists of a set of related 
                                                 
21 Near Space Corporation and Technology Service Corporation, 2007 Near Space Symposium.  Slide 
6. 
22  QinetiQ Corporation, “Zephyr HALE UAS,” Briefing to the Near Space Symposium, Colorado 
Springs, CO, 22 February 2007. 
23 University of Colorado at Colorado Spring’s (UCCS) SANSRG (Space and Near-Space Research 
Group), The Gazette, (Colorado Springs), July 23, 2005. 
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engagements.  Battles typically last longer; involve larger forces such as 
fleets, armies, and air forces; and normally affect the course of a 
campaign.24 
The publication continues speaking of the tactical level as: 
The level of war at which battles and engagements are planned and 
executed to achieve military objectives assigned to tactical units or task 
forces.  Activities at this level focus on the ordered arrangement and 
maneuver of combat elements in relation to each other and to the enemy to 
achieve combat objectives.25 
FM 1-02/ MCRP 5-12A defines the Tactical Level of War as, 
The level of war at which battles and engagements are planned and 
executed to accomplish military objectives assigned to tactical units or 
task forces.  Activities at this level focus on the ordered arrangement and 
maneuver of combat elements in relation to each other and to the enemy to 
achieve combat objectives.26  
FM 3-0 defines the Tactical Level as: 
Tactics is the employment of units in combat.  It includes the ordered 
arrangement and maneuver of units in relation to each other, the terrain, 
and the enemy to translate potential combat power into victorious battles 
and engagements.  A battle consists of a set of related engagements that 
last longer and involve larger forces than an engagement.  Battles can 
affect the course of a campaign or major operation.  An engagement is a 
small tactical conflict between opposing maneuver forces, usually 
conducted at brigade level and below.  Engagements are usually short - 
minutes, hours, or a day.27 
The manual continues with that definition with: 
Tactics is also the realm of close combat, where friendly forces are in 
immediate contact and use direct and indirect fires to defeat or destroy 
enemy forces and to seize or retain ground.  Exposure to close combat 
separates Army forces from most of their counterparts.  Army forces fight 
                                                 
24  U.S. Department of Defense, Joint Publication 3-0: Joint Operations, (Washington: Government 
Printing Office, 2006), II-2. 
25 U.S. Department of Defense, Joint Publication 3-0: Joint Operations, (Washington: Government 
Printing Office, 2006), GL-31. 
26 U.S. Department of Defense, Department of the Army and Department of the Navy, United States 
Marine Corps, Field Manual 1-02 / Marine Corps Reference Publication 5-12A: Operational Terms and 
Symbols, (Washington: Government Printing Office, 2004), 1-182. 
27 U.S. Department of Defense, Department of the Army, Field Manual 3-0: Operations, (Washington: 
Government Printing Office: 2001), 2-5. 
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until the purpose of the operation is accomplished.  Because of this, they 
are organized to endure losses, provided with combat service support 
(CSS) to generate and sustain combat power, and trained to deal with 
uncertainty.28 
Finally, we discuss how higher-level headquarters determine and support 
the tactical fight:   
The operational-level headquarters sets the terms of battle and provides 
resources for tactical operations.  Tactical success is measured by the 
contribution of an action to the achievement of operationally significant 
results.  Battles and engagements that do not contribute to the campaign 
objectives, directly or indirectly, are avoided.29 
b. Military in Civil Publications 
Here we find that the military member usually understands what 
“Tactical” means.  Where the confusion sets in is that in the civil publications or forums 
the audience does not always understand and often thinks “small in size” is equivalent to 
tactical.  LtCol Tomme gives a concise and accurate definition of tactical when talking 
about space assets and effects as:   
In a computer programming language, “tactical” would be a reserved 
word.  When one uses it to sell a program to a warrior, the warrior has a 
very specific understanding of what that technical term means: applying to 
small-scale, short-lived events, usually involving troops in contact. 30   
While Tomme speaks about the size in his definition, he refers to such in 
respect to engagement sizes, not the size of actual equipment.   
c. Government 
Government definitions of “Tactical” do not exist outside of the DoD.  
Other than using the reference of “Strategic” as the goal, mission or direction of the 
government, then operational and tactical as lower echelons of action used in order to 
achieve that strategic goal, there is no need at this level to define tactical. 
                                                 
28 Department of the Army, Field Manual 3-0: Operations, 2-5. 
29 U.S. Department of Defense, Department of the Army, Field Manual 3-0: Operations, (Washington: 
Government Printing Office: 2001), 2-5.  
30 Edward B. Tomme, The Strategic Nature of the Tactical Satellite, (Maxwell, AFB: Air University, 
2006), ii.   
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d. Civil 
For the purpose of our work, the term tactical has no relevance outside the 
military or civil paramilitary organizations.  However, when discussing tactical satellites 
we have come to the discovery that most professionals in this area do not fully 
understand the true definition of “Tactical,” as it applies to combat operations, or any 
other tactical segment of warfighting operations.  Something being small or short 
duration does not make it tactical, in a military sense.  The fact that a tactical-sized unit 
can use an asset does not mean that it either should be or will be available to them due to 
prioritization of need and cost and utility analysis of the asset.   
e. Tactical Defined 
For the duration of this thesis, the use of the term “Tactical” is used with 
the understanding and intent as defined here.  Tactical in reference to units are those of 
the size to operate independently for a short period of time and/or toward limited mission 
goals, in our case, units at or below Army Brigades and Marine Regiments.  Tactical in 
reference to missions are those executed in a period that the unit tasked can operate 
autonomously without continuous re-supply or control from higher headquarters. 
4. Tactical Warfighter 
a. Military  
While defining tactical was straightforward, we were not able to find a 
coherent and accepted definition, for the ambiguous term “Warfighter,” in any military 
document.  Many documents and persons frequently use the term “Warfighter,” but in 
extensive research, we were unable to find an actual definition of the term.  We will 
define the term “Warfighter” to be any person in the military from the Commander in 
Chief to the newest E-1 graduated from basic training that is actively involved in the 
execution of warfare.  They are all, by oath, directed to support and defend the 
constitution in the capacity of the military.  In current cases, “Warfighter” can and likely 
does apply to members of other national agencies that are conducting direct action in 
support of ongoing-armed conflicts.  It is further necessary to clarify that this thesis 
focuses on the disadvantaged user status of ground tactical warfighters, those serving 
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within the Army and Marine Corps and excludes the Air Force and Navy who do not 
generally face the same austere tactical environments.   
b. Military in Civil Publications 
During the recent American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics’ 5th 
Operationally Responsive Space Conference in April 2007, there was significant 
discussion on supporting the “Warfighter.”  A member of the audience eventually asked 
the pointed question of “who is the Warfighter?”  Air Force LtCol Carol Welch answered 
that the “Warfighter” is dependent on the acceptance of risk.  The conversation went on 
to say that the “Warfighter” and his assets are determined by the risk imposed by those 
assets.  This says that the “Warfighter” is defined by risks or assets not his capability to 
conduct actions as a unit. 
Numerous publications and articles mention the “Tactical Warfighter” but 
leave it to the reader to determine who this person actually is.  Again, the writer assumes 
both the author and the reader know what the other is referring to and agree.  When doing 
so, it is advantageous to the writer to remain ambiguous, to increase acceptance by a 
wider audience.  Using our definition of “Warfighter,” from above, one can see how any 
person in the military reading the information could think, “They are talking about me.” 
c. Civil 
Civil companies will use the term that will most likely get the attention of 
the person or organization that can afford what they are selling.  As they are trying to sell 
some product or service to the largest possible audience, it is not in their best interest to 
define this “Tactical Warfighter” customer in a clear manner.  This fact is painfully 
obvious when reading most TACSAT articles or information from almost any other entity 
trying to sell space to the “Tactical Warfighter.”  It would be ludicrous to say that there is 
no utility for the “Tactical Warfighter” from space-based assets.  However, to sell a 
space-based asset on the premise that it can and most importantly will support the 
“Tactical Warfighter” can be both dangerous and disastrous. 
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d. Tactical Warfighter Defined 
The “Tactical Warfighters” referenced in this thesis are the personnel 
attached to the Brigade or Regiment size units, or below, who are operating in a hostile 
area, possibly under austere conditions.  Essentially, we understand that company, 
platoon and squad sized units execute most patrols or other tactical operations.  These 
smaller units are most likely the “disadvantaged user.”  Units on patrol and executing 
distributed operations (DO) require certain capabilities to execute their mission. 
5. Tactical Space 
a. Military 
The phrase “Tactical Space” as a standalone term is one that we have not 
found used elsewhere.  The military often uses it in the context of tactical space effects or 
tactical space system, but not as a term of its own meaning.   
b. Military in Civil Publications. 
The closest use of the phrase by anyone directly related to the military is 
as follows:   
While global coverage may be a valid requirement for applications such as 
navigation and communication, other missions may only require continual 
coverage of a particular geographic region.  This is particularly true for 
tactical national security space systems supporting combat forces during a 
particular military crisis.31 
In this quote, we see that national security systems are useful to support 
tactical operations, but still no definition of “Tactical Space.”  Again when reading the 
phrase, one must take into account that this is first about “Space,” then “national 
security” and lastly “Tactical.”  Using those words together one can quickly see that these 
systems are not for the tactical units directly but for national security and the word 
“Tactical” refers to using those assets in support of a tactical operation. 
                                                 
31 Scott C. Larmmore, “Partially Continuous Earth Coverage from a Responsive Space Constellation,” 
Briefing to 5th Responsive Space Conference, Los Angeles, CA, 23 April 2007. 
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c. Government 
Here we again see no formal definition or use for the phrase that we have 
decided to use as a cornerstone for this thesis. 
d. Civil   
Here we find the first separation of the level of unit combatants and space 
as an area to facilitate a requirement: 
A program to leverage that is underway is Internet Routers in Space (IRIS) 
that recently announced a Joint Capability Technology Demonstration 
(JCTD) where a space hardened router will be placed on Intelsat’s 
geostationary satellite IS-14, expected to launch in 2009.  The system will 
provide access to the Internet from remote regions of Europe, Africa and 
the Americas.  This commercial GEO-based system along with other IRIS 
initiatives and/or potentially more accessible high altitude platforms (at a 
lower cost) may be excellent proving grounds for developing and testing 
net-centric communications and standards at the tactical level in space.32 
This was the only reference found that specifically addresses the different 
areas of capability to support a requirement(s) and how they can support any specific 
level of warfighting unit, specifically tactical.  This capability, without the requirement of 
liaison with higher or marked increase in the tactical unit’s autonomous support 
requirement, is the desire of any tactical unit. 
e. Tactical Space Defined 
Our definition for “Tactical Space” must cover a specific list of 
foundations, some of which we have already defined for this specific purpose.  For this 
reason, the reader must understand the preceding sections.   
“Tactical Space” is the operational environment that the tactical warfighter 
operates within and is from where he gets his support.  “Tactical Space” is dedicated 
specifically to providing capabilities to the tactical warfighter, to facilitate his mission(s) 
and address his status as a disadvantaged user.   
                                                 
32 Jeffrey L. Janicik, “Net-centric Operations and Responsive Spacecraft – A guide to 
Implementation,” Paper presented at the 5th Responsive Space Conference, Los Angeles, CA, 23 April 
2007, 8. 
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This “Tactical Space” can refer to both orbital and/or sub-orbital systems 
that provide capabilities traditionally only available from space assets.  These capabilities 
have to be specifically dedicated to the “Tactical Warfighter” as he executes his tactical 
mission(s).  These definitions and references establish a common frame of reference for 
discussion on providing much needed capabilities to the “Tactical Warfighter.”   
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III. TACTICAL REQUIREMENTS 
A. MILITARY ORGANIZATIONS 
1. Army 
The highest level United States Army organization on which we will focus is that 
of the Brigade Combat Team (BCT).  The BCT is a modular unit that exists in several 
types.  These types are the Infantry Brigade Combat Team, the Heavy Brigade Combat 
Team, and the Stryker Brigade Combat Team.33  These new BCTs are the basic building 
block for Army future operations, replacing the previously organized Divisional Brigades 
that were less mobile, less deployable, and less able to operate as self-sustaining units 
across large areas.   
The areas covered by BCTs are well beyond historical areas of coverage for 
tactical ground units.  Doctrinally, BCTs should operate in an area with a radius of 
60km34, with a Future Combat Systems equipped BCT extending that radius to 75km.  
BCT units in Operation Iraqi Freedom are reporting areas of operations extending to 200 
by 200 km.35  Units operating in areas much greater than their doctrinal organization 
capabilities must establish terrestrial based communication relays, shuffle around 
extremely limited SATCOM assets, or operate outside of communications range with 
higher headquarters.  All three options tremendously increase risk to the units forced to 
execute them. 
Under the Army’s recent transformation initiatives, these BCTs have greater 
capacity to operate independently, for longer periods.  This transformation results in a 
similar-sized unit, in regards to combat forces, but with more ability to conduct 
independent command and control, as well as the ability to better sustain itself without 
                                                 
33 U.S. Department of Defense, Department of the Army, Field Manual 3-90.6: The Brigade Combat 
Team (Washington: Government Printing Office, 2006), xvi. 
34 U.S. Department of Defense, Department of the Army, Army Comprehensive Guide to Modularity, 
(Washington: Government Printing Office, 2004) 2-12. 
35 U.S. Department of Defense, Department of the Army, Training and Doctrine Command Technical 
Report 06-014: Aerial Sensor and Relay Capabilities Based Assessment Final Report Volume II, 
(Washington: Government Printing Office: 2006), C-8. 
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higher headquarters support.  The BCT transformation gives brigade-sized elements 
greater flexibility to function over larger areas in a more autonomous manner.   
Generally, the BCT transformation removes the specialization of certain previous 
elements and allows for more units able to conduct similar missions.    
Current deployed brigades within the Army are between 2500 and 4200 soldiers, 
depending on task organization and manning.  There are also variations in size due to 
type of brigade, with armored and Stryker units having slightly more soldiers than 
infantry units of the same size.   
2. Marine Corps 
The Marine Corps forms and tasks its units to perform at specific levels of 
operations and in warfare.  Traditionally the Marine Corps has functioned primarily at the 
tactical level to provide a forward presence and crisis-response with the level of impact 
including all levels of war.  Although the Marine Corps has a formal structure for 
command and support, it traditionally organizes for operations into Marine Air-Ground 
Task Forces (MAGTFs).  Commanders tailor these task forces to specific operations and 
requirements.  MAGTFs come in three doctrinal sizes: Marine Expeditionary Force 
(MEF), Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB) and Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special 
Operations Capable) (MEU (SOC)). 
For simplification, the MEF is roughly a division or greater sized ground 
component, a wing or greater sized air component and one or more logistics groups.  A 
MEF is between 20,000 and 90,000 Marines and deploys as a major component in full-
scale warfighting.  This force size also applies for strategic levels of planning and 
warfighting. 
The MEB is roughly a reinforced infantry regiment, a Marine Air Group (MAG) 
and a Combat Logistics Regiment.  This force is highly configurable and can contain 
anywhere from 3,000 to 20,000 Marines and is used for Crisis Response and Small-Scale 
Contingencies.  Due to the range of utility of the MEB, it can function as both an 
operational and tactical unit for planning and warfighting. 
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The most used and normally operated size unit is the MEU (SOC).  This unit is 
comprised of a reinforced infantry battalion, a Marine Air Combat Element (ACE) or 
composite squadron and Combat Logistics Detachment.  This size unit ranges from 1,500 
to 3,000 Marines and acts as a forward presence for theatre commanders.  Being special 
operations capable (SOC), they are trained for enhanced capabilities, to address specific 
crisis possibilities.  This unit operates at the tactical level of war but very possibly 
influencing all levels of warfighting up to the strategic level.36 
3.  Generalizations 
From the preceding information, definitions, traditional uses and initial direction 
we have decided to restrict the scope to tactical units.  As defined from above, this will 
include the Army’s BCTs and the Marine Corps Brigade (MEB) and below.  
4. Unit Interactions 
We will now accept the fact that both services at this level execute very similar if 
not the same level and types of missions.  The organizational differences on how the 
services execute the same mission are not significant at this level and the thesis will only 
address significant differences. 
This thesis assumes that units in question are at Modified Table of Organization 
and Equipment (TOE) levels of personnel and equipment; meaning that all authorized 
equipment is on-hand, serviceable, and operates as demonstrated in actual use when 
applicable.  While fully manned and equipped units are often not realistic in actual 
practice, we offer the best-case scenario in this discussion. 
B. TACTICAL USER REQUIREMENTS 
Many sources define requirements of the Warfighter that are achievable with 
space or space-like effects.  Here again we are only concerned about the “Tactical 
Warfighter” and what is required for those size units to operate in the full scope of 
                                                 
36 U.S. Department of Defense, Department of the Navy, United States Marine Corps, Marine Corps 
Concepts and Programs 2006, Available from, http://hqinet001.hqmc.usmc.mil/p&r/concepts/2006/ 
APPA.htm; Internet; accessed on 12 September 2007. 
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tactical warfare.  The Army’s future doctrine in regards to space effects shows an 
increasing need for increased capabilities for information at the tactical level.   
At the tactical level, Objective Force units see first, understand first, act 
first, and finish decisively as the means to tactical success [emphasis in 
original].  Operations will be characterized by developing situations out of 
contact; maneuvering to positions of advantage; engaging enemy forces 
beyond the range of their weapons; destroying them with precision fires; 
and, as required, by tactical assault at times and places of our choosing.  
Commanders will accomplish this by maneuvering dispersed tactical 
formations of Future Combat Systems units linked by net-centric C4ISR 
capabilities for common situational dominance.  With these capabilities, 
the Objective Force will master the transitions at all levels of operations.  
Space systems provide critical support to the Objective Force “Quality of 
Firsts.”37 
A study by the National Defense Industrial Association (NDIA) of Joint 
Warfighter shortfalls, identified from the AFSPC Strategic Master Plan and Combatant 
Command/Service Requirements, progressively defined the top requirement shortfalls for 
the joint forces.  The prioritized shortfalls, at all levels were: 
1. Tactical BLOS Comms on the move  
2. Wideband Reachback & Dedicated Strategic Comm  
3. Persistent ISR & Red Force Tracking  
4. Change Detection, Detect Mines & IEDs  
5. Blue Force Tracking  
6.  Battlespace Awareness  
7. Foliage-Penetrating ISR  
8. Signals Detection & Characterization  
9.  All Weather Imaging  
10.  Detonation/IR Detection & Characterization  
11.  PSYOPs  
12. Fleeting Target Strike38 
Another document from the Rand Corporation breaks these basic warfighter 
requirements down to the lower level of tactical warfighter requirements.  This study 
reiterates the points made above. 
The most basic communication requirements for dismounted soldiers are 
to know (1) their own location, (2) the location of friends, and (3) the 
location of enemies.  Transmission power and antenna size will be limited 
                                                 
37 U.S. Department of Defense, TRADOC PAM 525-3-14, 10. 
38 Major General Don Hard (USAF Ret.),”National Defense Industrial Association (NDIA) Near-
Space Summer Study Final Briefing,” 9 November 2005, Slide 14. 
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to what can be practically worn and battery-powered.  In buildings, 
tunnels, and similar locations, geo-location via GPS is extremely 
limited.39 
The Marine Corps trail of requirements, from After Action Reviews, 
Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare Capabilities List (EMWCL), and Universal Need 
Statements (UNS) feed into the MAGTF Capabilities List (MCL).  This list ties to the 
Joint Capability Area (JCA) and Marine Corps Tasking List (MCTL).  The list of 
capability gaps from the MCL are prioritized by areas such as Logistics, Fires and 
Maneuver, etc.   
In the list the capability gaps that are relative to our topic are: 
Gap # / 
Division 
JCA MCTL 






Provide and Employ Joint Fires / 14 JCA’s  
Supported 
Unmanned 
Aircraft systems / 
Supports 23 of 49 
FMID FAA tasks 
Very limited capability in poor weather conditions.  Interoperability 
limited by capabilities of CAC2S.  Tier I and II need POM 10 continuance 
or capability will be lost.  POM 10 new start required for Tier III 




4.5.2.0 Intelligence Architecture 
Development 7.0.0.0 Joint Protection 9.3.0.0 
Conduct Decisive Maneuver 14.0.0.0 Joint 
Special Operations and Irregular Warfare 
14.2.0.0 Direct Action 14.4.0.0 
Unconventional Warfare 




Limited ability to rapidly disseminate actionable intelligence and relevant 
products, to include sensor to shooter Near Real Time (NRT) data to the 




4.2.0.0 Observation and Collection (All 
Domains) 
2.2 Collect data 
and intelligence 
Limited ability to establish and maintain a persistent, multi-sensor 





14.4.0.0  Conventional Warfare 
2.2 Collect data 
and intelligence 





Provide Robust, reliable communications to 
all nodes, based on the varying  requirements 
of those nodes (FORCEnet 1) 
5.1.1 Provide and 
Maintain 
Communications 
Gap in the ability to operate voice and data C2 systems to the squad level. 
Gap in the ability to define and display operational picture with minimum 
latency, incorporate air and ground tracks, do so on-the move and over-
the-horizon from any platform 
Gap in the ability to operate C4I systems on-the-move and over-the-
horizon 
Technological solution needed to build hybrid terrestrial/celestial 
networks which combine the low data latency aspects of terrestrial 
networks with the BLOS capability of celestial networks, in order to 
maintain complete, accurate blue force picture 
Table 1.    Excerpt from MAGTF Capabilities List.40 
 
                                                 
39 Leland Joe and Isaac Porche III, Future Army Bandwidth Needs and Capabilities, (Rand  
Corporation, 2004), 20. 
40 U.S. Department of Defense, Department of the Navy, United States Marine Corps, Marine Corps 
Combat Development Command, Capabilities Development Directorate MAGTF Capabilities List (MCL), 
Approval Brief, 5 February 2007. 
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From these lists, we can start to pick those critical “tactical warfighter” 
requirements and identify which are most important to the successful execution of his 
mission.  We see these requirements distilled down to:  communications; persistent ISR; 
Blue Force Tracking and Battlespace Awareness; and Position, Navigation and Timing. 
1. Communications 
Within the term “communications,” we are including those requirements that 
include voice and data.  These systems may be secure or open channel.  The most needed 
level of this requirement is not at the inter-tactical layer or in higher headquarters; it is the 
link between higher headquarters and the tactical level unit.  The need to transfer and 
communicate between the tactical and higher levels of command becomes increasingly 
difficult as our operations move into the environments of mountainous terrain, built up 
areas, and over extended distances for distributed operations.  High-Level Operational 
Concept Graphics (OV1) from service representatives and contractors repeat this 
requirement often.  Showing diagrams and using PowerPoint does not get the “tactical 
warfighter” connectivity.  The traditional way of setting up and securing terrestrial relays 
does not support the current tactical environment or the future concepts for the Army or 
Marine Corps.   
In a study by the Rand Corporation addressing US Army communication 
requirements: 
Achieving high mobility on a rapidly changing battlefield will require 
considerable bandwidth, the Army is not the only claimant— joint, 
coalition, and civilian organizations may be simultaneously operating in a 
region.  Available bandwidth is affected by the required information flows 
that need to be supported by communications.41 
This thesis does not address requirements for management of bandwidth.  We will 
assume, for now, that proper allocation of frequencies will occur for the equipment 
available to execute current and future missions. 
 
                                                 
41 Joe, Future Army Bandwidth, 9.  
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Below is an example of the Stryker Brigade Combat Team (SBCT) 
communications set-up for Brigade-level communications net in a study of systems that 
are organic to the Brigade.  The eight (8) networks used are those systems currently 
fielded to the SBCT. 
 
Purpose of Net Type of Communications Number of Users 
Command HF, voice 17 
Situation/command and control SINCGARS, data 10 
Army Battle Command System (ABCS) Data NTDR, data 34 
Operations and intelligence SINCGARS, voice 31 
Situation/command and control EPLRS, data 71 
Command SINCGARS, voice 33 
Administration/logistics SINCGARS, voice 20 
Fire support SINCGARS, voice 10 
Total  226 
Table 2.   SBCT Information System Architecture.42 
 
These eight networks with 226 users were at the BCT-level only.  These do not 
include the subordinate level elements at battalion or company level that have many of 
the same nets.  Those eight networks also rely on terrestrial relays through ground 
retransmission of predominantly frequency modulation (FM) nets.  Each of these 
retransmission sites requires manning and security, which detracts from tactical 
operations.   
This quote sums up the conclusion for communications that captures the typical 
cyclic thought process of users and providers. 
These measurements are taken in an exercise environment and hence 
represent demands for only a narrow slice of a real operation.  However, it 
                                                 
42 Joe, Future Army Bandwidth, 20. 
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is apparent that current and near-term systems will not meet capacity or 
mobility needs of the current force.  Far-term (2007+) systems will meet 
the needs of the current force, but demands can also be expected to grow 
in the interim.43 
In this case, we can readily see that what was then far-term (2007) is now present, 
and while our capabilities have increased, so have our requirements.  We currently see 
the deficit in capabilities predicted in that report. 
 
2. Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) 
Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance is the combination and 
integration of capabilities and tasks that include planning and directing, 
collection, processing, and production phases of the intelligence process, 
as well as the common functions of analyze, disseminate, and assess.44 
Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities for the tactical 
unit are probably the most addressed requirement lately.  It may be because tactical 
warfighters have grown accustomed to these capabilities in recent years.  Since many of 
the ISR products produced are from space-based assets and the higher echelons in the 
military and government rely heavily upon them, it is only natural for the lower echelons, 
tactical units, to desire the same products or capability.  To compound the problem for 
the tactical unit, however, these national system products tend to be very large and not 
easily acquired by tactical units due to the communication bandwidth constraints 
previously discussed. 
The prioritization and processing of ISR requests occur at the national level.  As a 
result, until the President of the United States, the Intelligence Community, the CFLCC 
Commander, the Corps Commander, and the Division Commander have all imagery 
products that they feel they need, the “Tactical Warfighter” is not going to get what he 
asks for, unless his mission is the main effort for one of the aforementioned commanders.  
This is one problem while the other problem is the timeliness of the information.  The 
operational and strategic decision makers and units are and should be looking further 
down the time line.  Tactical forces are often looking at an immediate timeline.  The lives 
                                                 
43 Joe, Future Army Bandwidth,  23.   
44 U.S. Department of Defense, TRADOC PAM 525-3-14, 23. 
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of troops in close contact frequently depend upon the receipt of timely ISR information.  
However, the request cycle for ISR resources is typically too long to be responsive to 
those needs.  The recurring theme here will be the fact that “you get what you pay for,” or 
in other words, “ownership has tremendous benefits.”    
Strategic or national systems undeniably cost hundreds of millions or billions of 
dollars to design and operate.  The operating budget of the DoD and government is of the 
size to support this cost.  Some services such as the Navy and Air Force also, due their 
operational nature, have greater justification for the use of both space-based assets and 
strategic level air-breathing assets such as U2 and Global Hawk.  These services 
generally deploy and use these strategic assets at the operational level, since those 
services typically fight at that level within theaters of operation and will utilize internal 
and external ISR assets when needed.   
The tactical units, however, do not have the capability, resources, or money to 
own, operate, and maintain a space-based ISR platform.  Even if a tactical unit could own 
a space-based ISR asset, ownership within the DoD is sometimes tenuous.  Higher-level 
headquarters can and often do decide that an asset “owned” by your tactical unit better 
serves their needs and will direct tasking or transfer of that asset for their own purposes.  
It is at this point that, even if the tactical unit owned and/or operated its own “tactical 
satellite,” the tactical unit must hope/demand/suggest to higher that they need that asset to 
the point that it is absolutely required to execute the mission.  Either they must be 
successful in that campaign or they must have an alternative asset at hand.  Currently 
these alternatives are either older imagery that is in archives, or the use of unmanned 
aerial systems (UASs).  UASs have proven to be an incredible asset at all levels of 
combat operations.  They have become an essential and required component of the 
tactical units’ arsenal.  However, UASs have their own limitations that need to be 
addressed, specifically that of persistency. 
A tactical unit does not have the time or manpower to fight the current process of 
acquiring relevant and timely ISR intelligence from national and strategic systems.  
While higher-echelon units are responsible for handling these requests, those 
organizations have their own priorities and concerns.  The commander at the tactical level 
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must be able to see the where and when on the battlefield, with some level of persistency, 
to support his maneuver plan.  Even with the use of UASs that provide the where and 
when, there are still serious limitations in persistence and coverage. 
3. Blue Force Tracking and Situational Awareness (BFT/SA) 
Blue Force Tracking and Situational Awareness (BFT/SA) is the accurate ability 
to identify friendly positions within the time required for the tactical commander to make 
decisions pertinent to his mission.  It also incorporates known enemy information into a 
similar interface, allowing the Warfighter to understand the disposition of his own forces 
and their geographical relationship to his enemy.  
Distribution of BFT/SA to necessary users is essential.  Distribution to users that 
do not need the particular unit’s information wastes bandwidth, increases latency, and 
poses a greater security risk.  The attempt to increase BFT/SA too far up the chain 
increases bandwidth requirements and reduces the access to information down the chain.  
BFT/SA availability and need to know are not the same.  Resolving the debate for 
distribution of this information is not within the scope of this paper.  However, it is 
paramount that those who need to know this information have it.  The elements who need 
to know would be those in direct command and those that are providing direct support.  It 
would be ideal for close air support to have a local common operating picture (COP) with 
a BFT picture overlay in order to acknowledge appropriate clearances and provide 
accurate targeting.  This capability would be invaluable in close quarters such as 
mountains and urban areas.  Often those controlling the supporting fires (air, mortars and 
artillery) cannot see the whole picture and could unknowingly put friendly forces at risk 
of fratricide.45    
BFT/SA, in particular, has greatly aided in the execution of war at the tactical 
level.  Using systems such as Force XXI Battle Command and Control Brigade and 
Below (FBCB2) and Blue Force Tracker systems, units down to the section level can 
know where they are and where other units or elements are in relation to them.  Injection 
of enemy force locations by other primarily intelligence systems, such as the All Source 
                                                 
45 “Blue on Blue ground incidents during Operation Iraqi Freedom,” Defense Update, International 
Online Defense Magazine, 2004, Available from http://www.defense-update.com/features/du-2-
04/fratricide-2.htm; Internet; Accessed on 12 September 2007. 
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Analysis System (ASAS), allows for a rather robust red SA, which allows the digital 
warfighter to decide and act faster than his enemy. 
The current capacity of BFT in theatre is a shared 2.6 kbps.  This limits the 
situational awareness (SA) update to 5 minutes minimum, considered near-real-time.  
While five minutes may be suitable update time for a dismounted unit operating at 
walking speeds, aircraft and mechanized forces can move a tremendous distance in 
between five minute refresh times.  The bandwidth restrictions provide for a limited 
number of supportable platforms.  To provide more capacity to larger or more dispersed 
units or those in rugged and or heavy foliage areas requires significant more capacity and 
cost. 
The hurdle to getting a clear picture starts with the different systems fielded by 
the Army and the Marine Corps (i.e., Grenadier Brat, FBCB2 etc.) and trying to integrate 
the individual data in to the COP.  Although currently working through the arduous 
JCIDS process, that integration is a difficult task since the services and not DoD fund 
these programs.  The point is to understand that not everyone needs to know where 
everyone else is on the battlefield.  Those that do need to know where particular sets of 
units are need to know that information faster and with better certainty.  Those above 
may only need to know the units’ general positions and not the specific locations of all 
their personnel.  Those below may only need a COP for their unit and the next higher 
unit’s position. 
4. Position, Navigation and Timing (PNT) 
Position, Navigation and Timing (PNT) covers far more than just the use of 
Global Positioning System (GPS) to identify a unit’s location on the ground.  Timing, 
though not likely something that many tactical units would address as a requirement, is 
almost essential for today’s modern secure communications.  Most modern 
communication systems, specifically those that operate in secure modes, require highly 
accurate timing to properly encrypt and decrypt signals. 
The GPS constellation is generally sufficient for most tactical operations, with a 
large number of satellites operating in specific orbits in order to provide near-global 
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coverage with PNT.  This system provides the same information to “warfighters” at all 
levels of conflict.  While the GPS system works well in most cases, augmentation by 
non-orbital systems could be extremely useful in situations such as urban or mountainous 
operations.  In such situations, terrain, both natural and manmade, can interfere with the 
GPS signal or cause multi-path problems that can degrade accuracy.   
In the near term, global positioning, velocity, navigation, and timing 
capabilities, provided by the GPS constellation, are our sole method of 
providing force-wide common location and timing essential for 
simultaneous, distributed operations (knowing where you are, where your 
buddy is, and where the adversary is).  GPS provides the “common grid” 
for precision engagement and maneuver, and a mechanism for effective 
BLOS blue force tracking to land forces.46 
While “Tactical Warfighters” pride themselves on the ability to operate using 
alternatives to GPS such as maps, compasses, and pace count / odometer, resorting to 
such drastically reduces the pace at which units can know and understand the position of 
themselves and their surrounding elements on the ground.  A GPS receiver allows for 
almost instantaneous knowledge of very accurate position location, versus a more 
difficult and time-consuming process of map/compass navigation. 
5. Can-Do vs. Should-Do 
While both the Army and the Marine Corps can operate in a technologically 
disadvantaged state, using previous generation capabilities to execute their missions, 
operating in this manner would greatly slow down our time lines and would degrade the 
enhanced chances of success our rapid decision-making processes have enabled.  The 
tactical warfighter can operate using line of sight radio networks with multiple relays, 
scouts observing enemy positions from high ground, paper maps with graphic overlays of 
enemy and friendly positions, and map, compass and pace counts for navigation.  While 
possible, the level of collateral damage that would occur during our operations would 
also likely increase, which is not likely acceptable in our heavily media-monitored 
operations.  The tactical ground warfighter using a compass and map with FM radios and 
using conventional means to execute fires is very much a proven capability.  However, to 
move at the speed and with the precision required on the battlefield of today and 
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tomorrow, the requirements above are needed in sufficient quantity and availability to 
allow the tactical warfighter to execute his mission. 
Current capabilities in each of these areas are not sufficient for maintaining the 
technological advantage that our forces rely on to completely dominate our adversaries.  
As we become more dependent on information in order to conduct our operations, we 
must have even greater increases in these capabilities at the tactical level, where success 
or failure occurs rapidly and with clear consequences measured in the loss of lives and 
individual systems.  Existing systems are not fully able to meet the needs of strategic and 

















































IV. TACTICAL CAPABILTIES DEFICIT 
Having established communications, ISR, BFT/SA, and PNT as our four focus 
areas for BLOS capabilities required by the ground tactical warfighter, it is now 
necessary to show where there are deficiencies in meeting those requirements.  There is a 
clear current deficit in capabilities in these four areas that affects the tactical-level 
warfighter’s ability to carry out current mission sets efficiently and effectively.  Without 
devolving into an exercise in counting bits per second, it is possible to show current 
deficiencies in required capabilities and project future deficiencies based on projected or 
expected system fielding.   
Many organizations and programs exist to develop existing areas of technology to 
meet the current and future deficiencies in communications, ISR, BFT/SA, and PNT 
better.  While often plausible and very efficient, none of these improvements or any 
combination of those will likely decrease or remove the deficit between what tactical 
users need and what they receive.  While some of these technologies are promising, the 
future systems will likely only allow us to meet our current needs better, without any real 
expectation of meeting anticipated future needs.  Essentially, in ten years we will likely 
be able to meet our current needs, putting us no further ahead in satisfying tactical 
communications, ISR, BFT/SA, and PNT requirements of the future. 
As our doctrine shifts toward offsetting reduced force size with increased abilities 
to observe, orient, decide, and act more rapidly, improvements in the four core 
requirement sets chosen for this paper are essential.  We cannot fight the war of 
tomorrow with tomorrow’s force structure and today’s technology and capabilities.  As 
the BLOS deficit grows between requirements and capabilities, this is what we ask of our 
warfighters at the tactical level. 
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A. COMMUNICATION 
1. Current Communications 
a. Current Communications Capabilities 
Currently, communication capabilities are generally limited to either 
traditional LOS systems or satellite communications.  Some capability exists for non-
satellite BLOS communications, such as the short-term use of helicopter-based 
retransmission of FM communications nets, but such are very specialized and generally 
commit a valuable combat asset that likely better used for their intended purposes.  HF 
radio capabilities are also very limited in use at the tactical level, requiring large antennas 
and being much more complicated to operate than FM voice systems.  Each of these 
options has tremendous limitations at the tactical level. 
Satellite communications, while available, are not sufficient for any real 
DO or regular use in tactical engagements.  Limitations in the fielding of actual systems 
are only part of the problem, the larger issue being availability of channels on existing 
satellite systems.  Even if a tactical unit can gain access to an appropriate radio set and 
cryptographic keys--the physical requirements for use--there are not enough channels or 
available bandwidth to allow easy adding of lower-echelon units to satellite 
communications.  In such cases, when required, the tactical unit must operate on 
frequencies and channels normally reserved for units several echelons above their own, 
tying up higher-level communication nets with their tactical traffic. 
LOS radio primarily using voice is the most common form of tactical 
communication.  While this works well in the close fight, it is limited in range and with 
increasing distances between units requires multiple relay sites, each requiring a security 
element that removes valuable manpower from the unit’s primary mission.  Additionally, 
engagements in urban and mountainous terrain pose real problems for communication 
both internally and to the next higher level, specifically for needs such as supporting 
fires, re-supply, and medical evacuation (MEDEVAC).  Often, this requires additional 
retransmission sites established upon clearly visible high ground for higher-level nets, 
which require additional security and further decrease available manpower to contribute 
to the unit’s primary mission. 
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The “MILSATCOM Satellite Communications for the Warfighter” 
publication gives a good understanding of the current architecture and what benefits they 
provide to users.  It not only gives us a view of what the world is like for the end users 
and individual services, but also a view of how things need to operate in the future. 
Even though there was no integrated vision or overall scheme in their 
development, until recently the collection of "legacy" systems adequately 
supplied the needs of DoD users.  However, as the need to fight as a joint 
team has increased, and as the tempo and breadth of the battlefield have 
expanded, warfighters no longer have the luxury of "stove piped" systems.  
The separate classes of users have merged. 
These users have traditionally turned to a variety of services to meet their 
combined communications needs.  Most of these needs are met by 
terrestrial means.  Communications needs that are satisfied through space 
fall into two categories of systems: militarily owned and operated systems 
and commercial leased systems.  The choice of system and the relative 
mix of services provided through these two sources reflects the varying 
needs of the user and the conditions under which they operate.47 
The above states that the need determines the choice of systems.  While 
very limited alternatives make that likely true, the real issue is that the choices are limited 
to two options.  Either they can afford to own and operate their own systems or they must 
rent or lease it from outside sources.  In either case, at the tactical level, the warfighter 
has no real choice in the process.  His budget does not support either option and he is at 
the mercy of his higher command to gain any satellite capabilities whatsoever.  
Essentially, the systems he has access to use are not developed based on his requirements, 
but rather are given to him to use when it is convenient, or when someone can figure out 
a tactical use for a system designed for some other purpose. 
Within commercial and military owned satellite communication systems, 
fielded man-portable satellite-enabled systems fall into two general categories: civilian 
systems such as Iridium and Thuraya satellite phone systems, as well as more traditional 
military man pack systems.  The satellite phone options provide good coverage in most 
latitudes and the convenience of access when needed, in a relatively small package, but 
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do not give the traditional and familiar method of multiple user communication nets.  The 
military systems tend to require setup of a directional folding antenna and require yet 
another full-size radio system.   
For the higher-level units, such as brigade, more traditional satellite 
communications use large-aperture antennae with radio systems mounted on trailers or 
vehicles.  These require stationary setup and a rather large footprint for these reasons:  
High-gain antennae like these are required due to the extremely weak 
nature of the signal coming from geostationary satellites 30k km above the 
earth.  High bandwidth requirements for data transmission and the large 
distance mean huge antennae are needed.  Antenna size could be 
considerably reduced by increasing the signal strength.  That increase 
could come by making bigger transmitters in GEO (expensive) or by 
locating the comm repeater closer (i.e., on airborne or near-space 
platforms—much less expensive).48 
Current tactical Army and Marine Corps elements field both UHF and 
SHF communication systems at the brigade level.  Common UHF systems include 
AN/PSC-3(limited), AN/PSC-5 Spitfire (most common) and AN/VSC-7 (mounted in 
vehicles).  These systems use satellite systems such as UHF – Tactical Satellite 
Communications (TACSATCOM) and Ultra High Frequency Follow-On (UFO).  
Tactical units using SHF (includes HF) use the AN/TSC SMAR-T radios mounted in 
vehicles or trailers and working off satellite systems such as the Defense Satellite 
Communications System (DSCS), and the Wideband Global Satellites (WGS). 
Current Army BCT Modified Table of Organization and Equipment 
(MTOE) list very limited assets for BLOS communications at the brigade-level.  These 
assets exist only at Brigade which loans them to lower-echelon units as needed, within 
availability.  This usually requires one staff element temporarily losing their internal 
capability to support the lower-level unit.  A review of the most current MTOEs for 
Infantry, Stryker, and Heavy BCTs shows the limited number of these assets.  Table 4 
summarizes these limited assets.  It is important to note that some of these systems, such 
as the multiple SMART-T are actually redundant systems, with only one active at any 
single moment.  SATCOM on the Move (SOTM) terminals such as the PSC-5s, are 
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limited not only in number but also by available channel access.  Further, it is more 
appropriate to call these systems “SATCOM on the Pause,” as with few exceptions; the 
user must setup a foldable antenna in a particular direction to get suitable gain from the 
satellite.  When loaned to lower echelon units, subordinate units must often operate on 
frequencies shared by both BCT and Division level units.  A battalion or company 
operating outside of their unit Area of Operation (AO), piggybacking on the Division 












7 6 6 
SC-190 
Trojan Spirit 
1 1 0 
SC-154 
SMART-T 
2 1 3 
Table 3.   Brigade-level Satellite Communication Systems.49 
 
Terrestrial communications, the greatest volume of tactical 
communication, occur primarily by voice over very high frequency (VHF) radio systems 
such as the PRC-119 SINCGARS (Single Channel Ground and Airborne Radio System) 
or the PRC-148 MBITR (Multi-band Inter/Intra Team Radio) system.  These systems 
weigh between two and 20 pounds, are usable while moving, and can transmit at ranges 
between 5 and 35 km depending on terrain and dismounted or mounted configuration 
(using power amplifiers and vehicle or mast antennae).  The tactical warfighter, at this 
level, uses these types of radios to coordinate maneuver, call for artillery, request 
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MEDEVAC, and generally communicate with both peers and higher/subordinate 
organizations.  These radios are time-tested and useful but have disadvantages such as 
power requirements, distance and terrain limitations (buildings or earth), weight (radio 
and battery requirement) and secure communications requirements (SINGARS).   
b. Current Communications Deficit 
The variables involved in actual bandwidth requirements for tactical units 
are so numerous that it is difficult to determine a fixed number of bits per second for a 
unit of a certain size.  Within the Army structure alone, there are three general types of 
BCTs, with typically six different battalion types in each BCT, with over a dozen 
different types of companies represented, with various compositions of personnel, 
missions, and equipment, it is easy to see that no single answer of requirements is easy to 
determine.  There are as many answers to the question as there are iterations of the 
question asked.  One answer to the question of a generic BCT-level unit gives, “At the 
tactical, ground level, the data rate need could be hundreds of megabits per second.  Raw 
sensor data (from UAVs) are major contributors to these requirements.”50  This estimate 
from 2003 also did not fully take into consideration the multiple versions and numbers of 
UAS in a future BCT or the enhanced digital systems for communication now seen.  
 
 
                                                 
50 Joe, Future Army Bandwidth, 42. 
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Figure 3.   Notional Growing SATCOM Needs of DoD, IC, and NASA.51 
 
The deficit in communications is increasing at the tactical level due to the 
type and duration of current missions.  Tactical units are more likely to execute missions 
in remote areas or over much larger geographic areas than ever before.  Current 
conventional radios, using LOS or satellite systems, do not currently support extended 
operations or multiple units executing these missions concurrently.  The distance alone, 
puts a strain on traditional terrestrial systems, with the requirements for power and 
logistics support even further away.  The periodic requirement to establish retransmission 
sites for LOS communications reduces combat manpower availability, as these sites 
require security, tying the maneuvering element (or some support element) with the same 
continuous line of communication issues that have limited military operations since 
Clausewitz coined the term in 1832.52  To operate farther from their support the tactical 
unit must establish and secure communication nodes every 20 to 40 km in order to 
retransmit their radio nets.  To complicate such situations further, often it is necessary to 
operate on multiple frequencies between each different set of retransmission sites, 
                                                 
51 U.S. Department of Defense, U.S. Strategic Command, Initial Capabilities Document for Satellite 
Communications (SATCOM) Systems,(Washington: Government Printing Office: 2003), 8. 
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requiring switching between frequency sets as the unit moves.  This section on terrestrial 
communications further clarifies these limitations: 
Current terrestrial communications systems are dependent on LOS 
transmission.  The effectiveness of LOS transmission is increasingly 
limited because units operate at greater distances and in complex terrain.  
Terrestrial relays can be used to extend LOS transmission, however they 
require detailed network planning, are limited in range, lack flexibility, 
and require combat power to secure, defend and support.  The vast, 
asymmetric battlespace prevents the force from holding and defending the 
terrain necessary to provide a robust terrestrial network.  53 
The old way of doing business and operating by sayings such as:  “Comms 
by exception,” puts lives at stake.  This meant that actually having communication was an 
exception, not the rule.  Communications and information flow is becoming essential to 
survival on the battlefields of the current and future forces.  As our forces become 
smaller, while remaining responsible for the conduct of more complex operations at 
greater ranges, communication capabilities must increase at the same or greater levels. 
BLOS communications seem to offer tremendous advantages to the 
tactical warfighter.  Currently, satellites provide the predominant BLOS communications.  
As shown in figure 3 above, there currently are not enough satellites, channels, or 
systems to meet the needs of these tactical users.  Additionally, with the exception of 
UHF SATCOM systems, most satellite systems do not allow for easy communication on 
the move due to the relatively weak signals coming from geosynchronous orbit.   
If the deficit in communications capability that exists, as stated in 
numerous studies and shown in the previous figure, is that large at the strategic and 
operational level then the bandwidth available at the tactical level will be even less.  
Currently, at the brigade-level, there is one primary asset for wideband satellite access 
and at best seven individual UHF terminals, primarily for voice communications.  
Higher-echelon units loan these systems, not fielded to battalion level, when required by 
the tactical situation. 
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The Army and Marine Corps, having both conducted extensive operations 
in urban and mountainous environments at the tactical unit level, have noted through 
After-Action Reports (AAR) and Urgent Needs Statements (UNS) the deficit in 
communications in the environments in which they expect to operate within in the near 
future. 
The U.S. Army’s combat operations in Afghanistan and Iraq in 2001 and 
2003, respectively, showed that the forces lacked adequate intra-unit 
communications, particularly at lower echelons, and that the use of 
satellite communications resources offered a future solution.  The promise 
of satellites was borne out by the success of Blue Force Tracker, a 
communications system used to track the locations of units and vehicles 
connected to low-orbit communications satellites.54 
The same ICD shows the usefulness of satellites for widespread BLOS 
communications using the Blue Force Tracker (BFT) system.  It is important to realize 
that BFT, while a very useful tool for providing near real time BFT/SA, has little tactical 
communication capability.  Bandwidth, message size, and latency of delivery severely 
limit BFT communications.  Currently few existing satellite communication systems 
provide truly tactical SOTM capabilities at the tactical level.  Those that do are either 
limited to Special Operations or the use of commercial telephones such as Iridium, which 
are not conducive to tactical operations. 
Another vulnerability to our tactical warfighters conducting DO is the 
assurance of immediate access to communications.  Waiting for access to a visible 
satellite or worse, waiting for a satellite to enter view is not a viable option for 
communications where delays potentially cost lives.  The possibility of that network not 
being available due to some level of network warfare could also prove detrimental to our 
small units operating remotely.  Although SATCOM has great advantages, it is not 
without its vulnerabilities. 
Currently, satellite communications (SATCOM) is being relied on to 
connect distant units, hopefully in an assured manner.  However, the 
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exclusive use of military or commercial SATCOM may not be available to 
meet all of the Army’s connectivity needs.55 
There are great challenges to operating in a BLOS communication 
environment.  By continuing to execute distributed operations (DO) or conduct 
conventional operations across large distances, in multiple theatres, it becomes 
increasingly apparent that the current SATCOM structure cannot and does not support the 
tactical warfighter. 
The two greatest barriers to satellites providing required BLOS 
communications at the tactical level are cost and control.  Cost and control are related, as 
typically the level of command that owns the system and pays for it, ultimately decides 
how to operate it. 
Satellite-based communications are very expensive to field and generally 
have limited bandwidth and availability.  Those assets with continuous 
availability are extremely expensive to build, and the costs of boosting 
them to their distant geosynchronous Earth orbits (GEO) put them well 
beyond the price range of operational and tactical commanders.  The 
existing alternatives—terrestrial communications systems such as cell 
phone networks—are difficult and time consuming to set up and are not 
responsive on a moving battlefield.56 
The existing solution to the lack of BLOS communication support to the 
tactical warfighter is the support of future space systems to provide more bandwidth.  
These systems are both expensive and slow to design, build and launch.  To compound 
the problem of availability, terrestrial systems develop at faster rates, and inevitably add 
bandwidth requirements with their improved capabilities.  The requirements for BLOS 
communications is increasing faster than we can field satellite systems to close the 
current gap.  To combat this tendency, satellite systems designers modify them during 
development in an attempt to meet changing needs.  This perpetual redefinition adds to 
requirements creep and cost overruns, keeping us one-step behind in our timely system 
fielding, and ensuring the tactical warfighter maintains his disadvantaged user status. 
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2. Future Communications 
Future communications systems, both ground and space-based, promise 
capabilities and availability that tactical warfighters currently require.  Most of these 
systems, designed and developed to meet future projected needs, fall victim to budgetary 
constraints, often because of the acquisition process failing to estimate future needs in the 
early development process, which causes a compromise of actual fielded capability.  
Generally, it seems that future systems give us the capability to meet today’s needs, when 
fielded, but leave a continued gap in the capabilities needed at the time of their fielding.   
a. Future Communications Capabilities 
It is essential that projected requirements tie directly to specific systems 
and programs scheduled for fielding.  Trying to predict future requirements for systems 
that are not yet in development becomes more daunting if not nearly impossible.  Future 
systems need a previously unknown capability for flexibility and configurability, to 
provide for unexpected requirements and or increases in related technologies.   
The complexity of such forward design planning is evident in an excerpt 
from a TRADOC report concerning use of the aerial layer. 
By 2017, the solutions identified provide the necessary conceptual, 
organizational, and platform/payload structure to address the gap, with the 
exception of the capabilities provided by the one identified payload that 
has no matching platform.  Based on the efforts to maximize Joint and 
Army assets, an alternative to the backbone network relay payload has to 
be found, or a platform identified to support the payload under current 
development.  This may require a new start material solution, modification 
of existing aircraft, or the exploration of high altitude, persistent platforms 
under exploration by the services for similar requirements.57 
This quote refers to overall recommendations concerning sensor and relay 
capabilities within the aerial layer, predominantly using UAS.  In the report, a clearly 
defined requirement is identified, a payload to fulfill the expected requirement is 
identified, but no current or projected system is able to place that payload into operational 
use.  Such problems require rather drastic changes in the way a system develops, in this 
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case, possibly requiring new material solutions or entirely new platforms.  This also 
reinforces the problems of technological capabilities developing at different rates.  This 
document shows a capability expected to meet a need, without any sure way of deploying 
it.  Clearly, the existing way forward in this region of tactical space is not sufficient to 
meet the needs of the warfighter and something more is required, one possible solution 
offered being high altitude systems. 
Terrestrial communications systems for the future tactical warrior should 
allow him to meet his needs within LOS of other elements.  Using new radios, 
waveforms, and mesh network systems should allow the tactical warfighter never before 
seen capabilities to share and access data and information within his local area.  
Improvements in his local area, within LOS, do little to reduce his requirements to be 
able to talk longer distances between both peer and senior-subordinate units.  Future 
systems require some way for both developing and legacy systems to extend beyond the 
LOS restrictions of tactical operations. 
Satellite communications (SATCOM) systems have the greatest focus for 
development for the future communications of the tactical warfighter.  The persistence 
and wide area coverage provided by space-based communication systems are key 
features that the tactical warfighter needs as he conducts more operations, farther from 
adjacent units and higher headquarters.  Currently, tactical warfighters are 
“disadvantaged users” in regards to SATCOM.  The requirements of size and weight 
force these users to resort to small aperture antennas and low-powered transmitters, 
reducing their bandwidth tremendously.  Space platforms are distant, by any measure, 
and sufficient signal gain with mobile, tactical platforms is often difficult to attain.  The 
Operationally Responsive Space initiative has attempted to address this fact with its 
TACSAT program.  Here we see one extreme of bringing the benefits of SATCOM to the 
tactical level. 
We believe we will give the soldier on the ground the ability to control a 
spacecraft payload.  That’s going to be a ground-breaking sort of 
development for the way we use spacecraft,” said Peter Wegner, the 
Responsive Space Lead for AFRL, at Kirtland Air Force Base, N.M. …  
Warfighters would be able to control or communicate with the satellites 
with existing communications and imagery dissemination systems, like a 
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Common Data Link radio.  There may also be the ability to communicate 
with the satellite directly with hand-held UHF radios.58 
There are many other initiatives intended to bring space capabilities to the 
tactical warfighter, however, there is no overall architecture in development that will 
truly tie these various systems into a working architecture, designed to meet the needs of 
tactical warfighters.   
Reviewing the current fleet of communication/data satellite systems, most 
of which have met or exceeded their projected life expectancy, it is clear that most are 
generations behind current technology levels.  The dependency on commercial 
communication infrastructure is noted by Lieutenant General Kevin T. Campbell, current 
commander of Army Space and Missile Defense Command.  
He [Campbell] also reiterated that the Pentagon is looking to reduce its 
reliance on commercial satellites for communications by expanding 
military satellite communications (MILSATCOM) infrastructure.  
MILSATCOM "is deficient in terms of bandwidth.  We don't have what 
the warfighters need," Campbell acknowledged.  He said that some 80 
percent of satellite intelligence and imagery now comes from commercial 
satellites.  "We would like to get that figure down to around 50 to 60 
percent commercial, with the balance being around 40 to 50 percent" 
military satellites, he said.59 
Systems now in development for the future have faced tremendous 
setbacks in technology maturity, cost overruns, and other developmental issues.  Even 
with such problems, the future systems show promise in supporting the warfighter with 
better more agile and secure systems in which to operate.  These improvements will 
allow tactical warfighters the capabilities, in the future, that they need today.   
We see from the SATCOM Initial Capabilities Document the planned 
transition for legacy to future systems or Transformational Communication Architecture 
(TCA).  Figure 4 shows various areas of risk and related capability improvements, 
including systems designed specifically with tactical communications in mind.  Actually 
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focusing on tactical users is a tremendous departure from the strategic nature of previous 
generation’s satellite systems that found some tactical usefulness, with few exceptions.  
Future systems are designed, from the beginning, with tactical support in mind.  
 
Figure 4.   Notional Transformation from Legacy to Transformational Communications 
Architecture (TCA).60 
 
Satellite systems require a tremendous expenditure of time and money to 
develop and field.  While it is economically more feasible to develop and field our own 
systems, we are often not budgeted for the future funding to see such systems to 
completion.  A popular alternative is the use of leased commercial systems to augment 
our SATCOM capacity.  This can be both an expanded capability and a tremendous 
vulnerability.  Commercial systems do not have the same requirements for protection and 
assured access as our military systems.  While providing tremendous capability, their 
employment accepts some greater risk, as they are easier to acquire and fund in the short-
term.  Figure 5 from the MILSATCOM Handbook shows a simpler version of our 
transition to new constellations with the leased commercial lines allocated a greater share 
of the load. 
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Figure 5.   Future Constellation Merging.61 
 
The Army’s Future Combat System Structure shows a terrestrial system 
with multiple domains and gateways.  Using the JTRS backbone for the larger areas and 
connectivity to the units beyond the range of their LOS systems, the FCS has more link 
options, allowing better connection to the communication grid without the need to switch 
radios or frequencies.  What is essential is that we do not drive our operations by our 
communication capabilities, but rather we develop our communication capabilities to 
facilitate our maneuver.   
 
Figure 6.   FCS Tier Communication Structure.62 
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The JNTC (Joint Network Transport Capability) program already extends 
SATCOM network capability down to the Battalion level.  Lower 
echelons have historically been limited to use of terrestrial radios for their 
voice and data solution.  As the force transforms making the Brigade 
Combat Team (BCT) the central fighting unit, its area of responsibility 
increases significantly.  Once in theater, troops may be widely dispersed 
and constantly mobile on an extended, and rapidly changing battlefield, 
supported by a long and disparate logistics trail.  When terrain and foliage 
are considered, terrestrial radios alone will be inadequate to maintain a 
connected network.  Although tactical relays mitigate this problem, they 
require forces to secure them, constrain positioning when considering non-
contiguous, multi-front battlefields, and cannot adequately serve Special 
Operations Forces (SOF) operating behind enemy lines.  Beyond line of 
sight (BLOS) solutions are required to keep the network connected.  
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) can close this gap, but offer limited 
coverage area, persistence on station, and resource availability.  SATCOM 
is another solution.  Today, commercial SATCOM is used to fill some of 
these BLOS gaps in the architecture.  As MUOS becomes available, it will 
inherit many of the missions currently met by commercial SATCOM.  
This extent of this migration as well as its ability to service other missions 
described herein is limited by overall system capacity and resource 
allocation, particularly in theater.63 
b. Future Communications Deficit 
The deficit in communications is not necessarily a bandwidth or number 
of systems issue.  It lies in the type and capabilities of these systems and their usefulness 
in meeting tactical requirements.  Legacy and developing systems will provide a 
tremendous LOS communication capability at the tactical level.  Units will be better able 
to conduct traditional operations at all levels with improved interoperability with joint 
elements.  However, providing secure, long-haul communication capabilities, required 
for DO and large area operations, will require a new architecture that is not tied to 
multiple ground repeater sites.  A statement from the commander of Army SMDC further 
acknowledges this future deficit.     
Earlier this month, the command's deputy chief of staff for operations and 
plans told Inside the Army that the military's ability to generate 
information and its need to exchange it will continue to outpace the                                                  
62 Russell Langan, “Interim Integrated Network Study,” Briefing for Army Research, Development & 
Engineering Command, Communications-Electronics Research, Development, and Engineering Center, 9 
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MILSATCOM infrastructure and, potentially, even the commercial 
infrastructure available for the next decade.”64 
Bandwidth and frequency management are not included in the scope of 
this thesis, but are discussed as a foundation for understanding the problems that 
influence future systems and their architectures for support of tactical warfighters.  A 
2006 TRADOC report provides an estimate on required future bandwidth. 
A recent study, which considered the Modular Force in the 2017 
timeframe, estimated that bandwidth requirements by a brigade would 
range broadly from 4 Mbps - 60 Mbps depending on the type of brigade.  
A complete FCS-equipped BCT might demand up to 140 Mbps.65 
While it is arguable that a BCT will not constantly require that much 
bandwidth, the study is only an estimate and does not likely consider real world scenarios 
in which multiple tactical units within the BCT are executing missions.  This architecture 
must be capable of meeting the maximum requirements, through permanent capability or 
a surge capacity controlled by the unit in question. 
The Unmanned Aerial System Roadmap reports predicted gaps in needs 
for current and developing systems.  “By 2010, existing and planned capacities are 
forecast to meet only 44 percent of the need projected by Joint Vision 2010 to ensure 
information superiority.”66  This shortfall will extend down the levels of command; the 
largest impacts being felt at brigade and regiment levels.  With the estimated 44 percent 
of the needed capacity, this shortfall in bandwidth will severely affect operational tempo 
and the scope of missions that are executable. 
Army Future Combat Systems (FCS) networks expect to require full-time 
unmanned air vehicles to provide relays.67  This need is likely due to increasing 
requirements for communications and other demands placed on limited space-based 
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communication systems.  FCS networks require a more robust and adaptable system than 
can be provided by the planned architecture. 
In the recent ICD for Aerial Layer Network Transport, inclusive of other 
outside studies, we find the same conclusion.  The limited physical constraints and 
resources are by far the limiting factors of the current and future planned architectures for 
communications. 
Satellites have finite bandwidth, which limits the amount of data 
transmitted and the number of users that can access the satellite resources.  
Throughput requirements as recognized in the Satellite Database will 
outpace the deployment of future military satellite communications 
constellations.  Intelligence requirements alone will saturate current and 
planned satellite constellations.  Future satellite bandwidth will only meet 
44% of warfighter requirements.  68 
The true scope of the deficit in future communication capability has not 
been widely accepted.  As more research occurs, future tactical warfighter dependency on 
systems that cannot be supported by currently proposed architectures will be increasingly 
evident.  Current focused studies are already publicizing this shortfall, but nothing 
significant seems to be in place to address the clear problem.  The Aerial Sensor and 
Relay Capabilities Based Assessment used a very benign environment to determine just 
minor difficulties.  With greater and more realistic terrain and weather challenges, the 
scope of the problem becomes even greater.  If our currently projected systems cannot 
function in the best-case scenario, they are sure to fail given the more difficult real-world 
nature of combat. 
A FCS trade study report found that in one scenario with relatively little 
terrain or weather challenges, the unit was able to maintain connectivity 
without an aerial layer.  However, significant congestion resulted in the 
terrestrial layer without the aid of aerial relays.  Overall the report noted 
that network latency increases without aerial nodes, and that aerial relays 
dramatically improve network performance.  This work suggested use of 
aerial relays for range extension and reduction of network congestion.69 
From the previous information and studies, we see that the deficit in 
communications for the tactical warfighter is real and immediate.  There are many reports 
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to support the future shortfalls that we will encounter in the future with little or no 
remediation below the Corps or Division level.  The tactical headquarters obviously does 
not need the same bandwidth as their higher headquarters, but as you consider the 
number of elements operating at the tactical level and the desire to provide more and 
more information to the individual warfighter, these BLOS communications requirements 
quickly multiply.  When dispersed tactical elements require BLOS communications, 
projected architectures fall woefully short in capability. 
B. INTELLIGENCE, SURVEILLANCE AND RECONNAISSANCE (ISR) 
In the past decade, the nature of intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance 
(ISR) has shifted from a mission conducted by tactical warfighters to a requirement that 
they levy on systems.  This shift in thinking created tremendous changes in the 
management and consideration of ISR.  Due to the nature of the current and future 
operations and the size of the units executing these distributed missions, the need for 
organizationally controlled or tasked ISR capabilities is greatly increased.  Traditionally, 
ISR assets, beyond that of binoculars exist well above the tactical level.  Requesting ISR 
products, most often imagery, from strategic or national level assets is a time consuming 
task that involves multiple iterations of request cycles, during which a tactical request 
may not ever actually be satisfied. 
The former commander of US Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM), Gen. 
Cartwright testified that the architecture to support this need for persistence from 
STRATCOM was “Our objective is a global, persistent, 24/7 collaborative environment-
comprising people, systems, and tools.”70  The tactical user needs the same level of 
support, albeit of a more localized region.   
1. Current ISR 
Current ISR requirements and capabilities remain disjointed among the services 
and the various subordinate agencies within them.  Those units requiring these ISR 
products rarely own the assets.  Passing requirements to platforms, having those missions 
executed, the data analyzed and returned to the unit requiring the intelligence products is 
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currently time-consuming and challenging in many ways, often failing to function within 
compressed time scales required of tactical operations. 
a. Current ISR Capabilities 
The ISR capabilities that the tactical warfighter has access to are either 
national means, requested for mission planning or Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS), 
either tasked by or organic to that unit.  National assets, due to heavy competition for 
their products, are not task able within the time constraints or priority levels of tactical 
warfighters, causing UAS to become the tactical ISR asset of choice. 
Space-based assets, by their nature, are very expensive and complicated.  
They exist to provide a specific user or customer with a specific capability.  These 
systems typically operate in space to meet a requirement that can only be met by a space-
based system.  The strategic and operational access to space based assets is a very 
specific and controlled environment.  The products provided are protected with multiple 
layers of security.  With these security protocols in place, the current system often makes 
the responsiveness to requests for the capabilities or products too slow for the tactical 
unit.  Although all the capability exists to support the needs of the tactical warfighter, 
they can only meet those needs if given sufficient priority, typically assigned to the 
national or strategic element for which the system was designed or deployed. 
The other ISR means most commonly used now by the tactical warfighter 
is the UAS.  The introduction of the UAS into the battlefield provides a huge capability 
to fill the responsive level of ISR needs.  UASs are divided into tiers for the capability 
and unit level for which they support.  These tiers, however, are not universal across the 
services.  They again are dependent of the services requirements and their individual 
missions.  For the Army and the Marine Corps, these tiers (I, II, III) are rather closely 
aligned.  These tiers as defined by the Marine Corps Warfighting Lab are: 
Tier I UAS - man-packable, hand-launched, autonomous systems designed 
to provide the small unit commander with a reconnaissance and 
surveillance capability to see over the next hill on the battlefield or around 
the next building in the urban environment. 
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Tier II UAS - designed to support our Divisions, Regiments, Battalions 
and MEUs. 
Tier III UAS - designed primarily to support a MEF or Joint Task Force-
level command.71 
The table below shows the current inventory of terrestrial based assets 
used to gather ISR data at the tactical level.  The scope and size of these assets are 
indicated with their corresponding capabilities.  Omitted from this table is the cost and 
controlling authority of each asset.  Operational and maintenance costs often dictate the 
control level of these assets.  Each of these assets provides invaluable sources of 
















Weight (lb) 4  130  375 1800  3,150 10,500  32,250 
Wingspan (ft) 3.4 11.4t 14  34 27.5 66  131 
Payload (lb) 2  25  60  200 600  750 3,000  
Ceiling (ft) 1,000  10,000 15,000  18,000  20,000  50,000  60,000 
Combat 
Radius (nm) 
6  40  68  144  150 2,000  5,400  
Endurance 
(hr) 
1.5 2  7 18  6 20-30  28  
Table 4.   Comparative Capabilities of Current UAS.72 
 
Current operational terrestrial platforms used by the tactical unit and 
below include the Pioneer for the Marine Corps and for the Army the Raven and Shadow.  
The famed Predator and Global Hawk systems are strategic assets currently used in 
strategic and operational roles.  
At the Marine Corps Battalion and below the current platform is the 
Dragon Eye, scheduled for transition to the Joint Raven B UAS.  Tier II UAS supports 
the Marine division, regimental, battalion and Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) 
commanders.  Currently, the Marine Corps uses a fee-for-service agreement for two Scan 
                                                 
71 Brigadier General Randolph Alles, Commanding General, Marine Corps Warfighting Lab, 
Testimony before the House Armed Services Committee Subcommittee on Air and Land Forces  On 
Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) Programs on April 19, 2007. 
72 Data compiled from U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Unmanned 
Aerial System Roadmap 2005-2030, (Washington: Government Printing Office, 2005). 
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Eagle UAS systems to fill the Tier II level.  This Tier will be capability gapped until a 
fully funded, JROC approved program can support the mission.  The current Tier III 
platform is the aged and proven Pioneer.  With service life problems of its own, the US 
Army’s RQ-7B Shadow will replace the Pioneer in the future.  The Shadow will be an 
interim platform until attainment of a suitable replacement that fulfills all capability 
requirements set by the Marine Corps for a Tier III UAS.73 
The Army currently employs the RQ-5 Hunter and the RQ-7 Shadow to 
support its warfighters.  The Army, while currently organized rather closely to the Marine 
Corps in its Tiers, will change its structure and categorization to the FCS model. 
b. Current ISR Deficit  
  In the past, tactical level units operated as subordinate elements in direct 
support of large-scale operations by their higher headquarters.  Those tactical units 
received information gained by higher-level ISR assets that were available and applicable 
to that unit’s portion of the overall fight.  Modern doctrine has shown a clear shift in 
operations of our ground forces from large-scale, contiguous operations to those of 
distributed units operating autonomously over areas many times larger than ever.  This 
change to independent planning and operations at the BCT level requires that ISR 
capabilities become readily available to these units for their independent planning.    
ISR assets currently utilized by theater and regional commanders were, 
not more than two decades ago, strictly national assets supporting strategic operations 
and goals.  Changes in technology and proliferation of space-based assets to other nations 
quickly threaten to outpace our ability to provide ISR products in significant time and 
detail to maintain the level of technical advantage needed to dominate the future 
battlefield.  Army Space and Missile Defense Command (SMDC) mirrors this view about 
the overall lack of available ISR and communication support. 
 
                                                 
73 U.S. Department of Defense, Department of the Navy, United States Marine Corps, Marine Corps 
Concepts and Programs 2007: Unmanned Aerial Vehicles, Available from, 
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ging%20Capabilities%20; Internet; Accessed on 12 September 2007, 62-63. 
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Current Army Lack of Persistent ISR:  Large area-coverage problem, Low 
probability of detecting a transient ISR event,  Inability to determine long 
term processes or operations, Insufficient Communications Resources, 
Oversubscribed, expensive satellite communications, Lack of bandwidth, 
Poor localized control and assuredness. 
Current Operational Inefficiencies:  High sortie rates drive to excessive 
operational costs, Excessive logistic footprint to sustain persistence.74 
Of all the ISR products that the tactical warfighter needs, the most 
obviously useful and valuable one is electro-optical imagery.  Human beings make 
decisions and we understand and are comfortable with processing the information 
provided by pictures.  ISR imagery products are effective and tactically useful.  The right 
picture can decrease planning time and increase the effectiveness of a tactical unit, if it is 
a picture of what they need to see, when they need to see it.  Tactical units need accurate 
imagery of their Area of Interest (AI) and Area of Operations (AO) at a resolution that is 
practical for decision making at his level of warfare.  This resolution typically requires at 
least one meter (1m) or better imagery, which provides tactically relevant intelligence, 
such as identifying vehicles by type and number.   
 
Figure 7.   Satellite Imagery Resolution Comparison.75 
                                                 
74 Faunce, “Army Activities in High Altitude,” slide 6. 
75 John Brock and Michael Yarymovych, “Operational Utility of Small Satellites,” paper delivered to 
the Air Force Science Advisory Board Summer Session, 28 June 2007. 
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Systems satisfying this resolution requirement from space are very 
expensive to build and operate.  Also, purchasing commercial imagery at that resolution, 
while less costly, is not responsive enough due to low revisit rates of usually individual 
satellite imagery systems.  A good explanation of the relationship between attainable 
resolution to sensor and platform distance is:  
Finally, the resolution of an image, the ability to distinguish small, closely 
spaced objects from each other, is directly related to how far away the 
object is.  The shallower the angle, the further away the objects being 
imaged and the poorer the resolution.  At shallower than certain angles, 
the images become useless as the information desired (discriminating 
between tank and truck, for example) can no longer be obtained.  For these 
and other reasons, imagery satellites seldom look more than about 30 
degrees off-nadir, where nadir is the direction of an imaginary line 
extending from the satellite straight down toward the center of the earth76 
In addition to the ISR sensing  requirements for the tactical and theatre 
commanders there is the limiting factor of how many assets we have available to support 
all levels of warfare.  Satisfaction of the need for newer technology and more capable 
systems on orbit is plagued with the same acquisition problems characteristics of many 
high priced programs.  It is not common knowledge that, “There are surprisingly few 
national ISR assets actually orbiting the earth.  These assets are frequently needed for 
higher-priority missions and are so heavily tasked with strategic missions that they may 
not be readily available to operational or tactical commanders.”77 
The proposed method of fulfilling requirements for timely ISR for the 
tactical commander is to allow local command and control of UAS.  UAS platforms 
discussed earlier provide the limited ability to sense within a tactical AO and to 
persistently observe any particular object of interest, within the limits of the system 
employed.  While proving to be valuable assets, UAS have many limitations in support of 
the tactical commander, such as loiter time, range, resolution and field of view.  Other 
related issues are the logistics of supporting these platforms, requiring critical support  
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structure as well as increased manpower and airspace de-confliction problems.  Attaining 
persistent ISR requires greater levels of complication in all areas of support and 
operations of UAS. 
The current ISR capability mix with their associated deficits is frustrating 
and restricting to tactical commanders.  These deficits require a hard look to the future to 
provide better systems with greater responsiveness, at a price that allows the tactical 
warfighter to control and task ISR resources on a tactically beneficial timeline. 
2. Future ISR 
Development of future ISR capabilities and satisfying emergent operational 
sensing requirements in support of the warfighter are a significant focus in the ISR 
community.  Achieving these objectives in a relevant and practical matter will prove to 
be the truth teller for many programs and concepts. 
a. Future ISR Capabilities 
What types of capabilities are tied inherently to the requirements of the 
user?  When we fail to define either the user or requirements then we are doomed to 
failure and a waste of precious resources, time, and money.  This failure in definition and 
execution places the warfighter at greater risk with inadequate products or assets they do 
not need. 
An often-repeated ISR requirement is that of persistent surveillance.  With 
the definition of persistence being relative to the mission or AO, for continuous 
operations, smaller areas and type of surveillance required in the tactical arena, 
persistence is not practical from space-based assets.  This is not to say that space-based 
ISR assets cannot support the tactical commander, but that these national assets are not 
likely dedicated to the tactical level.  In fact, the Army, Navy, and Air Force each have 
TENCAP organizations designed specifically for Tactical Exploitation of National 
Capabilities.  The support from future space-based ISR systems is better suited for the 
strategic and operational levels for reasons of cost and security.  The occasional support 
to the tactical level is always greatly appreciated and requests may be supported given the 
allocation schedule of these future systems.  Greater diversity of ISR assets is required to 
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better support warfighters at all levels, especially at the tactical level where some 
concerns such as strategic over flight are not requirements.  Integration of these various 
assets must more efficiently use their products and capabilities as outlined here: 
Space and terrestrial architectures cannot be stand-alone or stove-piped 
architectures.  They must be fully integrated with other surveillance 
architectures, to provide the Objective Force commander with complete 
battlespace awareness, and enable the Army to provide dominant land 
power support to the JFC.  Given the short timelines of a tactical 
battlespace, the cycle time required, from tasking to dissemination and 
receipt of all-source, integrated products, must be in near real time.  
Additionally, development of a mid- to far-term capability to cross cue 
intelligence and non-intelligence platforms will lead to more responsive 
and comprehensive targeting information.78 
The use of micro satellites and programs such as TACSAT from 
Operationally Responsive Space (ORS), will give us some practical experience in 
providing future capabilities from space specifically to the tactical warfighter.  Initially, 
tactical satellite assets still prove inadequate in both cost and capabilities as required by 
the tactical commander.  Scenario-based training and use for the ground operations will 
truly determine whether these “tactical” space based assets can achieve their advertised 
capabilities. 
Future non-orbital capabilities seem to be more realistic in their 
performance and supportability at the tactical level.  At sub-orbital altitudes, it is possible 
to convert ISR requirements to sensor capabilities and develop a curve of capabilities 
versus altitude.  Such would be a very simplistic model, subject to scrutiny about 
environmental factors such as wind, radiation and atmospheric effects.  One however can 
build the model to derive insight such as stated here. 
Accuracy specifications for the SBR (Space Based Radar) are classified, 
but if similar equipment were used aboard the HAA, the resolution of the 
HAA sensor products at surveillance distances of 22 km to over 500 km 
should be significantly better than the resolution of the space-based radar 
at 1,000 km from earth.  Further, while the radar range from 22 km 
altitude will be much less, the radar null area at the center of coverage—
the “nadir hole”—will be considerably smaller.  Atmospheric attenuation 
of signals to and from an HAA, however, will be greater across the mean 
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distance of coverage because of the relative increase in grazing angle and 
greater exposure to lower-altitude atmosphere.79 
While taking into account the above quote, tactical warfighters do not 
need the large areas of coverage gained by space-based radar systems.  The tactical area 
of interest is much smaller, easily fitting within the footprint of a high altitude radar 
platform.  While such systems are tactically useful, the tactical warfighter would benefit 
more from a tailored application over his area. 
As the Army moves forward in its force transformation and organization it 
further defines its ISR requirements for support.  The current terrestrial based system will 
transition to provide a more robust and responsive structure to support the tactical 
commander without total reliance on space based assets. 
The Army’s FCS consists of 18 systems, 4 of them unmanned aircraft that 
are expected to appear in an experimental brigade in 2008 and reach IOC 
in 2014.  TRADOC designated Raven as the interim Class I UAV, an 
improved Shadow as the interim Class III UAV and Fire Scout as the 
Class IV UAV in April 2004.  A fifth UAV category, Class IV B, has been 
created, requiring 24-hour endurance by a single aircraft, perhaps the 
eventual ER/MP UA.80 
Here a reliance on organizationally owned assets is predicted vice 
requesting support from higher echelons and nationally controlled assets, most of which 
are already over tasked.  This Army and Marine Corps move to more indigenous assets is 
further evidence of the current deficit in ISR capabilities needed to support the tactical 
warfighter.  Acquiring and deploying newer and more capable UAS controlled at the 
tactical level is another step in constructing a more robust and responsive ISR 
architecture.  
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Table 5.   FCS UAS Characteristics and Performance.81 
 
Above is the Army’s FCS UAV layout.  The characteristics are indicative 
of the added weight and logistics required for that size unit.  Specification of UAS 
requirements down to a platoon level underscores the need for integrated and internal ISR 
capability required for execution of future missions.   
The Marine Corps Warfighting Lab (MCWL) is currently performing test 
and evaluation exercises on a hand-launched, back-packable, micro air vehicle.  These 
assets and future similar platforms will further extend ISR capabilities in the Marine 
Corps to lower levels with more capable means in which to obtain their products.   
Known as the Wasp, it is being developed and employed in conjunction 
with the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency.  The fourteen 
deployed Block II Wasp systems have flown more than 1,000 sorties in-
theater with tremendous success.  This Micro UAS extended user 
evaluation has provided small-unit leaders with unprecedented situational 
awareness during combat operations and has developed and validated joint 
tactics, techniques and procedures.  We see the Wasp as a complement to 
the Tier I Raven B UAS.  
Another MCWL effort, the USMC Tier II UAS Concept Demonstrator, 
SpyHawk, will be employed as a test platform for evaluation of emerging 
technologies.  It will also be used to develop and refine Tier II UAS 
concepts of employment and tactics, techniques, and procedures; and to 
collect data to inform Joint Tier II program of record development.82 
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The products having an immediate and relevant effect on their missions or 
combat effectiveness show the move to more information independence from traditional 
sources.  The next step in the future ISR architecture is HAAs operating in the HAAI.  
These HAA platforms address the gap between tactical and strategic capabilities and the 
ability to support the warfighter as missions are completed and AO’s change.   
Persistent surveillance from a fixed position is an important need that 
HAAs can meet.  Over time, they can facilitate continuous collection and 
comparison analysis of terrain covered by different sensors, such as IR, 
EO, and HSI.  Comparisons can highlight changes like freshly turned dirt 
along a roadway where bombs have been emplaced, and fusion of data 
from multiple sensors may furnish tracking data on targets under foliage.83 
The capabilities of future HAAs will bring a new view of ISR capabilities 
to the operational and tactical levels.  These HAA based ISR systems will allow a shorter 
decision chain for some sensing.  The positive effects of these regional systems will be 
the reduced load on national assets and multiple source information to support all 
echelons of the warfighters.   
Future systems and integrated ISR architectures, proposed and currently in 
demonstration phases, look to posses the needed capabilities to support the tactical 
warfighter.  The optimal system mix and ISR architecture will take time and experience 
to determine.  The fact that the mix is tailor able without placing new items in orbit on 
long timelines and high costs is a step toward effectively responding to address the 
widening gap in ISR resources.  Many of these Systems of Systems (SOS) and Families 
of Systems (FOS) appear effective in design and development but they must progress 
through the JCIDS process and secure funding. 
b. Future ISR Deficit 
ISR requirements in support of tactical warfighters will continue to widen.  
While the needs and requirements for ISR products grow at an ever-increasing rate, the 
resources available to service requirements remain relatively constant.  Without a  
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corresponding increase in capabilities or an information flow reduction the commander 
will continue to be restricted by the availability of information used to make a timely and 
educated decision. 
Future space assets required to support the strategic level of warfare will 
be replacing a robust yet aged architecture, with many current platforms in use beyond 
their expected service lives.   
In the area of space-based collection, unanticipated technical problems 
with some satellite programs in development will likely cause scheduling 
delays and cost increases.  Moreover, an insufficient priority on 
developing cutting-edge technologies ensures that the core mission of 
space intelligence--to collect secrets--will continue to languish and 
become increasing limited.84   
The lack of quantity of space assets places a greater strain on those 
systems that are available and operational.  Further reliance and competition of 
commercial systems is becoming another factor that affects the tactical warfighters 
technological advantage.  With the availability for all customers, imagery in particular, 
from commercial vendors or other state owned assets threatens our information 
dominance.  The obvious drawback to this is responsiveness and revisit required for 
many ISR needs.  The expense of these products is seen by some to be cost prohibitive to 
design, build and launch a similar state-owned asset, when one could buy it from 
commercial sources.  A singularly important requirement for an ISR asset is assurance 
and security.  The developing Operationally Responsive Space’s TacSat initiative to 
bring the space-based ISR to the control of the tactical users becomes inadequate after 
thorough examination.  The claims that TacSat will solve the tactical warfighters’ ISR 
requirements are misleading and impractical.   
If the experiment goes as planned, a tactical user will be able to upload 
commands directly to the spacecraft, have it carry out the imaging and 
then downlink that imagery within minutes.  
 
                                                 
84 U.S. House of Representatives, 106th Congress Report:  Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal 
Year 2001, 16 May 2000; http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/2000_rpt/hr106-620.html; Internet: Accessed on 
19 September 2007.    
65 
Warfighters would be able to control or communicate with the satellites 
with existing communications and imagery dissemination systems, like a 
Common Data Link radio.  There may also be the ability to communicate 
with the satellite directly with hand-held UHF radios.85 
The tactical commander does not have the money or manpower allocated 
to operate his own space-based asset.  He also does not have the time in his decision 
cycle to task an orbital asset that will only be available for a maximum of 15 minutes, 
spread in small intervals throughout several days of coverage of his AO.  Although the 
TacSat program is an excellent proving ground for technologies, it is ill suited for the 
combat commander at the tactical level, if he ever actually has priority for tasking the 
asset in the first place. 
The final line comes down to the realization that our future space ISR 
systems will do little to impact the tactical warfighter directly.  Space-based ISR assets 
are uniquely suited and required for many missions.  Support of the tactical warfighter is 
neither their primary nor their most efficient use.  As a result, these limitations in 
usefulness and priority should lead into the development of less expensive and capable 
systems that function in the terrestrial environment.  With the increasing development of 
HAAs and UAS to fill the gap documented in both services, we look to address the 
current ISR gap. 
The future road map for UAS looks to be fairly well organized.  The 
ability to distribute products and capabilities at different tiers down to the lowest tactical 
unit required is a great capability.  Such distribution of capabilities and assets allows for 
increases in ISR capabilities not only to the tactical warfighter, but also to all agencies 
and organizations above him, as higher-level assets are free for their intended usage.  To 
configure maneuver units and supporting assets allows a commander greater flexibility 
and ability to cover more terrain.  This asset allocation will also support decisions of the 
higher commanders who may be able to make their decisions faster due to less latency in 
information from forward units. 
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Figure 8.   Timeline of Current and Planned DoD UAS Systems.86 
 
C. BLUE FORCE TRACKING AND SITUATIONAL AWARENESS (BFT/SA) 
Blue force tracking (BFT) and situational awareness (SA) (BFT/SA) represents 
two different but supporting capabilities.  BFT is concerned specifically with the location 
of blue or friendly forces within an AO and reporting that information.  Situational 
Awareness adds information on enemy or adversary forces and other pertinent battlefield 
information to the same overlay or Common Operating Picture (COP).  The technologies 
being developed to integrate all the sources of data continue to be updated.  Currently, the 
U. S. Army uses the Force XXI Battle Command, Brigade-and-Below (FBCB2) and Blue 
Force Tracker (FBCB2-BFT) suites to provide a COP to its units at the BCT level and 
below.  The U. S. Marine Corps uses the Command and Control for the PC (C2PC) suite 
for its tactical level picture, using inputs from the FBCB2 systems.  Both services are 
currently working toward a joint compatible system, such as the FBCB2-BFT. 
1. Current BFT/SA 
The BFT system currently fielded by the Army and the Marine Corps uses the L-
band satellite version of FBCB2-BFT.  This is a satellite -based version of the more 
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robust LOS FBCB2 system.  FBCB2-BFT allows users with the same L-band version of 
the system to have near-real time knowledge of friendly elements.  At brigade and higher 
levels, this BFT feed can be input into other COP systems, such as EPLRS based FBCB2, 
Maneuver Control System (MCS), and Global Command and Control System (GCCS). 
a. Current BFT/SA Capabilities 
The FBCB2-BFT system allows for near-real time updates on position of 
friendly forces integrated with a digital map to provide commanders with a visual 
representation of the battlefield.  As more information feeds into the COP, ranging from 
friendly aviation to enemy positions, the system provides the much-needed seamless look 
at the battlefield.  The system relies on various communication architectures such as 
FBCB2, SMART-T, GCCS and other SATCOM links to feed various systems of friendly 
force information.  Each individual system gains position information from an attached 
GPS receiver and this information travels half way around the world and back to update 
surrounding unit locations for the satellite-based versions of BFT.  This long path causes 
inherent latency with updates due to distance traveled, processing at the CONUS-based 




Figure 9.   Current Blue Force Tracker Configuration (Simplified). 
 
Figure 9 shows a simplified schematic of the current BFT operation and 
how it integrates at the tactical level.  By allowing personnel, vehicles and aircraft to 
determine their own locations and view that of all others reporting on their display we 
greatly reduce the possibility of fratricide and accelerate the tactical decision cycle of 
commanders.  
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Figure 10.   Example of BFT Coverage Capability 7 April 2003 OIF.87 
 
Figure 10 shows an example of the COP provided by BFT.  The user 
interface allows for selection of scale for the map to enable smaller units to focus only on 
their AO.  BFT’s proven capability to show near-real time location of friendly units has 
saved lives and has compressed time necessary for mission planning in some cases from 
days to hours.   
b. Current BFT/SA Deficit 
The greatest deficit in the BFT system is due to the bandwidth of the L-
band communication link.  While the position data and text capabilities are relatively 
small, the required bandwidth used quickly adds up as the distribution of BFT systems 
increases to additional units due to their great tactical value.  
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The most beneficial area of improvement would be decreasing the update 
time required for BFT between adjacent units.  Mobile units, especially aviation or 
vehicle-mounted ones can travel tactically significant distances in the time taken for a 
BFT update.  Further, in urban terrain, even small distance differences can tremendously 
change the situation for the nearby force.  For example, awareness of which side of a 
building a friendly unit is located is essential in preventing fratricide incidents.   
The update times currently available for BFT are inadequate for units 
engaged in combat.  The radio-based FBCB2 system continuously updates the local COP 
between units in the same network, with higher tiered FM nets updating between peer 
and higher-level units with slightly greater update times.  The L-band version of the same 
system has significant latency, measured in minutes, which limits its usefulness in the 
close fight, particularly in urban terrain. 
Another deficiency in current BFT systems is the level at which they are 
fielded.  Current BFT systems require a vehicle or command post mounting system and 
are about the size of a modern personal desktop computer with flat screen monitor.  As 
such, these are rarely issued below the company level for dismounted elements, and 
below the platoon level for mounted elements.  Individual vehicles and soldiers, not 
typically outfitted with the system, leave some units with no coverage, while others are 
only represented by a single vehicle, often that of the unit’s leader.     
2. Future BFT/SA 
The value of BFT and its demonstrated capabilities will continue to grow as the 
environment and missions continue to change toward more distributed and nodal 
operations.  BFT systems must be capable of adaptation and interaction with users across 
the full mission spectrum and update as required for the mission. 
a. Future BFT/SA Capabilities 
Future capabilities of BFT systems appear promising with the 
development of systems such as the Commanders Data Assistant (CDA) and other 
Personal Data Assistants (PDA).  As technology develops, the size and weight of these 
systems decreases, with current systems providing limited FBCB2-BFT capabilities to 
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dismounted users in roughly the same package as a 1st generation PSN-11 GPS receiver.  
While the tactical warfighter may not need tremendous amounts of bandwidth in hand at 
all times, the ability to see a real-time report of his Forward Line of Own Troops (FLOT) 
is crucial.  The next generation of equipment and level of deployment will provide an 
increased capability for coordination and communication within the unit and with their 
higher commanders.  
b. Future BFT/SA Deficit 
The utility of BFT to the tactical warfighter is undeniable.  The term ‘near-
real time’ does not, however, provide the tactical warfighter the update times required, 
currently, nor does it provide adequate security for the data.  The latency in information 
is a byproduct of the network utilized.  The use of a space system allows for large area 
coverage by dispersed and varied units at a cost of latency in update time.  The LOS 
based system, FBCB2, has excellent update characteristics with nearby units, but distant 
units will not display.  Currently, the ability to introduce information from one system to 
another requires higher-level units with gateways to inject and convert data between 
system formats.     
The BFT application is well suited for the space segment and for tracking 
forces on a large scale where a time delay of minutes and position lag of hundreds of 
meters are not a great concern.  For the tactical warfighter, especially in close 
engagements, meters and seconds count.  The warfighter needs the rapid update times of 
the FBCB2 LOS system with the range and availability of the BFT L-band system.  This 
system does not currently exist. 
The BFT system requires tailoring to the level of unit involved in the 
mission.  If it is a small unit, then LOS systems are adequate, providing the terrain or 
surroundings do not prevent clear transmission and receiving of the signals.  For larger 
sized tactical units such as the Brigade, BLOS systems may be more suitable since they 
tend to have more support and capability to link to those networks.  The greatest deficit is 
for those units below the Brigade, specifically dismounted units without the benefit of  
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vehicles to carry FBCB2 or similar systems.  For tactical maneuver elements such as the 
platoon or company, LOS may not be sufficient to cover the range or support bandwidth 
required for their operations. 
D. POSITION, NAVIGATION AND TIMING (PNT) 
Accurate Position, Navigation and Timing (PNT) capabilities are critical assets 
for the tactical warfighter.  Tactical warfighters are critically reliant upon these 
capabilities.  PNT is essential for BFT/SA, synchronizing secured communication nets, 
enabling employment of precision munitions, and providing quick and precise geo-
location.  These capabilities have become critically essential in our modern warfare and 
are all significant contributors to our technological superiority in ground tactical 
operations.   
1. Current PNT 
The current constellation of Global Positioning System (GPS) satellites provides 
worldwide coverage of the earth with not only position and navigation information but 
also very accurate timing.  Position information allows the warfighter to know, quickly 
and accurately, where he is located on or above the surface of the earth.  Modern GPS 
receivers allow access to that information as well as giving the warfighter vector and 
distance data to plotted points from his current location.  The GPS signal is publicly 
available within the latitude ranges covered by the system.  Military users have additional 
capability provided by a second secured channel that allows for greater accuracy as well 
as more jam resistance.  The navigation capability provides valuable service to all fixed 
and mobile users from dismounted soldiers to high-speed fixed wing aircraft.   
While positional knowledge is important, an equally important value provided by 
GPS is accurate timing.  Without GPS timing, the quick and easy ability to synchronize 
and secure encrypted voice and data communication nets is impossible.  Most common 
secure communications require accuracy in timing to operate in secure modes.  GPS 
allows this common time reference, globally.  Additionally, this same timing reference is 
critical to almost every banking institution for security and management of electronic 
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transfers of all types, including ATM withdrawals.  Without the GPS timing signal, 
synchronization of modern communication systems would not be possible. 
a. Current PNT Capabilities 
The capabilities of the current GPS constellation and equipment are 
sufficient for most environments.  The ability to provide precise positioning information 
requires multiple satellites in view to provide optimal geometry.  Precision timing 
between spacecraft provides the individual user accurate position location, suitable for 
most civil and military use.  While the GPS system works well in most terrain and 
situations, GPS accuracy degrades in mountainous and built-up urban areas, such as 
cities.  Unfortunately, the tactical warfighter must often operate within built-up areas 
such as Iraq and mountainous areas such as Afghanistan.  While it is foolish to base our 
future capabilities on current wars, it is highly likely that we will continue to conduct 
tactical operations within these types of terrain in the future. 
Current tactical users employ the AN/PSN-11, AN/PSN-11(V) 1, 
Precision Lightweight GPS Receiver (PLGR) AN/PSN-13 as well as a variety of 
Commercial off the Shelf (COTS) receivers designed for civil use.  These provide the 
tactical user a lightweight, handheld computerized receiver that provides very accurate 
position data in a matter of seconds as well as accurate timing and navigation assistance. 
b. Current PNT Deficit 
A limitation of our current architecture is the ability to get clean signals 
into areas surrounded by high vertical structures that mask and restrict signal 
propagation.  The effects of multi-path signals due to path bounces and multiple signals 
reaching the receiver from the same satellite at slightly different times, but with the same 
codes causes an error of one type.  Loss or reduced number of signals reduces the 
accuracy of our equipment and makes our reliance on those systems in that environment 
tenuous at best.  The requirement of at least four satellites to obtain a 3 dimensional 
solution may be problematic and cause a loss of equipment function at an inopportune 
time, especially within urban or mountainous terrain where the horizon is not clear. 
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The GPS system transmits a signal from 10,900 nautical miles away and 
produces a very weak signal on the earth’s surface.  This is much like viewing a 25-watt 
light bulb from the same distance.  This low signal strength is one of the largest 
deficiencies in the current system, contributing to weakness against jamming and 
spoofing attacks. 
Other more directed problems are the cases of jamming and spoofing.  
Jamming will become highly proliferated in our future operations.  In our current fights, 
lower tech forces have attempted to use GPS jammers to interfere with our ability to fight 
as we intend to.  With many of our weapon systems and equipment relying on GPS 
guidance, adversaries target the weak signal at the surface of the earth by overpowering it 
with terrestrial transmitters at the same frequency.  The loss of a GPS signal, in a 
jamming environment, may prevent the user from reacquiring navigation signals until the 
jamming ceases or they get far enough away from the jamming signal to acquire a good 
satellite signal.  GPS signal jamming can be deliberate or as in many cases, inadvertent.  
The typical user cannot identify whether he is intentionally or inadvertently jammed, and 
only knows that an essential capability is no longer available to him, unexpectedly.   
The ability to spoof the GPS signals is another limitation in the system.  
Spoofing is the replication of the GPS signal to provide bad or erroneous data to the 
receiver causing an error in position and timing.  This method of GPS attack is more 
subtle than jamming, since the user may only detect that his position is in error but is still 
receiving a signal.  If the user does not recognize his position information as incorrect, he 
could report his position or other data erroneously.  The timing portion of GPS will also 
not function in a spoofing situation, since it will not match up with other times on the 
same frequency.  The result can be that a communication net can become unsynchronized 
during spoofing attacks and communication might be lost due to synchronization errors. 
The current PLGR system accesses the Precise Positioning Service (PPS) 
when operated with COMSEC.  This provides it with Selective Availability, Anti-
Spoofing and Anti-Jam capabilities.  The PLGR is phasing out, with the Defense  
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Advanced Global Positioning System (GPS) Receiver (DAGR) replacing it.  This newer 
DAGR provides a greater security and technology to help defeat our adversaries’ current 
tactics against PNT and GPS. 
2. Future PNT 
The current block of GPS III satellites deployed is the next generation with more 
bands and more signals with power increases in signal strength to 40 watts.  These 
satellites should be operational by the year 2013 or earlier.  With a more advanced 
satellite system, improved user equipment should take full advantage of the 
improvements and security of the next generation GPS equipment. 
a. Future PNT Capabilities 
The added capabilities that the next generation GPS space segment offers 
is an improvement on the current PNT capabilities for the warfighter.  The use of a spot 
beam for the military channel will increase its power received at the ground and make it 
more resistant to jamming and spoofing.  The better timing and error resolution provides 
position information that is more accurate, especially when linked to the FBCB2 and 
other BFT/SA systems.  The added capabilities of the space segment will provide more 
secure and dependable links to the warfighter.   
The user segment of PNT requires receivers for the tactical warfighter that 
can ensure connectivity in a hostile electronic and battlefield environment.  Many things 
can affect the GPS link.  Ensuring the tactical warfighter can effectively execute his 
mission will require many improvements to the current receivers.  Improvements in 
equipment such as the DAGR and hardware like the Selective Availability and Anti-
Spoof Module (SAASM) will attempt to ensure the tactical warfighter has the ability to 
fight in that hostile environment.  Other equipment upgrades for vehicles and aircraft will 
enable interoperability and better coordination. 
b. Future PNT Deficit 
The increase in power from space to the ground, although significant, is 
still rather small compared to the amount of power an adversary can emit from a 
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terrestrial jammer.  Although these jammers can become a target themselves by being 
active emitters, remote activation allows them to be distant from their operators.  
Developing systems will be able to identify some of these adversary actions and notify 
the user of a potential problem.  SAASM will help greatly for a time before our enemies 
determine and counter its capabilities.   
A continuing future deficit is a shortage of GPS receivers for tactical 
warfighters at the lower levels of organization.  This shortage in systems is filled with 
either individually or unit-purchased civil receivers.  Even military issued receivers 
without current cryptographic keying are not much better than civilian receivers.  The use 
of civilian transmitters to fill the gap is potentially dangerous to those who use them and 
others interacting with that user.  These commercial systems while more susceptible to 
jamming and operating with lesser accuracy, offset those risks with the tremendous 
capability provided by civil receivers in comparison with the use of traditional navigation 
techniques. 
Improvements in software and internal hardware for receivers will likely 
have the most impact on the tactical warfighter.  A better receiver will allow him more 
capabilities in the navigation portion of the system, that part completely reliant on 
manipulating the position signal with processing at the receiver.  Anyone that has used a 
first generation PSN-11 and then tried your typical COTS receiver can easily see the 
additional capability provided by upgraded receivers and software.  First generation GPS 
receivers used very complicated button sequences and required extensive training to 
operate effectively.  Modern versions use more efficient control inputs as well as more 
intuitive information display.    
Changes in the space segment, other than incremental block changes, will 
not make significant changes in our overall GPS capability.  How we use and manipulate 
the signals after they reach the user or ensure that the signal reaches him will provide our 
greatest future gain.  By increasing signal security, we can reduce the jamming and 
spoofing of signals.  Another method to increase GPS capability is to establish 
Differential GPS (DGPS) sites.  These sites may be land based for long-term  
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engagements or could be airborne for initial hostilities, rough terrain or denied areas.  The 
DGPS concept uses a local known point to determine localized GPS error, providing 
greater accuracy within that region. 
E. CONCLUSION 
At the tactical level of war, the “disadvantaged user” status of the tactical 
warfighter in regards to BLOS systems remains a real concern.  While this status and his 
increasing requirements for support are acknowledged more than ever before, current and 
future systems are unable to now or in the forecasted future, provide the tactical 
warfighter with adequate levels of communications, ISR, BFT/SA and PNT, specifically 
in the types of terrain he will likely operate.  Traditional methods of providing these 
assets to the warfighter use either additional LOS radio or BLOS satellite systems.   
It is clear that the traditional methods of providing these capabilities will not be 
sufficient in the future to meet these increasing needs.  The tactical warfighter doesn’t 
need a specific system to necessarily fix any one of these capability gaps, he instead 
needs a system of systems, encompassing a wider range of delivery platforms for 


















































V. TACTICAL SPACE 
Having identified the key capabilities required in the areas of communications, 
ISR, BFT/SA and PNT, and the associated deficit in each, concerning the tactical 
warfighter, the thesis will now propose solutions to mitigate the deficits.  Departing from 
the more traditional concepts where tactical space relates specifically to orbital assets, the 
proposed architecture sees tactical space not as a physical region but rather as a type of 
support.  No single region or regime solves all of these requirements for the tactical 
warfighter in all scenarios.   
Current BLOS systems are predominantly space-based for the tactical warfighter.  
Satellite systems due to their high cost and complexity previously existed for support of 
national-level and strategic purposes.  While recent trends have placed these same assets 
in support of the prosecution of warfare, even at the tactical level, these systems are still 
strategic in design and nature.  Various programs such as the services’ Tactical 
Exploitation of National Capabilities (TENCAP) programs work to identify innovative 
methods of supporting tactical level forces with national strategic capabilities.  These 
programs essentially determine how to fit a square peg in a round hole as opposed to 
building the round peg that the tactical warfighter requires.   
Tactical commanders face shortfalls in BLOS capabilities that prevent their ability 
to execute expanding operations and missions.  Existing BLOS systems provide 
inadequate performance, especially in the areas of communications and ISR.  Future 
systems, while improved, face continual delays, resulting in over tasking of current 
systems and shortcomings of the newly fielded system due to some level of obsolescence.  
Future systems seek to provide more of the same, adding additional satellites or terminals 
to the same inadequate model of support.    
The Army’s Concept for Space Operations in Support of the Objective Force 
further highlights theses BLOS needs. 
Internetted, overhead (high altitude and space) communications, and ISR 
far-term capabilities, and the means to protect them, are critical to provide 
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the essential communications, timely and accurate surveillance, and en 
route mission planning and rehearsal capabilities for deploying forces.88 
Warfighters at all levels receive data from multiple sources.  These three layers 
are terrestrial, air (including the HAAI), and space.  Only through efficient use of all 
three layers is any real reduction in the BLOS deficit achievable.  While improvements in 
any of the layers will likely provide greater capability, the cost vs. benefit analysis 
between alternatives in different regimes is essential to provide the greatest and most 
appropriate capabilities at the most reasonable cost.  The capabilities required by strategic 
and operational commanders are not always the same as those required by the tactical 
commander.  The tactical level of war is a unique area of operations with very focused 
and tailored requirements, not a smaller version of the higher levels.  Systems to support 
the tactical warfighter must be fielded based on tactical requirements, not by watering 
down higher-level needs. 
 
Figure 11.   Current Layers of the Infosphere.89 
 
                                                 
88 U.S. Department of the Army, TRADOC PAM 525-3-14, 15. 
89 Joe, Future Army Bandwidth, 56. 
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A. COMMUNICATIONS 
Persistent and assured communications is arguably the BLOS capability that most 
directly influences tactical success.  Tactical commanders rely on many different systems 
that require communications to facilitate.  Synchronization with senior, subordinate, and 
peer units and requests for fire support, medical evacuation, and logistics are critically 
reliant on the warfighter’s ability to communicate with elements outside of his line of 
sight.  Tactical level commanders do not have the luxury of waiting for optimal or non-
peak times to communicate for these essential elements.  The tactical commander must be 
equipped with communication systems that allow him to talk to who he needs to, when he 
needs to.  A failure in either of these two needs easily translates into the loss of human 
lives, either friendly or civilian.  While the amount of bandwidth the tactical commander 
requires may be less than his superior headquarters, his need for timely information and 
communication may be, in many cases, more urgent.  To remove these gaps, current and 
emerging solutions to the BLOS communication deficit for tactical warfighters must 
consider tactical requirements as their own unique entity, not as a subset of higher issues. 
Proposed solutions to the current communications gap range from eliminating 
some communications requirements to the deployment of entire constellations of 
communications satellites for tactical warfighter support.  While greater efficiency in our 
use of bandwidth is surely desirable, telling the tactical warfighter to do more with less is 
not a rational and realistic option to reduce his bandwidth requirements.  In the same 
way, adding more systems, links, hardware, receivers, power, widgets or gadgets does not 
truly help the tactical user become more effective.  The table below provides five 
possible techniques for improving available bandwidth. 
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Table 6.   Techniques for Improving Bandwidth.90 
 
Increasing the capacity of links, improving routing efficiency, and adjusting the 
needs of applications are all techniques that are also very applicable to civilian and 
commercial communications systems.  These will continue to develop at a rapid rate, due 
to the greater population affected by the changes.  Communications experts have sought 
these changes for some time already, as civilian bandwidth requirements increase rapidly.  
Managing bandwidth operationally is something that units currently do out of necessity, 
due to limited available capability.  The final option, the addition of a vertical element, 
shows great promise to providing a new capability rather than improving or reducing the 
requirement on existing systems.   
1. Emerging Communications Solutions 
a. Emerging Space Communications 
Space is the current first choice for global communications in a sparse 
environment.  While severely limited in many capabilities, compared to robust terrestrial 
wire networks, space provides a level of access required by the military that other 
systems cannot provide.  The tremendous line of sight benefits to the warfighter are 
                                                 
90 Joe, Future Army Bandwidth, 44. 
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widely advertised and undisputed when access is available.  However, for the tactical 
warfighter, space assets are not accessible in sufficient types or number.  An obvious 
solution would be to procure more, better and bigger satellites, however, for the tactical 
user, this has its own inherent problems.  Specifically, the tactical warfighter cannot 
afford or accept requirements for large antennas, sophisticated architectures, or issues 
with his communications disappearing over the horizon at inopportune moments. 
Geostationary (GEO) satellites can cover enormous areas with millions of 
users; for this reason significant investments have been employed for 
commercial exploitation of satellites.  However, GEOs suffer from very 
critical free-space path loss and propagation delay, which require large 
antennas and sophisticated architectures and protocols at the customer 
receivers.  Not only that, technological constraints for on-board antennas 
prevent the possibility of optimizing the cell dimension on the ground, 
thus potentially lowering frequency reuse efficiency and, consequently, 
overall capacity.  These problems can be partially solved with the use of 
low orbit (LEO) satellites; however, these suffer from the widely 
investigated issues related to the rapid appearance and disappearance in 
the sky portion visible to the receiver.  This means that LEO-based 
systems must include an efficient handover protocol among cells and 
satellites.91 
Current experiments such as the TacSat from Operationally Responsive 
Space (ORS) program show some promise for control of satellite by tactical units.  While 
the possibility of deploying long duration communication platforms in Medium Earth 
Orbit (MEO) or Highly Elliptical Orbits (HEO) is investigated, the problems with 
communications in these two orbital environments are still not fully understood.  Those 
environmental challenges and power requirements due to increased range may quickly 
raise costs far beyond the budgets of tactical level commanders. 
b. Emerging HAAI Communications 
The HAAI is part of the aerial layer.  Currently few, if any, air-breathing 
platforms conduct routine long-term communications capabilities at high altitude.  The 
few systems that even operate within the region such as Global Hawk and the U-2 are 
highly specialized ISR systems that provide no communications mission, other than 
                                                 
91 Emanuela Falletti, Massimiliano Laddomada, Marina Mondin, and Fabrizio Sellone, “Integrated 
Services from High-Altitude Platforms: A flexible Communication System,” IEEE Communications 
Magazine, (February 2006), 124. 
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perhaps the transmission of data collected by sensors on the platform.  Essentially, the 
HAAI is currently void of any assets to support the communications capabilities of the 
tactical warfighter. 
The Army is interested in the development of High Altitude Long 
Endurance (HALE) systems.  Although these various systems are still in an early phase 
of development, the Army sees potential capabilities in these types of systems and has 
provided some funding for research and development.92  These platforms show 
tremendous potential for support, specifically to the tactical warfighter. 
The Marine Corps is not currently evaluating any specific HAPs for future 
communication support.  Some experimental systems have been evaluated for capabilities 
to support the Marine Corps, but none were found sufficient to support the C4ISR 
capabilities required in the short-term.  The Marine Corps further relies on other services 
for portions of its support, making it redundant and wasteful to spend many resources for 
parallel program development.  
The Navy and the Air Force both have interest and programs concerning 
the HAAI.  The Navy has been the executive agent for lighter than air vehicles since their 
inception but does not operate at the higher altitudes.  The Air Force systems currently 
involve systems out of its TENCAP program, specifically Talon Topper and Combat 
SkySat.  These systems both consist of variations on high-altitude free-floating balloons 
to extend hand-held LOS communications systems over hundreds of miles.   
There are currently no fully funded DoD high altitude programs that are 
expected to provide communications to the tactical warfighter other than the free-floating 
systems.  Several commercial entities see value in the region for communications and 
have developed prototype HAPs with tactical support in mind.  One such system is the 
Zephyr HALE UAS under a three-year demonstration to provide communications relay.93 
 
                                                 
92 “High Altitude Airship,” GlobalSecurity.org, Available at 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/intell/systems/haa.htm; Internet; accessed on 12 September 2007. 
93 Graham Warwick, “U.S. Military Plans for New UAV to Stay Airborne for Five Years,” Available 
at http://www.flightglobal.com/articles/2007/05/23/214154/us-military-plans-for-new-uav-to-stay-airborne-
for-five-years.html; Internet; accessed on 12 September 2007. 
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A Zephyr HALE UAS with a communications relay payload, orbiting for 
weeks at a time at 60,000ft+ provides a comms link at typical hand held 
frequencies in real time for ground communications over an area of 
thousands of square miles.  Communication links are permanent due to the 
persistent nature of Zephyr allowing the mission to progress.  94 
c. Emerging Terrestrial / Aerial Communications 
For purposes of this thesis, the terrestrial layer is restricted to and defined 
as land-based communications existing on land with transmitter, receiver, and any 
intermediate relay stations being at the ground or at low altitudes.  Essentially, these 
cover traditional LOS communications and low altitude (below HAAI) airborne relay 
systems. 
Current terrestrial communications systems have provided greater security 
and power, in better and more capable radios, with smaller batteries and more bandwidth.  
Due to their LOS nature, however, they have done little to extend the range of the tactical 
warfighters communications without creating physical lines of communication that 
require persistent security.  UASs may provide some increases in the ranges of LOS 
communications, but still suffer from persistency issues as well as frequent mismatches 
in the size of the unit’s AO and the footprint of the UAS system.   
The short-term view of the use of the aerial layer for communication 
improvements describes the use of UASs for communication support of the tactical 
warfighter.  This study addresses the value of HAPs in support of tactical commanders, 
but cautions on the requirement to ensure that these assets are available to that level of 
command. 
The airborne communications layer contains manned and unmanned aerial 
vehicles carrying communications payloads.  Aerial communications 
relays will be present at relatively low altitudes on vehicles controlled by 
the tactical commander, such as Hunter and Shadow and future UAVs.  At 
higher altitudes, Army forces will rely on larger joint, national and 
commercial aerial platforms such as mid-altitude airships, aerostats, or 
Global Hawk to provide coverage to a wider area.  High-altitude aerial 
vehicles also route traffic to the space layer.  Since these platforms are not 
                                                 
94 QinetiQ Corporation, “Zephyr HALE UAS.” 
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under direct control of the tactical commander, policies must be 
established to ensure these assets can be readily used as needed.95 
The use of an aerial network layer of some kind greatly improves 
conventional terrestrial network capabilities, reducing latency and improving bandwidth.  
“The WIN-T AOA found that most key performance parameters could be met when an 
aerial layer was employed, but could not without the aerial layer.”96  This statement 
sends a strong message in support of an integrated architecture for current and future 
terrestrial systems.  The use of low altitude platforms, either free flying or tethered, 
would be an easy step in the evolution of extended LOS communications for the tactical 
warfighter. 
2. Communications Recommendations 
There are many ways to provide greater communications capabilities to the 
tactical warfighter.  Not all of these options are effective due to the tactical warfighter’s 
unique properties and limitations.  The tactical warfighter often conducts operations in an 
austere environment, with little or no infrastructure, with limited ability to transport 
systems, limited personnel to operate systems, and most often in harm’s way.  Systems 
that provide him capabilities must be simple, durable, compact, lightweight, and easily 
transportable.  The tactical warfighter, at the most basic level, is a man walking, with 
everything he needs carried on his person.  He must be able to walk where he needs to go 
and talk to others, beyond his line of sight, when he needs to. 
a. Space Communications Recommendations 
Currently, space provides our most effective BLOS communication asset 
for the tactical warfighter.  At the same time, this is the most expensive method of 
communication that the tactical warfighter has access to, especially as a disadvantaged 
user.  Developing systems for and operating systems in space is inherently expensive.   
                                                 
95 U.S. Department of Defense, Department of the Army, Training and Doctrine Command Pamphlet 
525-1-0.1: The United States Army Objective Force Battle Command (C4ISR) Concept,(Washington: 
Government Printing Office) 95-96. 
96 Department of the Army, Technical Report 06-014: Volume II, C-18. 
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While space can answer the communications needs of the tactical warfighter, the limited 
number of very expensive systems makes those assets more likely assigned to elements 
above the tactical level.   
More overhead communications systems are needed, but satellites are 
costly and require either expensive geosynchronous satellites or many 
low- or mid-earth-orbit satellites.  Potential alternative platforms are solar-
powered high-altitude airships and airplanes flying at or above 65,000 
feet.97 
The quote above brings out the point of cost being prohibitive to the lower 
levels of warfighters.  The tactical warfighter does enjoy some of the benefits of space 
but space is not sufficiently accessible by the tactical warfighter to meet his requirements. 
 
 
Table 7.   Comparison of Terrestrial, High Altitude, LEO, and GEO Communication Systems.98 
 
Table 7 shows the benefits space platforms provide are specific to their 
region.  The ability to provide near global coverage supports our ability to fight and 
operate anywhere in the world.  The footprint of these systems helps to ensure the 
commander on the ground has access to networks needed to execute his mission.  These 
high-cost satellite systems were developed for strategic level forces, due to their near 
global coverage.  It follows that those space systems best support those strategic assets 
for which they were designed. 
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Also visible are the drawbacks to space systems.  The cost of space 
systems is high and for the essential capabilities they bring to the warfighter, especially at 
the higher levels of command, they are cost-effective.  The benefit to the tactical 
warfighter is limited tremendously by this cost and the limited availability of space-based 
assets.  You cannot easily create additional capability or bandwidth on orbit.  To provide 
support to the tactical warfighter requires that some capability be transferred from 
another element or level of organization.  Further, spacecraft are rather inflexible, 
requiring a trade of lifespan if a decision to move an asset to support an uncovered region 
is made.  The true cost of moving a satellite to support an unforeseen operation in a 
remote area of the world could cost millions or billions of dollars in future capabilities 
lost.  The availability, cost and complexity of operations for space-based assets do not 
support the tactical warfighter well, and in most cases, are better tailored to strategic and 
operational support. 
For the tactical warfighter, space does not appear to be the best solution to 
support his communication requirements.  While more orbital assets, directly suited and 
developed to support the tactical warfighter would be welcome, it is doubtful that any 
future budget will support the needed number and types of systems to fulfill the needs of 
the tactical warfighter for communications alone.  The support from space to the tactical 
warfighter is incredible, when available.  The tactical warfighter needs a capability 
developed and fielded to meet his requirements and tailored to his mission.  The tactical 
warfighter uses space, currently, rarely to communicate around the globe, but more often, 
within the same geographical region.   
b. HAAI Communications Recommendations 
The HAAI region may prove to be an area that is specifically suited to the 
budget, requirements and needed capabilities of the tactical warfighter.  With properly 
developed and fielded systems, the tactical warfighter could likely remove the label of 
“disadvantaged user” from his vocabulary.  Additionally, the regional BLOS capabilities 
provided by HAPs would reduce the tactical warfighter’s need for space assets, freeing 
them for use by higher-level organizations and elements, operating in even larger 
geographical areas.   
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Table 8 shows a quick comparison between a GEO communication 
satellite and a similar functioned HAP.  Specifically for the tactical warfighter, who 
rarely needs to communicate regularly beyond a 200km coverage radius, the additional 
coverage area of GEO satellites is unneeded.  The reduction in free space path loss helps 
to lighten and shrink required communication receivers and antennas.  Reduced 
propagation delay is also much better suited for voice communications, which are 
essential in tactical communications.    
 
Table 8.   Comparison of High Altitude Platform with GEO Satellite Communications.99 
 
The following list details the “Advantages and Features of HAP 
Communications” as determined by the article “Broadband Service Delivery from High 
Altitude Platforms.”   
Rapid deployment, Relatively low cost upgrading of the platform, 
Broadband capability, Large area coverage and fewer problems with 
obstructions (compared with terrestrial), Very large system capacity, 
Flexibility to respond to traffic demands, Ideally suited to multimedia 
services, broadcast, and multicast, Low propagation delay, Less ground-
based infrastructure, Low cost and, Incremental deployment.100   
This list is a very broad look at HAPs for commercial employment, but it 
takes little imagination to see clear military utility based on the study.   
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The use of secure cellular-like networks is another possible employment 
of communication systems from HAPs.  Another study proposes that HAPs and satellite 
systems are not competitive with each other, but rather that each has tremendous 
advantages if employed in a consolidated architecture that takes advantage of each 
system’s capabilities at the proper location within the architecture.   
Due to lower latency and the more favorable link budget of ground–HAP 
links, HAPs are a more cost-effective solution than satellites for the 
provision of services to mobile users.  A cellular like pattern with 
frequency reuse can be achieved by spot beam antennas on the HAP, thus 
achieving high spectral efficiency.  As a base transceiver station (BTS) of 
a 2G or 3G cellular system, HAP can fill in the gaps in network coverage 
and cover areas prior to the establishment of full terrestrial coverage.101 
No commander would likely refuse the ability to increase the range of his 
existing communications systems to 50 times greater than he can currently talk.  This 
would allow the tactical commander the ability to deploy his forces throughout his 
increased AO, without the need for complicated and resource intensive communication 
relay sites.  The increased range could ensure the ability to coordinate with supporting 
arms and support units. 
An in-theater example cited by combatant commanders is that blue forces 
on the ground using line-of-sight radio communications are limited to a 
footprint of approximately five to seven nautical miles.  One of the near 
space projects currently in the demonstration phase uses communication 
relay to extend the range of those radios out to nearly 300 nautical 
miles.102 
The citation above provides an example of what a system could provide.  
Army and Marine Corps are the prime users of such systems and systems of that type 
should be developed and deployed to meet those specific needs.  To fight ashore and 
establish a self-sustaining command in areas of the world without a communications 
infrastructure or to operate in sparse environments without having to use scattered 
communication nodes would greatly increase the operational capabilities of tactical 
warfighters.     
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Army FCS, Marine Corps DO, and the increasing trend for tactical units to 
operate in increasing sizes of AOs, require more information access and communication 
networks capabilities at these lower levels.   
The Army has a critical need for an airborne layer for future force 
networks.  The successful production of airships could satisfy this 
requirement: their communications and surveillance capabilities should 
considerably improve force performance in the theater battlespace.  
Airships can function as surrogate satellites.  In comparison to space-
based assets, they offer the advantages of shorter transmission distances 
for relaying ground-based communications and shorter ranges for sensor 
surveillance of the battlefield and acquisition of ground targets.  In fact, a 
host of innovative uses for such a platform have been proposed, including 
but not limited to (a) the use of HAAs as optical relay platforms from a 
ground station, (b) the use of HAAs as hub nodes that relay 
communications to and from satellites, or (c) perhaps the use of HAAs as 
mobile computing platforms.103 
The Army’s need for more capability starts from the future organizational 
structure.  The Army’s current operations and Marine Corps’ doctrinal operations have 
placed an immediate need for greater communication capability that will only increase 
with time and operational tempo. 
HALE systems enable the links to the GIG and logistics C2 structure 
enabling the exchange of critical maneuver support and logistical 
information for units operating BLOS and platforms operating over the 
horizon.104  
This quote from the Army’s Space Operations document provides an 
insight as to some of the benefits HALE systems can potentially provide.  The ability for 
a commander to know the progress of his subordinate units could provide for faster 
logistical support and information sharing with adjacent units. 
The benefits of HAAI available are not only in what capabilities that they 
could support for the tactical warfighter but also the benefits of taking advantage of better 
physics.  Greater BLOS capability is useless to the tactical warfighter if he cannot carry 
it.  Reduced power requirements mean fewer and lighter batteries.  Further, HAPs can 
potentially extend existing radio systems to formerly BLOS ranges using software and or 
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operational concept changes.  These changes are transparent to the user, who will gain the 
additional benefits without having to change existing equipment, training, or CONOPS.   
A passive antenna on a satellite that received 1 watt of power from a 
transmitter in its footprint would receive between 100 and 400 watts on a 
near-space platform, implying that it could detect much weaker signals (10 
to 13 dB weaker).105 
Similarly for communications, the power received by a passive antenna 
drops off roughly as the square of the distance to the transmitter.  A 
passive antenna on a satellite that received one watt of power from a 
transmitter would receive several hundred watts on a near-space platform, 
implying that it could detect much weaker signals.  The signal strength 
improvement for active systems such as radar would be about a factor of 
100,000.106 
Some of the examples of potential gains from HAPs are evident, just from 
the aspect of communications capability enhancements.  Currently, communication is the 
commander’s most valuable asset.  Other information that can be passed over these nets 
would provide and invaluable picture of the battlefield in real time. 
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Figure 12.   Use of HAA systems for In-Theater Communication.107 
 
The above figure demonstrates the possibilities of a future HAA operating 
within a theater of operations.  The capabilities proposed, in support of the tactical 
warfighter, would provide tremendous increase in operational effectiveness. 
Recommendations for further research into communication capabilities in 
HAAI should be consistent with the needs of the tactical warfighter.  These systems 
promise to provide a capability that is, at present, either inadequate or non-existent.  The 
use of the HAAI is essential to the tactical warfighter in his current and future missions of 
supporting the joint commanders in their operational and strategic goals.  Many private 
and commercial corporations, ready to close the gap in communications at the tactical 
level, have already begun developing the trade space for HAPs.  We must ensure that the 
requirements of the tactical warfighter are met by realistically developing and procuring 
appropriate systems. 
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c. Terrestrial / Aerial Communications Recommendations 
While terrestrial communications technology is well developed and 
proven, such systems are rather ineffective when pushed BLOS.  Future terrestrial 
communication systems and architectures focus on JTRS and SATCOM OTM.  These 
areas are important and deserve due process.  The push toward net-centric and flexible 
communications requires even more flexible communication platforms. 
The Marine Corps future communication systems include the Command 
and Control On-the-move Network Digital Over-the-horizon Relay (CONDOR).  
CONDOR will use EPLRS and tactical data networks to link smaller units to higher 
either by extending traditional LOS communications via a mesh architecture or 
SATCOM. 
Very Small Aperture Terminal (VSAT)/Support Wide Area Network 
(SWAN) is proposed to provide SATCOM capability further down the tactical chain to 
lower levels of the MAGTF.  Although this system will increase the connectivity of 
commanders to higher via satellite is still does not give the tactical warfighter any better 
way to talk to his battalion or company commanders.  It may provide better capabilities to 
lower levels than normal but they are still running over the same over-tasked space-based 
networks.   
These systems should be net-centric and operate over any available 
network.  These systems will provide a seamless architecture that would allow disparate 
units operating on different systems to establish communication and provide a degree of 
support to the tactical warfighter. 
A promising addition to the terrestrial region for communication support is 
the use of tethered aerostats by the Army and Marine Corps.  These systems provide 
many of the same capabilities expected from HAPs, with more developed and fielded 
technologies, albeit on a smaller scale and footprint.  These platforms provide some 
tremendous capabilities for the lower levels of tactical command.  The Rapid Aerostat 
Initial Deployment (RAID) from TCOM is such a platform that can be fitted with any 
number of payloads.  Usually it is a down looking radar or sensor package for monitoring 
activities within a moderately sized footprint. 
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B. INTELLIGENCE, SURVEILLANCE AND RECONNAISSANCE (ISR) 
The ability to visually observe and identify certain information about enemy or 
friendly forces, and terrain provides a tremendous tool that allows the commander to 
shorten his decision cycle and thereby act faster than his enemy.108  This gives the 
tactical warfighter greater abilities to act first and bring combat power to bear upon his 
objectives more effectively and efficiently.  This capability is more essential at the 
tactical level than ever before due to the more dispersed and independent operations 
conducted by tactical units.   
1. Emerging ISR Solutions 
a. Emerging Space ISR 
Space has long been the region of choice for ISR capabilities.  Nations 
first developed space based ISR systems during the cold war, in the form of national 
technical means, in order to verify treaty limitations concerning strategic and nuclear 
forces of their adversaries.  These capabilities remain essential, perhaps more so today, to 
allow a nation to remain vigilant for strategic threats from deep within foreign locations.  
In the last couple of decades, the availability of space-based ISR has proven extremely 
useful in the prosecution of warfare at the tactical level.  This support has not been 
specifically dedicated to the execution of conventional warfare, but rather provided when 
convenient and the priority of such support was allowable by the intelligence community 
for which the ISR systems were designed.  
ORS and the TacSat program are currently experimenting with greater use 
of commercial off the shelf (COTS), and responsive space systems, advertised as support 
for the warfighter.  These capabilities, while perhaps tailored to tactical level needs, are 
not able to fulfill those needs in any significant way.  TacSat program satellites operate in 
low orbits, due to cost of production and launch.  These low orbits translate to short 
availability periods over an area of interest, even shorter and more infrequent if not the  
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specific region that the system was launched to cover.  Further, to provide any useable 
level of persistence the number of satellites required in a LEO orbit would make the cost 
unfeasible in support of tactical operations. 
 
Figure 13.   Notional Operational Timeline from 300km Circular Orbit.109 
 
Figure 13 shows a notional EO/IR TACSAT platform utilizing a modified 
version of the proven DB-110 sensor camera, currently used in aerial applications.  Of 
note is the timeline included that shows the breakdown of system use during a typical 90-
minute orbit.  If the target and ground site are in favorable locations, this satellite can 
provide NIIRS 4.5 quality EO imagery from nadir to 30 degrees off-nadir and transmit 
that data to the ground station.110   
Though the above chart gives very general timeline measurements, it 
clearly shows the limited communication access time of 8 minutes.  A requirement for 
command uplink to be pre-determined and designated, and a very small window for 
pointing, imaging, and then down-linking the imagery to the ground station, that will 
likely give no more than 3 to 5 images over the target area, provided no drastic slewing is 
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required and the target is close to nadir.  This data then requires additional time, on the 
ground, for processing before it ever becomes available to imagery analysts to interpret 
what the image means and thus provide good intelligence value.  Further, due to the 
orbits they operate in, these small satellites will only likely provide a handful of useful 
images over any geographical area in a day, and often not pass over that region for 
several days at a time.  Such images, while obviously of some use, do not provide a 
reliable level of support for the tactical warfighter, who may conduct entire operations 
within the non-available time of the satellite system.   
Emerging solutions to support the tactical warfighter directly from space 
with ISR capabilities seem to be beyond the cost benefits and current technology 
available.  The utility of space-based systems are great but their specific ability to support 
tactical operations, whether due to priority, availability, or capability, is not yet 
convincing.   
b. Emerging HAAI ISR  
Emerging HAAI platforms, capable of filling the needs of the tactical 
warfighter, require the implementation of existing system capabilities, adapted to the 
HAAI and modified to meet the longer activity periods and expected reduced power 
capacity of HAPs.   
The need for assets to fill gaps in tactical ISR, specifically using HAPs has 
already been explored for operations such as those ongoing in Afghanistan and Iraq.  
Developing systems, such as the High Altitude Reconnaissance Vehicle (HARVe), a 
product of John Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory, could provide a 
responsive ISR capability to a theatre commander or initial joint commander in theatre, in 
the distant future.  This prototype could be rocket launched to its predetermined location 
and then deployed.  After deployment, it would self-inflate and move to its assigned 




The previously mentioned Zephyr HALE UAS also intends to provide ISR 
assets to the tactical warfighter.  While developed to support Special Operations Forces in 
austere communication and ISR environments, the Zephyr could provide excellent 
capabilities to a tactical commander. 
Another Zephyr orbiting at similar altitude provides persistent surveillance 
imagery down linked to local commanders thus improving the battlespace 
awareness of the team on the ground.  Zephyr is stealthy and goes 
unnoticed.  Zephyr’s low cost means many platforms may be deployed in 
support of multiple missions.111 
Many of the currently developing and experimental systems are at the very 
beginning of the spiral technological development process.  The technology needed to 
field a fully capable HAP for ISR does not exist yet.  Commercial satellite ISR systems 
and existing UAS systems have set the groundwork for the optical sensor systems of 
these future HAPs.  Actual fielded solutions may not see a single HAP performing all 
aspects of ISR for the tactical warfighter, but rather a HAP platform, outfitted modularly 
with different ISR payloads, will be the preferred system, based on changing 
requirements for information.  It is understandable that the high altitude problem is a 
difficult one, but it shows the greatest promise in support of persistent ISR at the tactical 
level and as such, failure to pursue it with vigor is unacceptable. 
c. Emerging Terrestrial / Aerial ISR 
Terrestrial ISR capabilities, specifically those of low to mid altitude UASs 
and tethered aerostats have increased tremendously in recent history.  Lower unit 
procurement and development cost, as well as immediate operational test fielding, has 
provided benefits that the tactical warfighter can see immediately.  Operations in both 
Afghanistan and Iraq have provided not only the motivating need but also extremely 
challenging environments to test these systems in, under actual combat operations.   
In Afghanistan, the US Army has employed radars mounted on high 
towers and in aerostats, with Raytheon acting as prime contractor for this 
Rapid Aerostat Initial Deployment (Raid) program.  The Tcom-produced 
aerostat, which is far less expensive to operate than a fixed-wing drone, is 
flown for five days at heights of 350 to 900 ft, compared to the 110 ft of 
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the tower.  It carries a 90 kg payload, normally consisting of a FLIR 
Systems Safire III EO/IR sensor.  Three systems have been delivered and 
three more are planned.  In Iraq, the US Army also employs the much 
smaller Lockheed Martin Rapidly Elevated Aerostat Platform (Reap), 
which is deployed from the back of a Hummer.  It carries a 16-kg payload 
with Raytheon day/night cameras and operates at 300 ft, giving a horizon 
at 33 km.  Two have been deployed to Iraq and two more are planned.112  
The above example brings useful and developing technologies to the 
warfighter with a capability that will help him execute his mission while a system is in 
development.  Using a developing system in operational use is beneficial to both 
developer and user, as it allows for actual use testing in authentic environments.  It also 
provides the end user more input into the development of specific systems, better 
ensuring that the tactical warfighter needs are met in final production and fielding.  These 
terrestrial based systems provide the tactical warfighter with five-day persistent 
capabilities formerly only available from national systems and aircraft, both of which are 
more expensive and are not under direct tactical control.   
Other emerging terrestrial platforms are the UASs.  Although already 
fielded in many areas and at many levels, the ability to provide more systems, at lower 
unit levels, provides capabilities where they are often needed most.  With “Marine-proof” 
platforms that are simple to operate and rugged enough to withstand operation in rough 
conditions, these small, tactical UASs place few burdens on the tactical commander, 
while providing tremendous capabilities.  Systems such as the SpyHawk UAS provide a 
technology test-bed in which to allow the Marine Corps Warfighting Lab (MCWL) to test 
emerging capabilities and subsystems for ISR possibilities.  Systems such as this also 
provide a valuable service in developing concept of operations (CONOPS) and tactics, 
techniques and procedures (TTPs).  
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2. ISR Recommendations 
a. Space ISR Recommendations 
The recommendation for space systems supporting the ISR mission at the 
tactical warfighter level does not involve the development and launch of more space-
based ISR systems, particularly those of electro-optical and infrared systems.  Space 
based radar promises to provide a useful capability to the tactical warfighter, from space, 
specifically if fielded with aspects of coherent change detection (CCD) and moving target 
identification (MTI).   
Likely, the greatest impact to the tactical warfighter from space will 
continue to manifest itself in the various services’ TENCAP operations.  These 
operations should be expanded, as they are well known for leveraging existing national 
and strategic systems with innovative methods of providing support to the tactical and 
operational warfighter.  These capabilities from existing space systems do not require 
extensive development, manufacturing, launch or operations, making them much more 
cost-effective than the space systems they exploit.   
The ORS TacSat program should continue development of lower-cost 
space systems and its exploration of support for the tactical warfighter.  As the program 
develops and expands, in the future, the tactical warfighter may see real capabilities 
fielded that support tactical operations.  The true tactical utility of these initial systems 
will likely be limited, but the research into solving the deficits of the tactical warfighter 
are important and the developments of this program may well enhance more conventional 
satellite development and fielding.  Currently, persistent capabilities to the warfighter 
will only be possible with large constellations of satellites from this program, however.   
While not the optimal solution for ISR capability in support of the tactical 
warfighter, the importance of space-based ISR assets should not be underemphasized.   
The importance of freedom of overflight cannot be overemphasized as a 
positive aspect of orbital operations.  Satellites are the only legal means by 
which overhead ISR can be performed deep inside the territory of 
sovereign nations during peacetime.113 
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If space continues to provide the capabilities that it is best suited for and 
not attempt to execute missions that are more effectively and efficiently executed by 
other systems, warfighters at all levels will find themselves with greater capabilities, 
better suited for their unique needs.  
b. HAAI ISR Recommendations 
The persistent surveillance from a fixed position by airships, in contrast to 
periodic snapshots from the moving platforms that satellites provide, 
furnishes two long-needed changes to military surveillance.  These 
changes will allow continuous collection and comparison analysis over 
time of terrain covered by different sensors, such as infrared (IR), electro-
optical (EO), and hyper-spectral imagery (HSI).  Comparisons can 
highlight changes like freshly turned dirt along a roadway where bombs 
have been emplaced.114 
This quote captures the essence of HAPs potential value to ISR at the 
tactical level.  When air superiority has been achieved and ground forces are operating in 
close contact with enemy forces, the benefits of space-based systems, to support troops in 
close combat, become less important.  Space based systems have proven their value 
consistently since their first uses, even with their many shortcomings.  With the United 
State’s ability to gain and maintain air superiority in many of our expected conflicts, it is 
confusing why these systems have not been in development for many years.  From the 
days of the American Civil War and World War I, balloons and dirigibles have been able 
to monitor the lines and make detailed observations of the battlefield.  It seems 
unthinkable that we have not continued to take advantage of similar “high-ground” 
technologies especially when advanced power sources and miniaturized electronics are 
making them so much more capable.  With the value of airships to ISR established, we 
should now look to exploit this region for the true benefits that it holds. 
Potential Missions for High Altitude Systems include Tactical Operations: 
Battle Damage Assessment, Targeting, Reconnaissance, Surveillance, 
Blue Force Tracking, Missile Warning, Strike Support, Strike Delivery.  
Tactical Support: Mapping, Tactical Communications, Theater 
Communications, PNT Augmentation, Meteorological Augmentation.115 
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The above list of tactical capabilities provided by HAPs is not all-
inclusive.  Such a platform, when mature and fielded, could support other collection 
capabilities such as MTI, CCD, and SIGINT collection.  These possibilities need further 
research and evaluation to determine their validity for the HAAI and support of the 
tactical warfighter.   
Only stationary or slow-moving platforms can provide the fine-grained 
temporal resolution demanded by new intelligence concepts, and such 
platforms provide the greatest cost/benefit ratio when operated from near 
space.  From there they have extensive fields of view, are defendable, and 
do not conflict with conventional air operations.116 
Link budgets and spacecraft sizing requirements are rather complex issues 
when designing satellites.  Similar effects in HAPs, while tailored to the smaller tactical 
operations level, make it clear that HAPs are likely a better fit for the tactical warfighter 
than a satellite.   
Considering a point at nadir, near-space platforms are 10-20 times closer 
to their targets than a typical 400-km LEO satellite.  This distance 
differential implies that optics on near-space platforms can be 10-20 times 
smaller for similar performance, or the same size optics can get 10-20 
times better resolution.117 
The signal strength improvement for active systems such as radar or ladar 
would be factors of 10,000 to 160,000 (40 to 52 dB) for near-space 
platforms.  These examples at nadir are best cases for the satellites, too.118 
These are two examples of physical advantages of HAPs compared to 
similar orbital systems.  Not only would the HAP perform better due to reduced distances 
between sensor and target (from a resolution standpoint), it is likely that these sensors 
would be less expensive, certainly for matters of persistence, due to the prohibitive cost 
required to conduct ISR from GEO or persistently from LEO orbits.  The long-standing 
staple of the Air Force’s UAS capability has limitations that HAPs can reduce or 
eliminate.   
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Even when compared with air-breathing assets, near-space platforms are a 
bargain.  A low-cost UAV that provides reasonably long persistence, the 
Predator, can carry 450 pounds to 15,000-25,000 ft, can travel 400 
nautical miles and then loiter for 14 hours before returning to base—all for 
a price of about $4.5 million each, not including infrastructure costs and 
the training costs required for the highly skilled rated officers the Air 
Force assigns to fly them.
  
More expensive but more capable, the Global 
Hawk can take a 900 pound sensor package
 
to over 65,000 ft, flying for 
more than 35 hours at up to 350 knots.  The cost for this capability is 
projected to be about $48 million each for the production versions of the 
aircraft.119 
With the amazing capability that Global Hawk offers, a persistent HAP 
could deploy from within theater and operate for 7 to 30 times longer, providing support 
to the tactical warfighter within a coverage region of significance to his operational area. 
The greatest persistence that a commander can currently expect from an 
air-breathing asset is about a day or so for a Global Hawk.
55, 56 
Air-breathing 
assets provide responsive, close-up, staring persistence for the duration of 
their limited loiter times.  In contrast, one near-space platform currently 
receiving technology demonstration funding will be able to stay on station 
for six months, and planned follow-ons are projected to stay aloft for 
years.120 
With all evaluations and comparisons complete, we see that HAPs require 
some technological maturity.  The spiral development and technological advances will 
quickly develop the HAAI systems as a mainstay of tactical and operational commanders.  
This allows better focus and utilization of our limited and very capable national assets in 
space.  No one system can operate across the full spectrum of warfare, and should 
provide enough overlap with the next level to ensure a seamless transition.  HAPs will 
not replace space-based assets, especially at the higher levels of war, but they can provide 
a tremendous increase in focused capabilities at the tactical level. 
A combination of space and high altitude long-loiter radars provide an 
integrated air picture to the ABCS and emerging sustainment and BCS 
enhancing maneuver support and sustainment operations airspace 
management.121 
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c. Terrestrial / Aerial ISR Recommendations 
The future of terrestrial ISR specifically that of UAS systems, is a very 
mature field both conceptually and technologically.  The ability of the warfighter at 
various levels to operate his own ISR systems when and where he needs them is a 
tremendous added capability.  The Army’s FCS UAS platforms should prove to be an 
ideal link in the overall architecture, by providing short-term persistence over small, 
tactically relevant areas.   
Tethered sensors, already in limited use, will provide limited local area, 
persistent ISR.  Future systems will fly higher, with longer endurance and greater 
capabilities.  The payloads would be small and interchangeable with available power 
supply options.  Mobile systems will allow this tethered capability, at limited speeds, or 
upon short halts. 
The ability to have indigenous ISR assets without a reduction of combat 
power projection makes him more flexible and uncertain to the enemy.  The ability to 
network the sensors into a complete picture on the battlefield or AO can increase 
situational awareness both up and down the chain of command. 
C. BLUE FORCE TRACKING AND SITUATIONAL AWARENESS (BFT/SA) 
BFT/SA provides the commander with improved visualization to understand force 
dispositions within his operational area.  When properly working, he can see the 
distribution of his forces across the terrain as well as know where known or suspected 
enemy elements are in relationship to them.  The systems are still new, compared to the 
other BLOS capabilities discussed, but few dispute their utility.  In the best case, the 
commander knows the disposition of his forces, where his enemy is situated, and can see 
both of those bits of information with graphical overlays of his plan on digital terrain.  
This enhanced awareness allows him to make better and faster tactical decisions.  In the 
current operational environment, knowing the location of widely dispersed and 
individually operating elements across a huge AO can prove extremely challenging.  The 
commander needs to be able to trust his COP and the information provided to it by 
BFT/SA. 
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1. Emerging BFT/SA Solutions 
a. Emerging Space BFT/SA 
Space-based BFT/SA is still a developing concept, with the current use of 
FBCB2-BFT systems actually tested in combat and developed with feedback from 
operational testing.  As lower-level units enter the system, the increase in subscribers 
often increases considerably.  Without increases in bandwidth and available space 
systems to support BFT, the addition of subscribers results in increased latency and 
longer refresh rates.  As FBCB2-BFT expands further, beyond users limited to those of 
the Army and Marine Corps, current systems will experience more latency.  The 
increased time between updates of the local and regional COP offsets the advantage of 
adding more subscribers to the system.  Future FBCB2-BFT systems will require 
additional satellite systems or more efficient bandwidth management techniques to have 
them remain useful with higher loads and subscriber numbers. 
b. Emerging HAAI BFT/SA  
There are currently no emerging interests or technologies for BFT/SA in 
the HAAI.  The lack of this is by the design of the system to be space based for both 
security and utility around the globe.   
The HAAI has a huge capability to fill in temporarily or permanently the 
needs of future BFT/SA systems.  The ability to maintain position and be closer to the 
user will better support more tactical systems.  While no proposed military uses of the 
system are known at this time, some investigation of similar civilian systems has been 
conducted.   
On the other hand, HAPs can play an important role in enhancing 
communication capabilities in some GNSS services such as fleet 
management, traffic control, and infomobility.  However, thus far, this 
aspect has not received much attention.  In the case of fleet management 
and traffic control, mobile users (i.e.. trucks or private cars) could transmit 
their position (computed by GPS), speed, and identification code to the 
HAP by using a low-cost only-transmit terminal; data are then forwarded 
by the HAP to the control center for traffic control or fleet management.  
The advantages of such a system with respect to the use of a satellite 
constellation (e.g., ORBCOMM) are threefold: The cost of the service (for 
each HAP) could be shared with other communication services.  A single 
106 
HAP could be a complete and functional system locally, for instance, by 
exploiting fleet management in a metropolis.  The improved link budget 
could reduce the transmit power as well as the cost and size of user 
terminals.122 
A system that provides better tracking for commercial vehicles, in a 
smaller package with less power requirements can surely have tremendous impact on 
tactical systems that conduct the same basic mission.  HAPs can be tremendously useful 
in the tracking of friendly forces in an AO. 
The absence of current military research into this area may be due to the 
disparity in evolving terrestrial systems currently used.  As existing systems make more 
efficient use of both radio and satellite-based BFT/SA systems, the utility of the HAAI 
platforms as enablers of these capabilities will likely increase.   
c. Emerging Terrestrial / Aerial BFT/SA 
BFT/SA is one area of tactical capability where the move towards jointly 
developed systems can produce extremely positive effects.  Joint FBCB2 is a great 
example of this capability, with a future integrated and truly joint COP a real possibility.  
Consequently, these systems should allow supporting arms branches within and external 
to the Army and Marine Corps to better support the tactical warfighter.  The ability for air 
and indirect fires to know the disposition of troops should greatly reduce the possibility 
of fratricide incidents. 
2. BFT/SA Recommendations 
a. Space BFT/SA Recommendations 
The space segment of BFT/SA is currently the only way to execute the 
mission BLOS without extensive radio retransmission systems.  Because the space-based 
and terrestrial radio-based systems cannot interact at the user level, it is sometimes 
necessary for elements within a unit to have both systems in order to understand their 
own unit and those around them.  Expanding L-Band access on future space architectures 
will ensure that as the BFT systems mature and grow that we will not face the access 
problem we currently have in communications.  
                                                 
122 Cianca, “Integrated Satellite – HAP Systems,” S37. 
107 
Whenever units are operating in widely dispersed terrain, out of easy LOS 
with each other, BFT becomes the tracking system of choice.  In the close fight, units of 
the same organization enjoy much more functionality and decreased latency by use of 
LOS systems of a similar nature that operate over EPLARS radios.  The shortcoming 
between the two is that FBCB2 and FBCB2-BFT do not share information between 
themselves.  Efforts to fix this shortcoming and conduct information sharing require COP 
information from both versions of the system be sent by satellite to a processing system 
where they are then converted and transmitted back to both systems as a COP update.  
This adds even greater latency than already experienced by the heavily subscribed L-band 
FBCB2-BFT systems.   
Efforts must be made to both increase bandwidth for the L-band BFT 
systems while simultaneously increasing the efficiency of the user hardware and software 
that uses the system.  Satellite-based BFT systems are useful and likely essential to our 
future combat operations at the tactical level and should be greatly expanded to provide 
BFT/SA to those forces operating beyond LOS, especially in immature theaters of 
operation. 
b. HAAI BFT/SA Recommendations 
 “Potential Missions for High Altitude Systems include Tactical 
Operations: Battle Damage Assessment, Targeting, Reconnaissance, Surveillance, Blue 
Force Tracking, Missile Warning, Strike Support, Strike Delivery.”123  The above quote 
included BFT as a potential mission two years ago.  The subsequent progression of 
technology and capability should enable attainment of developmental capabilities today. 
The expansion of FBCB2 and EPLRS LOS systems to make use of the 
HAAI would immediately benefit the tactical warfighter.  Giving traditional LOS systems 
the BLOS/OTH advantage will greatly increase battlefield SA for those users while 
reducing required retransmission stations.  Additionally, L-band BFT systems could 
perhaps benefit from a local transponded signal from a HAP that replicates the L-band 
system from satellites using the system.   
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The space segment of BFT/SA cannot be discarded, but it can be relieved 
of the burdens of most tactical users, allowing it to track and service other users more 
efficiently.  Existing FBCB2-BFT systems could be software converted to utilize 
antennae placed in the HAAI to process and propagate BFT information within the 
footprint of the system.  The HAP could then use L-band to transmit the consolidated 
footprint COP for L-band BFT to the central processing centers for update of the global 
COP.  Further, the use of L-band to satellite would provide an excellent redundant 
capability should the HAP system malfunction or be destroyed.   
A HAP designed to support BFT/SA could provide increased capabilities 
in four major areas:  retransmission of EPLARS FBCB2, retransmission of FBCB2-BFT 
in local region, integration and transmission of disparate FBCB2 systems to one another, 
and integration of both FBCB2 and FBCB2-BFT COPs into the global COP.   
A HAP BFT/SA system could act as a single-point retransmission system 
for all EPLARS FBCB2 information within the footprint of the HAP.  On-board 
computers, controlled from the ground, could consolidate this COP and propagate it, 
using existing EPLARS radio nets, to all units within the AO, subject to filters and other 
access rights.  This would allow for a much shorter latency between distant units at all 
levels of command.  It would also reduce loss of units from the COP if the vehicle or 
system that relays information to the next higher level of command malfunctions or is 
destroyed. 
The same HAP could receive L-band BFT signals in the HAAI and 
perform local area consolidation, processing, and retransmission of BFT signals within its 
own coverage area.  Reducing the requirement for the information to travel to CONUS 
and back over the L-band link would reduce latency for all users within the footprint of 
the HAP.  The HAP could then consolidate the regional BFT COP and forward that over 
satellite link to the global operation center for update of the global COP. 
Finally, on-board processing would allow the HAP to consolidate the 
COPs from FBCB2 and FBCB2-BFT systems into a single consolidated COP and 
transmit over both EPLARS and L-band to both user groups within the footprint.  Using 
automation aboard the HAP, the requirement for higher headquarters elements to 
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consolidate and then push the other COP information down into their own system would 
cease to exist.  A HAP system operating in support of BFT/SA could drastically improve 
all aspects of the capability, mitigating many of the current and future limitations of the 
system.     
c. Terrestrial / Aerial BFT/SA Recommendations  
The most important improvement to BFT/SA systems within the terrestrial 
region is that the system is fielded to lower-echelon units using hardware and software 
that is feasible for those units.  In the future, all soldiers operating in an AO should 
populate, when desired, the COP at various levels.  Each soldier does not necessarily 
need access to the COP or SA personally, but he should propagate his position into the 
system so his leaders know his location.  The employment of the FBCB2-CDA looks to 
fill that niche.  The Commanders Data Assistant (CDA) would provide the unit 
commander with a COP on a hand portable unit smaller than a clipboard. 
D. POSITION, NAVIGATION AND TIMING (PNT) 
Position, Navigation and Timing (PNT) refer to the key capabilities provided by 
the Global Positioning System (GPS) and associated receivers.  Over the past twenty 
years, these capabilities transformed from nice to have to critical assets at all levels of 
operations.  It is rare to see any fielded system fail to integrate some capability provided 
by PNT. 
1. Emerging PNT Solutions 
a. Emerging Space PNT 
There are no emerging U.S. solutions to any of the foreseeable deficits in 
PNT from the space segment.  Other nations are developing their own versions PNT 
constellations, which might augment our own system capabilities.  GPS Block III is 
scheduled for fielding and is anticipated to address many of the deficiencies in current 
and future PNT, while remaining compatible with legacy constellation parts.  Other 
countries have seen the incredible value and edge that the GPS system has given the 
United States and are currently fielding their own navigation systems. 
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b. Emerging HAAI PNT 
To assist the user, both ground and airborne, HAAI platforms have the 
potential to increase availability and security from jamming or spoofing to the tactical 
warfighter.  Differential GPS (DGPS) is not a new concept and the Coast Guard has 
employed it successfully for years to provide additional signals for maritime shipping 
lanes.  Both commercial and military organizations realize the added benefit that HAPs 
can provide.  
The Air Force Space Battlelab is currently working a preliminary 
investigation of GPS accuracy augmentation and GPS reconstitution using 
near-space platforms, and the Air Force Unmanned Aerial Vehicle 
Battlelab recently conducted a similar investigation that successfully 
demonstrated the usefulness of a UAV as an aid to GPS navigation in a 
jamming environment.  There appear to be no technical hurdles to either 
augmentation or reconstitution via near-space platforms, although the 
number of required platforms would be significantly higher than the 
existing constellation to provide global coverage.  It would appear to be 
more realistic to envision near-space reconstituting theater-sized 
regions.124 
The military utility of HAAI platforms provides an area to exploit the 
known advantages of PNT.  The argument that we need global coverage would seem 
poorly formed since it is seemingly very unlikely that someone or thing could jam our 
entire constellation simultaneously.  The current satellites can operate autonomously for 
some time without ground updates. 
HAPs can provide support services to Global Navigation Satellite Systems 
(GNSSs) such as the Global Positioning System (GPS) and Galileo.  It is 
recognized that as a local component of a GNSS, the HAP can enhance the 
required navigation performance (RNP), that is, accuracy, availability, 
integrity, and continuity, with respect to terrestrial components.  A system 
that enhances the RNP for a local area (ranging from hundreds of meters 
to hundreds of kilometers) is often referred as a local-area augmentation 
system (LAAS).  An augmentation system that operates on continental 
areas is referred as a wide-area augmentation system (WAAS).  Due to its 
visibility, a single HAP can be a LAAS while a constellation of HAPs can 
provide a WAAS.125 
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The military could deploy such systems when needed.  For long conflicts, 
addition of DGPS to HAPs could provide more accuracy, especially within urban or 
mountainous areas, as well as easier detection of jamming and spoofing due to the higher 
strength signal available on the HAP.  
Further studies support the feasibility of HAAI platforms to support the 
PNT structure, thus providing greater support to the tactical warfighter and those directly 
supporting him and his mission.126  This would be a valuable tool in the fight against 
adversary jamming and spoofing attempts. 
c. Emerging Terrestrial / Aerial PNT 
Terrestrial PNT systems are currently the only way to cope with the deficit 
that is both existing and expected in the future.  Emerging technologies in the system 
hardware and software show promise in supporting the tactical warfighter.  
Improved military receivers, compatible with both Block II and III GPS 
satellites, provide the user with information about his PNT environment.  The ability to 
lock and maintain signal reception in the face of jamming lets him continue the fight and 
know that someone is attempting to disrupt this capability. 
Selective Availability / Anti-Spoofing Module (SAASM) provides the 
user with greater assurance of good authenticated signal.  It has a further benefit of 
reducing the workload on users and support with new keying techniques to ensure secure 
codes. 
These emerging capabilities will provide the user greater support into the 
near future.  Continued development must follow to ensure the tactical warfighter stays 
ahead of the adversary, especially as other nations field alternatives to GPS and the 
proliferation of spoofing and jamming systems increases. 
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2. PNT Recommendations 
a. Space PNT Recommendations  
Space has long been the domain of PNT systems and is ideally suited for 
that purpose.  The continued fielding of the Block III GPS constellation will provide 
greater support to everyone.  Adversary countermeasures to our Block III systems are 
expected and future systems will need to overcome these countermeasures with enhanced 
technology or operational employment.  This would be an evolving utility for the follow 
on to GPS Block III. 
b. HAAI PNT Recommendations  
In the area of HAAI, there are great possibilities and recommendations 
ideally suited for direct support to the tactical warfighter.  Together these will assure 
continued success in his missions.  As mentioned before, DGPS could be easily adapted 
to HAP.  With the much closer position relative to the user, signal strength would be 
significantly stronger and therefore more resistant to jamming or spoofing.  This would 
provide additional, stronger signals to augment the future constellation.  The ability to 
attach a DGPS payload and deploy it into HAAI would give the theatre commander and 
his troops a more reliable PNT architecture. 
With this added signal and additional safeguards, this platform would have 
the capability to broadcast any detected jamming or spoofing attempts within its 
capabilities.  This would allow for precise positioning and targeting for any device and or 
its user.  It may even be possible for the higher-strength HAP mounted DGPS system to 
broadcast an unhealthy status message that would take the jamming or spoofing system 
out of use until it could be terminated. 
Further, a constellation of multiple HAPs could augment or even replace 
the GPS constellation, if required, by providing a dispersed aerial constellation of 
transmitters.  This would provide regional GPS-like capabilities with potentially greater 
signal strength to combat widespread jamming or other disruption of GPS signals to the 
tactical warfighter.  
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c. Terrestrial / Aerial PNT Recommendations 
The greatest limitation of terrestrial PNT capabilities is the fielding level 
of PNT receivers.  Fielding of military issued units to all elements of tactical units that 
can make good use of them has not yet occurred.  The current fielding of PNT receivers 
does not extend far enough down the tactical chain.  Other smaller units and individuals 
do not have access to a military receiver, causing many individuals and units to procure 
COTS systems to fill this gap.  Reliance on civilian systems, without the increased 
security and accuracy of military signals and capabilities, can increase risks to the tactical 
warfighter.   
The development and fielding of smaller and more capable receivers, 
further down the tactical warfighter organizations, will provide the smallest unit or 
individual to be an integral part of the mission and allow him to maintain his own PNT 
knowledge.   
When conflicts lead to a prolonged engagement, the military could deploy 
a ground based DGPS position.  This would provide the commander and his troops with a 
very strong, ground powered, GPS signal to ensure authentication and security. 
These recommendations for support to the tactical warfighter would assist 
in reducing the deficit in PNT for the tactical warfighter at the terrestrial level.  
Incorporating major portions or significant pieces in all layers would ensure PNT to that 
































 VI. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The tactical warfighter needs expanded BLOS capabilities to support his current 
and emerging operations in a more autonomous manner over larger distances.  This thesis 
has identified the tactical warfighter, what his BLOS requirements are, where these 
requirements are in deficit, and recommends architectural improvements to meet these 
deficiencies.   
The ground tactical warfighter, the focus of this thesis, fights in an operational 
environment that is most often sparse in terms of infrastructure.  The terrain is 
complicated, in the worst cases, consisting of urban and mountainous terrain, both of 
which increase the difficulties of operating in distributed formations.  As LOS decreases, 
due to terrain, operational complexity increases, often due to the need to augment LOS 
capabilities with BLOS alternatives.  Currently, the only fielded options for this 
augmentation requires the use of satellite systems hundreds of miles from the earth’s 
surface and utilizing specific equipment to interact with them.   
This thesis identified the four most important BLOS requirements of the tactical 
warfighter as communications, ISR, BFT/SA, and PNT.  Each of these requirements 
provides the tactical commander and his subordinates increased ability to conduct 
operations across greater distances than ever, in complicated and difficult terrain, that 
does not favor reliance on LOS systems.  Currently the tactical warfighter faces some 
deficits or limitations in each requirement, most of which will likely increase in the 
future.  While improved systems are in development for future fielding, these systems 
will not likely overcome future deficits; at best, they will meet currently noted 
deficiencies in most of these requirements.   
Chapter IV investigated current and future system capabilities and deficits within 
each requirement area, discussing the clear and current deficits that limit the tactical 
warfighter in today’s operations.  Identification of future deficits demonstrated a 
widening gap between the capabilities of systems in development and the expected 
requirements in each area needed by the tactical warfighter as operational areas expand 
and autonomous operations increase.   
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Chapter V identified emerging solutions, those systems or capabilities that show 
some promise but are not funded or in current development.  An evaluation of these 
emerging systems or technologies led to recommendations in each requirement area, in 
the regions of space, the HAAI, and the terrestrial and aerial layers.  Recommendations 
covered all three regions, including support of continuing or enhancing future planned 
systems as well as development and research into new areas, most specifically the greater 
exploitation of the HAAI.  The largest portion of the discussion surrounded the HAAI 
due to that region’s status as a new frontier for deployment of tactically supportive 
systems.  Decades of experience in space and the air, along with centuries of experience 
on the ground, make technologies in those areas extremely mature.  The HAAI, only 
recently seriously considered as an operational region, shows the greatest area for 
revolutionary alternatives to existing deficits.   
A. REGIME RECOMMENDATIONS 
Ultimately, no single platform or architecture will meet the BLOS requirements of 
the tactical warfighter.  Often the solution to the tactical warfighter’s requirements 
changes with his operational environment.  In some cases, LOS communications are not a 
limiting factor, while other times, he must rely solely on satellite systems for his various 
needs.  Within this tactical spectrum, lie the range of operational challenges requiring 
communications, ISR, PNT and BFT support.  In these situations, only a consolidated 
and integrated architecture, made up of systems in multiple regions can meet the tactical 
warfighter’s needs.  The tactical warfighter must be equipped to conduct his mission 
successfully and he must be able to shed the limitations of his “disadvantaged user” status 
concerning BLOS systems.   
The tactical space that supports the tactical warfighter composes the areas around 
and above him that provides him these LOS and BLOS capabilities discussed in this 
thesis.  The following recommendations show a path, one that is more likely to meet 
future needs in the four areas identified, and more able to reduce future deficits in these 
critical requirements.  A single region cannot meet all the tactical warfighter’s needs.   
117 
The challenge is to identify and develop the proper systems within the appropriate 
regions to support the tactical warfighter with robust capabilities that enable him to 
accomplish present and future missions. 
1. Space Regime Recommendations  
We do not launch satellites just to launch them—space launch is a very 
expensive proposition.  We launch satellites only when we determine them 
to be the best way to get the desired effects related to their missions in 
spite of their costs.127   
This statement is essential to the operation of an efficient and capable military 
space program.  Space systems are extremely expensive and while often capable of 
supporting a wide range of requirements, they are very often not the most efficient or 
effective system for a task.  Space systems are only the right choice if they are the best 
way or the only way to accomplish a mission.  In most situations, using space to solve a 
terrestrial-based mission is likely to be many times more expensive than other 
alternatives.  
Space provides our nation with many advantages, which are historical, political 
and technological in nature.  The status of the United States, known as a space-faring 
nation brings tremendous international prestige and technological advantages.  Space 
systems are less limited by matters of politics than non-orbital systems, and provide true 
global reach and coverage to our military forces.  Space provides us many capabilities 
within the four critical requirement areas discussed in this thesis that would not be 
possible without orbital assets.  The tactical warfighter uses many space assets to support 
his tactical operations.  In some cases, space is the tactical commander’s only link to 
outside forces and higher headquarters, and therefore critically necessary for his mission 
success.   
Future land force operations will be regional in nature, possibly in strange 
areas, on short notice, with joint, combined or coalition forces, and in 
concert with other agencies of government…  At the strategic level of war 
(global projection), space capabilities are used primarily to reduce the 
National Command Authorities' (NCA) uncertainties and support the 
combatant commander's requirements to execute our national security 
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policy…  At the tactical level (ground projection), space systems provide 
real-time and near-realtime support to the combat, combat support, and 
combat service support forces that execute battles and engagements on a 
non-linear battlefield (i.e., close, deep, and rear operations).  During 
combat, space systems provide: realtime position and navigation 
(POS/NAV) data (with accuracy unavailable from terrestrial sources); 
near-realtime surveillance and warning of enemy locations, activities and 
strength; current and projected weather information; terrain and 
hydrographic information, as well as other conditions of the battle space; 
and both internal and external communications to enhance the 
synchronization of close, deep, and rear operations.  Seeing deep is crucial 
to our ability to disrupt the enemy's tempo and effectiveness of his follow-
on operations.  Space systems provide targeting information needed to 
support deep operations.  Space systems can provide a more robust battle 
management command, control, communication, computers, and 
intelligence (BMC4I) architecture in conduct of theater/tactical missile 
defense (TMD) at the tactical level, as well as at the operational and 
strategic levels.  Additionally, they provide an opportunity to reduce the 
need for man-in-the loop by streamlining the sensor-to-shooter linkage 
process.128 
The extract above highlights the Army’s view on space and its benefits to the 
warfighter at all levels.  Space is capable of providing the tactical warfighter with all four 
BLOS requirements discussed in this thesis; the issue becomes the availability and 
capacity of those space systems to meet all of these requirements sufficiently.  Future 
systems seek to increase the number and capabilities of space systems, in some cases 
with support specifically designed for the tactical warfighter.  Unfortunately, these 
systems cannot meet the tactical warfighter’s current needs nor will they meet his future 
ones.   
Space can provide for the communication needs of the tactical warfighter, if those 
limited systems prioritized tactical support.  Existing space systems do not consider the 
tactical warfighter as their primary customer, nor are they designed for supporting him.  
Space provides nearly global communication support to those warfighters given access 
and priority.     
At the strategic level of warfare, space-based ISR is the standard of choice and for 
good reason.  ISR from space allows for legal over flight of foreign territory, providing                                                  
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for greater national security, and allowing for accurate intelligence development, given 
sufficient time and priority.  The tactical warfighter rarely has the availability of time or 
the allocated priority that makes space systems his best choice for ISR.  These systems, 
while quite capable and useful, are generally not responsive enough to meet his needs 
effectively and in a timely manner.  Further, the use of space-based ISR systems for 
tactical operations requires that some higher-level requirement for information is not met 
at the same time.   
The use of space systems in support of BFT/SA provided the premier opportunity 
for some level of global situational awareness in military operations.  Due to limitations 
in LOS systems and interoperability between different units using those LOS systems, 
space became a clearly suitable option for global SA.  Space will continue to provide this 
essential capability to know the disposition of friendly forces, which aids greatly in the 
reduction of fratricide incidents.  At the tactical level, the latency of a space architecture 
is unfortunately a tremendous limitation in the systems usefulness at the tactical level.  
The metrics of measurement in the close fight, the realm of the tactical warfighter, are 
measured in seconds, not minutes. 
Global PNT is impossible without the use of satellites.  The GPS constellation 
provides a tremendous capability, not only to warfighters at all levels, but also to the 
entire world.  Limitations of these systems, specifically concerning the distance they 
operate from earth, make them vulnerable to enemy interference, as well as terrain 
effects.   
Generally, space is not well suited for supporting the tactical warfighter due to 
physical and operational reasons as outlined in this quote.   
Developing tactically useful payloads that can take advantage of 
responsive launch, however, is a different matter.  A combination of 
physical constraints placed on satellites by orbital mechanics and 
operational requirements placed on their payloads by the missions that 
can be performed from space prevent all but the most rudimentary tactical 
missions from being attainable for the foreseeable future.  Foreseeable 
tactical satellite capabilities mean that tactical requirements of persistence 
and coverage can only be filled by constellations of relatively large 
numbers of satellites.  If these missions are carried out, they will cost  
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hundreds of thousands to millions of dollars per hour in overhead, costs 
that would seem to be beyond the reach of tactical or even theater 
commanders.129 
Space is an essential region that provides the seamless continuity from strategic to 
operational, and often tactical.  Support to the tactical warfighter from space, when other 
regions are better suited to his needs, reduces those systems’ capabilities to support 
operational and strategic needs.  The tactical warfighter needs responsive systems, 
developed with his requirements in mind, and dedicated to supporting him.  Space is not 
often  the best way to meet the tactical commander’s needs.   
2. High Altitude Area of Interest Regime Recommendations 
 
Figure 14.   High Altitude Contribution to warfighter.130 
 
There are many systems in early development within the HAAI and some 
currently fielded on the lower end of complexity.  This thesis does not intend to 
recommend which of the many types or models of HAP to develop or field, but rather to 
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note that operational platforms within the HAAI will provide tremendous and much-
needed capabilities to the tactical warfighter that cannot be otherwise fulfilled.  Figure 15 
shows a representative sample of HAPs in research or development.  These systems 
generally fall within three broad categories; free floating balloons, steered floater 
platforms, and high altitude maneuvering systems.  Within the latter category, there are 
further divisions into lighter than air, UAS, and hybrid systems.  
 
 
Figure 15.   High Altitude Representative Platforms.131 
 
Army doctrine already acknowledges the utility and necessity for systems 
operating in the HAAI in the four requirement areas of communications, ISR, BFT/SA, 
and PNT.   
Systems operating in the high altitude region have the potential to provide 
rapid, on demand, dedicated capabilities augmenting strategic space assets.  
Further, high altitude long-loiter systems may be developed as part of the 
aerial layer, thus providing persistent, organic capabilities to the operational 
and tactical commander.  These systems may provide effects such as robust 
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communications, theater-centric intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance 
(ISR), operational environment situational awareness, battle damage 
assessment, enhanced positioning, velocity, timing and navigation 
augmentation capabilities, and the capability to cross-cue intelligence and 
non-intelligence platforms leading to more responsive and comprehensive 
targeting information.132 
Further, the same document places these HALE platforms in support of tactical 
commanders, providing them with BLOS communication and ISR capabilities in 
restrictive terrain.  
HALE platforms in the high altitude region are dedicated to tactical 
commanders.  These assets link and provide positive C2 of operations 
such as:  over-the-horizon and BLOS reconnaissance and surveillance, and 
attack operations; long range maneuver in difficult and restricted terrain; 
non-contiguous operations over extended distances.  It is these assets that 
bring the connectivity of the network to the “last tactical mile.”133 
There are many versions of these systems in development and there are several 
significant technological challenges that must be overcome, specifically in regards to 
power and station keeping, especially in the lighter than air systems.  Perhaps more 
detrimental to their development is the lack of sufficient funding devoted to this 
promising regime that is highly conducive to supporting the tactical warfighter.  HAPs 
promise to provide much-needed capabilities in support of the tactical warfighter that 
planned development of the space and terrestrial regions do not meet.  HAPs promise to 
be persistent, multi-functional, networked, expeditionary, flexible, repairable, and 
relatively inexpensive compared to current and proposed space systems.134   
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Figure 16.   Near Space Alternatives and Timelines.135 
 
Unlike space systems and UASs, HAPs have a potential advantage in persistence.  
With systems designed to occupy an extremely low geostationary position, HAPs provide 
the tactical warfighter with BLOS support over extended periods and in direct support of 
his mission.   
Although the near-space advantages in footprint size, resolution, received 
and radiated power, cost, and survivability are significant, perhaps the 
most useful and unique aspect of near-space platforms is their ability to 
provide responsive persistence, the ability to deliver their space effects to 
battlefield-commander-specified locations around the clock with no gaps 
in coverage.136 
HAPs maintain several advantages in both communications and ISR capabilities 
due to their distance from the supported user.  Table 9 shows a brief comparison of 
distances applicable to both communication links and ISR collections for space, near-
space, and UAS systems.  Tactical, man-portable LOS radio systems have secure 
communication ranges that are able to transmit to a receiver in the HAAI.  These radio 
systems can transmit with omni-directional antennas, on the same nets and frequencies 
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that they conduct LOS communications.  This advantage in range, combined with large, 
tactically relevant footprint sizes for HAPs, provides a tremendous potential for the 
tactical warfighter to achieve reliable and continuous BLOS communications with 
existing and future radios designed primarily for LOS, while freeing satellite 
communications for use by those who truly need them and do not have a HAP alternative 
available.    
 
Distance to:  
Asset Type Asset Altitude Horizon 






Predator 15,000 ft. 150 miles 30 miles 15 miles 3 miles 
Near-Space 120,000 ft. 425 miles 200 miles 120 miles 25 miles 
LEO 200 km. 980 miles 700 miles 500 miles 120 miles 
Table 9.   Comparison of Mission-useful Distances for Various Platforms.137 
 
The same distance advantage that gives HAPs an enhanced communication 
capability provides advantages in ISR.  Distance to the target and size of the optic are the 
primary attributes that determine ISR system resolution.  HAPs bring the system much 
closer to the target, enabling either greater resolution with the same size optic, or the 
same resolution in a smaller optical system.  Further, their potential for persistence 
provides further advantage over competing ISR systems where over flight and 
maneuverability are not concerns.   
HAPs can provide enhanced support to both EPLARS and L-band BFT/SA 
systems.  BFT systems emplaced on HAPs could receive, consolidate and retransmit BFT 
signals from both LOS and satellite systems within the same geographical region.  This 
would provide faster refresh rates for both types of systems as well as more seamless 
translation between the different systems.   
While HAPs could theoretically provide global PNT, the size of the constellation 
would be immense and entirely cost ineffective.  What HAPs can provide in the area of 
PNT, specifically in support of the tactical warfighter, is the ability to provide a higher 
strength DGPS signal as well as enhanced capabilities to detect jamming and spoofing, as 
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well as notify units within their footprint that such actions are occurring.  An alternative 
use for HAPs in this requirement could use multiple HAPs to create a regional PNT 
system replacement, where the space-based GPS system was for some reason 
unavailable. 
3. Terrestrial / Aerial Regime Recommendations  
While many ground based terrestrial systems aim to provide enhanced capabilities 
to the tactical warfighter, the systems that provide greatest BLOS usefulness are the UAS 
and the tethered aerostat.  The Army and Marine Corps currently field these systems, in 
limited numbers, to tactical units in wartime operations.  These systems can perform 
missions in support of communications and ISR.   
There is no question about the utility and capability of UASs in support of the 
tactical warfighter.  The fielding of UASs at lower levels of command provides tactical 
commanders excellent capabilities to conduct their own airborne ISR on timelines that 
they choose.  This allows tactical commander the ability to see where they need to, when 
they need to and thereby lets them make better-informed tactical decisions.   
 
 
Figure 17.   Recommended Range Extension Architecture.138                                                  
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In the future, UASs will provide temporary and localized enhancement of 
communications and BFT/SA systems for tactical warfighters, on their chosen timelines.  
Figure 17 shows how UASs can augment both requirements, at the tactical level, without 
the requirement for satellites or multiple ground-based retransmissions.  The unit will 
own and operate these systems, allowing them to use the UAS to extend their LOS 
communications without the requirement for security of multiple land-based 
retransmission sites.  Recent studies found that without some sort of aerial layer, future 
networks are not sustainable due to bandwidth or latency reasons.  The future roadmap 
for UAS considers UASs as a key asset in support of communications at the tactical level. 
 [Aerial Communication Nodes]  (ACNs) can enhance intra-theater and 
tactical communications capacity and connectivity by providing 1) more 
efficient use of bandwidth, 2) extending the range of existing terrestrial 
LOS communications systems, 3) extending communication to areas 
denied or masked to satellite service, and 4) providing significant 
improvement in received power density compared to that of satellites, 
improving reception and decreasing vulnerability to jamming.139 
Currently, UASs provide the tactical warfighter with excellent and responsive ISR 
capabilities within the limit of their range and endurance.  The future sees more 
capability with increases in range and duration, as well as fielding to the lowest level of 
tactical operations.  While not persistent, they allow tactical commanders to maneuver 
them to observe locations within their AO at specific times and from specific points of 
view.   
Figure 17 shows the use of UASs for augmentation of existing LOS EPLARS 
BFT systems, which is essentially the same as employment of UASs for LOS 
communication extension, only with the retransmitted nets being EPLARS based FBCB2 
signals.  This technique increases the range of these FBCB2 coverage areas without the 
requirements for security of ground or unit-based retransmission paths. 
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B. RECOMMENDED SOLUTION 
As stated previously, no single regime or system can meet the many needs of the 
tactical warfighter for BLOS capabilities.  Each regime has advantages and disadvantages 
in each of the four requirements explored.   
 
 Satellites Near-Space Air-Breathing 
Cost  9  
Persistence  9  
Responsiveness  9 9 
Footprint 9 9  
Resolution  9 9 
Overflight 9   
Table 10.   Relative Strengths of Satellites, Near-Space Platforms, and Air-Breathing Assets.140 
 
Table 10 lists the relative strengths of the three regimes in comparison to 
capabilities of the various systems.  Another report discusses the strengths and 
weaknesses of satellites and UASs, showing that they both have advantages when used 
properly and in support of the right user and mission set.   
Tactical communication needs can be met much more responsively and 
effectively with ACNs than with satellites.  ACNs can effectively augment 
theater satellite capabilities by addressing deficiencies in capacity and 
connectivity.  Satellites are better suited than UAS for meeting high 
capacity, worldwide communications needs.  ACNs can enhance intra-
theater and tactical communications capacity and connectivity by 
providing 1)more efficient use of bandwidth, 2) extending the range of 
existing terrestrial LOS communications systems, 3) extending 
communication to areas denied or masked to satellite service, and 4) 
providing significant improvement in received power density compared to 
that of satellites, improving reception and decreasing vulnerability to 
jamming.141 
The most effective method of meeting the tactical warfighter’s requirements is by 
developing systems in all three regimes that can meet his various needs most efficiently.  
The tactical warfighter does not much care if his communications, ISR, BFT/SA, or PNT 
                                                 
140 Tomme, Paradigm Shift,  26. 
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comes from a satellite, a HAP, an UAS, or a large antenna on a mast.  He cares that he 
gets the capabilities he needs, in the quantity he needs them, at the proper time. 
When one understands that it is effects that matter on the battlefield 
instead of the platform or medium from which the effects are delivered, 
near-space makes much more sense for many applications.  There are also 
missions that satellites do extremely well, and for which near-space is not 
competitive.  The point is that a layered approach whose goal is to enable 
space effects in the most economical, effective way will direct the 
acquisition of the appropriate platform using the appropriate medium, 
turning the current acquisitions methodology of medium-then-platform-
then-effect on its head.142 
Army doctrine already seems to see the value of combining systems in multiple 
regimes, in this case, orbital and high altitude systems. 
 The combination of orbital space and high altitude long-loiter capabilities 
is a critical enabler for implementation of the fundamental principles of 
the future Modular Force concepts, particularly with respect to achieving 
information superiority, creating situational understanding, and operating 
within the high tempo, non-contiguous, simultaneous framework of 
distributed operations.143 
Civilian studies concerning HAPs also conclude that HAPs are not a replacement 
for satellite communications and systems, but rather when used in conjunction with 
satellite systems, HAPs can provide increased capability to more users.   
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Figure 18.   User to Satellite Communication Through HAP (USH) Architecture.144  
 
In this scenario, shown in figure 18, the data sending towards satellite by 
means of HAPs could be provided when final users are supplied with 
limited transmitting capability devices or even hand-held terminals.  In 
fact, user terminals with reduced transmitting capability are envisaged to 
allow a direct communications with HAPs.  Therefore, the user data could 
be sent to a HAP, which subsequently will supply the data forwarding to 
the satellite.  In this sense, the HAP could provide the “translation” 
between the user terminal and the satellite (with its own specifications), 
acting as a terrestrial gateway satellite station placed in the stratosphere.145  
A similar study advocates the use of HAPs to augment both of the other regimes, 
providing greater synergy between all the platforms and their capabilities.   
While satellites are more suited for coverage of very large areas and 
broadcast applications, HAPs are able to cover remote or sparsely 
populated areas at reduced cost and offer broadband services to mobile 
users when fixed directive antennas cannot be used, and finally terrestrial 
infrastructures are advantageous for interactive services in densely 
populated areas.  For this reason the final design goal must be a flexible 
and synergic integration between satellite, stratospheric, and terrestrial 
segments, which can lead to a truly evolutionary scenario.146 
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Satellites, HAPs, and UASs should not compete with each other.  Each provides 
specific capabilities with inherent limitations and all are required to meet the tactical 
warfighter’s BLOS needs.  Figure 19 shows the relationship between satellites, HAPs, 
and UASs.  Each system provides similar capabilities at different altitudes and supports 
different levels of command or mission types.  The figure shows both strengths and 
limitations of the systems, further suggesting that integration among the regimes is the 
most efficient method of providing these capabilities at all warfighter levels. 
 
 
Figure 19.   Layered Net-Centric Architecture.147 
 
While both space and aerial systems are in development as extensions and 
improvements of existing capabilities, HAPs are still in the early development stages, 
making them appear less promising due to the challenges involved with new unproven 
systems.  Unless proven unfeasible, due to insurmountable technical issues, the 
development of HAPs should be pursued with increased vigor.   
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131 
We need to push the envelope to determine what effects we can produce 
from near-space.  More importantly, we need to find the right synergistic 
mix of air, space, and near-space capabilities to produce the battlefield 
effects our combatant commanders need.148 
The HAAI is an unexploited regime uniquely suited to support the tactical 
warfighter.  HAPs provide coverage of tactical AOs, persistent support, modularity, 
upgradeability, and can extend LOS systems without drastic changes in ground 
equipment.  Improvements in the other two regimes alone will not remove the tactical 
warfighter’s deficit in BLOS capabilities.  In order to ensure the tactical commander has 
the proper capabilities, new areas, specifically the HAAI, need to be developed. 
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After Action Review (AAR):  Formal military method of capturing lessons learned from 
operations after they are complete.   
 
Area of Interest (AI):  Physical area comprising a unit’s area of operation and that area 
outside of it which can influence the unit’s operations.   
 
Area of Operations (AO):  The physical area that a unit is assigned responsibility for 
during military operations.   
 
Brigade Combat Team (BCT):  Brigade-sized Army unit able to operate autonomously 
for tactical operation time frames.  BCTs support divisions in accomplishing operational 
and strategic objectives.  BCTs are of similar size and make-up to regiments. 
 
Beyond Line of Sight:  Not limited by direct line of sight between system and target.  In 
communications, this means that the transmitter and receiver can form a link without a 
direct, clear path to each other.  
 
Blue Force Tracker (BFT):  Short term used to refer to FBCB2-BFT which is a L-band 
satellite version of the FBCB2 command and control system that reports location of 
friendly forces on a digital map system. 
 
Blue Force Tracking:  Systems designed to automatically track and report the location of 
friendly forces.   
 
BFTSA: Blue Force Tracking and Situational Awareness.  The combination of friendly 
force location information and enemy force location.  BFT/SA systems allow the 
commander to understand himself and his enemy, allowing him to make decisions faster. 
 
Common Operational Picture (COP):  A shared digital view of the battlefield.  A COP 
combines digital maps or imagery of an area with accurate geo-spatial information, 
location of friendly and enemy forces, operational graphics overlays, and other 
information.  The COP is propagated at various levels, allowing for ease of understanding 
of the operational picture among different and separated levels of command. 
 
Commercial off the Shelf (COTS):  A product commercially available that can be 
modified or used by military forces without requiring a lengthy development and 
procurement cycle.   
 
 
DARPA:  The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) is the central 
research and development organization for the Department of Defense (DoD).  It 
manages and directs selected basic and applied research and development projects for 
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DoD, and pursues research and technology where risk and payoff are both very high and 
where success may provide dramatic advances for traditional military roles and missions. 
 
Disadvantaged User:  Communications term referring to users of a system or type of 
systems that are unable to utilize the full capabilities of a system.  For instance, mobile 
users with small aperture antennas are often considered disadvantaged users of satellite 
communication systems. 
 
Distributed Operations (DO):  Marine Corps term for units operating beyond the limits of 
mutual support.  These operations are deliberately executed using deliberate dispersion 
and decentralized decision-making to achieve advantages over an enemy in time and 
space. 
 
Electro-optical/ Infra-red (EO/IR):  Refers to a platform or system that provides digital 
visible spectrum or infrared imagery of a target. 
 
Force XXI Battle Command and Control Brigade and Below (FBCB2):  Digital 
command and control system used the U.S. Army.  The system uses EPLARs based FM 
radios to propagate friendly unit locations to both peer, subordinate, and higher-echelon 
units.  Friendly force location is overlaid with operational graphics on digital maps, 
allowing for greater levels of command and control.  An L-band satellite version, known 
as FBCB2-BFT, provides less capabilities but without requirements for LOS 
connectivity.  The two versions of the system are not compatible without some translation 
and injection of information from one system to the other at a higher echelon. 
 
Future Combat Systems (FCS):  Army family of systems designed to equip the soldier of 
the future.   
 
Global Positioning System (GPS):  Constellation of satellites in medium earth orbit that 
provide global position, navigation and timing through measurement of the time it takes 
signals to travel known distances to a single ground receiver.   
 
Initial Capabilities Document (ICD):  Acquisition document that specifies a non material 
or material approach (or combination of both) to meeting specific military capability 
gaps.   
 
Infantry Brigade Combat Team (IBCT):  As the light force, all IBCTs are uniform in 
design, replacing the specialized brigades of the airborne, air assault, and light infantry 
divisions.  Though their training suits them for particular infantry missions, their standard 
organization facilitates their training, employment, leader development, and logistics. 
 
Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR): The collection of intelligence 
information using surveillance and reconnaissance.  In this paper, it focuses on the 




Heavy Brigade Combat Team (HBCT):  A single type of heavy brigade replaces the 
armored, mechanized, and balanced brigades of the heavy divisions, and the separate tank 
and mechanized brigades and armored cavalry regiments of the corps.  These HBCTs 
field tanks and mechanized infantry within standardized combined arms maneuver 
battalions. 
 
High Altitude:  Airspace above 65,000 feet, up to but not including the orbital regime.  
Loosely, this excludes all but very specialized air breathing manned aircraft as well as 
current and projected orbital systems. 
 
High Altitude Area of Interest (HAAI):  The Area of Interest characterized as High 
Altitude. 
 
High Altitude Platforms (HAPs):  A platform for sensors or other payloads that operates 
in the region known as High Altitude.  Generally, HAPs operate above traditional aircraft 
and below orbital systems.  
 
International Telecommunications Union (ITU): 
 
Line of Sight (LOS):  Requiring a relatively unobstructed path from transmitter to 
receiver or from sensor to target. 
 
Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF):  Marine element organized for combat 
operations.  Can operate in multiple sized configurations based on mission requirements. 
 
Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF):  Marine combat organized element of roughly 
division size. 
 
Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB):  Marine combat organized element of roughly 
brigade size. 
 
Marine Expeditionary Unit, Special Operations Capable (MEU/ SOC):  Marine combat 
organized element of roughly brigade size that is capable of accomplishing specific 
special operations missions.   
 
Modified Table of Organization and Equipment (MTOE):  Department of Defense 
document that prescribes organizational (personnel) and equipment requirements for a 
specific unit.   
 
Near Space:  See High Altitude. 
 
Operationally Responsive Space (ORS): A space program focused on timely satisfaction 
of Joint Force Commander’s needs, while also maintaining the ability to support others.  
The program focuses on rapid development and fielding of lower-cost and more 
specifically focused satellite systems.  
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Position, Navigation, and Timing (PNT):  The product produced by the Global 
Positioning System constellation and associated equipment and receivers.  PNT provides 
accurate geo-location, navigation assistance, and timing synchronization on a global 
scale. 
 
SATCOM:  Satellite communications.   
 
Space:  The altitude of perigee or orbit in which a space craft (designed for operations in 
that environment), can maintain an orbit for an extended duration (months for 
comparative analysis to tactical operations). 
 
Stratospheric Platforms (SPFs): 
 
Tactical Exploitation of National Capabilities (TENCAP):  Programs run by all services 
that attempt to use national level assets to support tactical operations.   
 
Tactical (mission):  Missions executed in a time period such that the unit tasked can 
operate  
autonomously without continuous re-supply or control from higher. 
 
Tactical Space:  “Tactical Space” is the operational environment that the tactical 
warfighter operates within and is from where he gets his support.  “Tactical Space” is 
dedicated specifically to providing capabilities to the tactical warfighter, to facilitate his 
mission(s) and address his status as a disadvantaged user.   
 
Tactical (unit):  Units of the size to operate independently for a short period of time 




Tactical Warfighter:  Those personnel attached to the Brigade or Regiment size units, or 
below, who are operating in a hostile area, possibly under austere conditions. 
 
TRADOC:  US Army Training and Doctrine Command.  Army command responsible for 
recruiting, training and educating the Army’s Soldiers.  Responsible for developing 
doctrine and establishing standards for the Army. 
 
Unmanned Aerial System (USA):  Unmanned systems operated by ground stations that 
operate within airspace.  These systems most often provide ISR capabilities. 
 
Warfighter:  Ambiguous term used to describe a person involved in the prosecution of 
warfare. 
 
Warfare Information Network- Tactical:  Military tactical information network. 
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